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Union Of India And Others v. Shatabadi Trading & Investment Pvt. Ltd. And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 10, 2001
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Factual and Procedural Background

An agreement dated 1-2-1991 contemplated the sale of property situated at 25, Friends Colony (West), New Delhi (“the subject property”) for Rs 1.75 crores. The transferor and transferee jointly filed Form 37-I on 4-2-1991 seeking a “no-objection certificate” under Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”). On 18-4-1991 the Appropriate Authority (“AA”) issued an order under Section 269-UD purchasing the property for the Central Government and directed surrender of possession.

That purchase order was quashed by the Delhi High Court on 1-3-1993 following this Court’s decision in C.B. Gautam v. Union of India. The AA then issued a fresh show-cause notice outlining a detailed comparative-sales valuation that placed the fair market value at approximately Rs 4.564 crores—about 160 % higher than the agreed price. After considering objections, the AA again ordered acquisition. The transferor and transferee challenged this second order by writ petition; the High Court admitted the petition and granted an interim stay. The AA filed a special leave petition (“SLP”) against that interim order.

During pendency of the SLP, this Court directed an auction (25-4-1994) subject to its confirmation. Smt. Anju Jain, Shri Vineet Jain and Shri Manish Jain offered the highest bid of Rs 4.01 crores; the Court confirmed the sale on 19-9-1994. A sale deed was executed in their favour. The original owner, Arjun Anand, accepted Rs 1.75 crores (plus interest) from the Government without protest and did not pursue litigation. The SLP was thereafter disposed of as infructuous.

Subsequently, the High Court allowed the writ petition on merits and set aside the AA’s acquisition order. The present appeals by the AA challenge that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court, in exercise of judicial review under Article 226, exceeded its permissible scope by re-appraising the merits of the AA’s valuation and acquisition decision under Section 269-UD of the Act.
  2. Whether non-supply of the full departmental valuation report, despite disclosure of valuation particulars in the show-cause notice, vitiated the AA’s order.
  3. The legal effect of this Court’s earlier order confirming the auction-sale of the subject property while the writ proceedings were still pending.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners before the High Court (Transferor & Transferee)

  • The difference between the agreed consideration (Rs 1.75 crores) and fair market value was below 15 % once legitimate deductions for tenancy and other circumstances were made; therefore Section 269-UD could not be invoked.
  • The AA relied on an incomparable property (60, Friends Colony (East)) that was vacant, unlike the tenanted subject property; numerous other valuation instances showed different methodologies.
  • The departmental valuation report was alleged to be mala fide and not disclosed in full, rendering the process arbitrary.
  • Offers of higher prices (e.g., by Vinod Jain) were described as “bogus and manipulative,” allegedly used to justify acquisition.

Appropriate Authority / Revenue

  • Adopted a comparative-sales approach adjusted for time-gap, plot size, open sides, potential basement and tenancy, arriving at a market value 160 % above the declared price.
  • Contended that sufficient particulars of the valuation had been furnished in the show-cause notice; full reports need not be supplied.
  • Asserted that the High Court’s role was limited to reviewing the decision-making process, not re-valuing the property.
  • Relied on this Court’s confirmation of auction-sale as final and binding on all parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.B. Gautam v. Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 78 Natural-justice requirement of prior notice and opportunity before an order under Section 269-UD. Explains why the first purchase order (1991) was quashed; not decisive for the present appeal.
Appropriate Authority v. Sudha Patil, (1998) 8 SCC 237 Scope of judicial review—High Court cannot act as appellate body on merits of AA’s valuation; review confined to decision-making process. Central authority for overturning the High Court’s re-appraisal of valuation and reinstating the AA’s order.
K. Basavarajappa v. Tax Recovery Commissioner, (1996) 11 SCC 632 An agreement to sell does not create an interest in immovable property; an agreement-holder lacks locus to challenge auction in absence of a decree for specific performance. Used to underscore that writ petitioners (agreement-holders) had limited standing, and that the confirmed auction could not be ignored.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court emphasised that Article 226 proceedings are confined to supervising the legality of the decision-making process. Relying on Sudha Patil, the Court held that the High Court erred by reassessing valuation data and substituting its conclusion for that of the AA when two views were reasonably possible.

It found the AA’s methodology—comparative-sales approach with explicit adjustments for tenancy—neither “illegal, irrational nor arbitrary.” The show-cause notice disclosed valuation particulars in “sufficient detail”; hence, non-supply of the complete valuation report was not fatal.

A pivotal consideration was the earlier, final order of this Court directing and confirming auction-sale of the property. That confirmation, coupled with the owner’s unqualified acceptance of compensation, created a fait accompli which the High Court could not disregard. Applying the ratio in K. Basavarajappa, the Court held that the agreement-holders lacked a subsisting interest sufficient to undo a Supreme Court-confirmed auction.

Given these factors, interference with the AA’s order was unwarranted, and the High Court’s judgment was set aside.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; High Court judgment set aside; acquisition order of the Appropriate Authority restored.

The decision reinstates the Government’s acquisition and the already-confirmed auction-sale for Rs 4.01 crores. It reaffirms that High Courts, in writ jurisdiction, may review only the procedural legality of an AA’s order under Chapter XX-C, not the substantive valuation, and that Supreme Court-confirmed auctions attain finality. No new substantive precedent on valuation standards was created, but the ruling reinforces existing limits on judicial review.

Show all summary ...

S. Rajendra Babu, J.— In respect of property comprised in 25, Friends Colony (West), New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the subject property”), an agreement was entered into to sell it for a consideration of Rs 1.75 crores on 1-2-1991. On 4-2-1991, the intended seller and the purchaser filed Form 37-I for issuance of “no-objection certificate”. However, on 18-4-1991, a purchase order was passed by the appropriate authority and on the same day, the owner of the land was directed to surrender the possession of the subject property. In that regard, a writ petition was preferred before the High Court and on 1-3-1993, that writ petition was allowed in the light of the decision of this Court in C.B Gautam v. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 78. Subsequent to the decision in the said writ petition decided by the High Court, a show-cause notice had been issued disclosing the following facts:

“In the case of subject property, the apparent consideration is Rs 1,75,00,000. The plot area is 3595.32 sq m including 830.95 sq m declared as excess land under the ULCR Act. The net plot area comes to Rs 3595.32 − 830.95 = 2764.37 sq m. If salvage value of Rs 1,64,445 is considered, the achieved land rate works out to Rs 1,75,00,000 − 1,64,445 = 1,73,35,555 divided by 2764.37 = Rs 6271 per sq m. We may compare the sale instance of property at 60, Friends Colony (East) which was agreed to be sold on 5-12-1990 for apparent consideration of Rs 2.65 crores. If the depreciated value of structure of sale instance is taken at Rs 11,60,000 the land rate per sq m works out to Rs 2,65,00,000 − 11,60,000 = 2,53,40,000 divided by 1173.91 = Rs 21,586. If adjustment on account of time-gap of + 2%, side open + 10%, potential for basement + 10% in the sale instance and nearness to railway track − 5% and size of plot − 5% is taken into account, the rate per sq m works out to Rs 24,180. This gives land value of subject property as Rs 2764.37 × 24,180 = Rs 6.68 crores. In view of the fact that the subject property is tenanted, its value is deferred for 5 years at 8% interest and the present value would work out to Rs 4.55 crores to which Rs 1,64,000 salvage value is to be added. This brings value of the subject property to Rs 4.564 crores which is 160% above the apparent consideration.”

2. The intended transferor and the transferee raised several contentions before the appropriate authority for not proceeding with the said show-cause notice. The principal ground is that the difference between the sale consideration and the fair market value does not exceed 15 per cent if the various circumstances surrounding the sale are taken note of. Even assuming that there is such a difference between the apparent sale consideration and the fair market value beyond 15 per cent, it would not automatically prove that there was an undervaluation so as to attract the provisions of Section 269-UD of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). It was contended that the apparent sale consideration of the property in question is higher than the fair market value if determined by an appropriate norm, method or standard. There were several compelling circumstances set out in the affidavit filed by the transferor which existed under which the property was sold at Rs 1.75 crores considering the best/maximum price he could get for a tenanted property. Even otherwise, the facts would disclose that the transferor sold the property for Rs 1.75 crores particularly when he was getting a rental income of the property to the extent of Rs 4000 per month and he was residing in a tenanted house where he was paying about Rs 8000 per month as rent and he had no other house in Delhi and no business premises wherein he could carry on his business and that he was also paying very heavily, more than Rs 14,000 per month, as rent for the business premises and was in dire need of finances to carry on his business gainfully and successfully. The transferor had no hope of getting the property vacated from the tenant, Shri Vinod Jain who was very affluent, possessed of great political influence and at whose instance the action to acquire the property had been initiated. It was contended that the sale instances cited in the notice are not comparable properties because the property comprised in 60, Friends Colony is a vacant property and the actual physical and vacant possession of the property was handed over and delivered to the purchaser while the subject property is a tenanted property occupied by a person who cannot be easily evicted. There were dissimilarities between the subject property and the property comprised in 60, Friends Colony and, therefore, the Department ought not to have compared the same. Thereafter, they set out a dozen instances where the method of valuation adopted was different. It was also contended that the valuation report prepared by the departmental valuer is not a bona fide one. Thus, it is ultimately submitted that the conclusions of the Department are mala fide, arbitrary and discriminatory resulting in deliberate adoption of a wrong method of determining fair market value of the subject property. It was also contended that in the previous purchase order made on 18-4-1991, it was noticed that one Vinod Jain had offered Rs 4.5 crores and it was made clear that the offer of Bishwanath Traders and Investment Ltd. in the case of the previous purchase order and also now the offer of Vinod Jain are all bogus and manipulative and a pretext for the appropriate authority to acquire the subject property. The appropriate authority rejected the various contentions raised by the parties and proceeded to pass an order for acquisition. Challenging the said order on the averments raised before the appropriate authority, writ petition was filed before the High Court.

3. The High Court admitted the writ petition and granted interim order of stay restraining the Department from proceeding further in the matter. Against the said interim order, a special leave petition was preferred before this Court. During the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, an order was made on 25-4-1994 directing that the property be auctioned subject to bid confirmation by this Court. Auction was held and Smt Anju Jain, Mr Vineet Jain and Mr Manish Jain as the highest bidders of the property offered their bid at Rs 4.01 crores and permission was sought for confirmation of the same. Various pleadings were raised in those proceedings to the effect that the auction itself was a farce and stage-managed by the appropriate authority in collusion with Mr Vinod Jain and the property was purchased by him in the name of his wife and two sons for Rs 4.01 crores and that if the said bid was allowed, it would be a fraud on the Government and public exchequer and the writ petition filed before the High Court challenging the validity of the proceedings initiated under Chapter XX-C was yet to be considered. However, this Court after hearing the matter at length rejected the said objections of the intending purchasers and confirmed the same on 19-9-1994. A sale deed has been executed by the appropriate authority in favour of the highest bidders and it is significant to note that the original owner of the property Arjun Anand, Respondent 9 herein has not challenged the aforesaid impugned order of the Department and in fact without any protest received a sum of Rs 1.75 crores from the Department and a further amount of Rs 14,03,500 by way of interest. He had accepted the amount without any protest and has not contested the matter either in the High Court or in this Court and thereafter the said SLP (C) No. 6040 of 1994 filed by the appropriate authority along with other connected matters was disposed of as having become infructuous in view of the auction-sale held and confirmation thereof by this Court.

4. One of the learned Judges of the High Court (K. Ramamoorthy, J.), apart from referring to the various facts arising in the case, the pleadings, the contentions put forth before the Court, some of the decisions of different High Courts and of this Court on the matter of law, did not specifically deal with the contentions arising in the case on analysis of the facts arising in the matter. As regards the contentions of the impact of the sale that had taken pursuant to the permission granted by this Court, which stood confirmed by an order of this Court, the learned Judge stated that the same could not come in the way of deciding the writ petition as the order of this Court was made only in proceedings arising in an interlocutory matter. In the other judgment rendered by Sabharwal, J., the facts stated earlier have been noticed but it does not deal with the matter in the perspective in which the Department has proceeded and on the other hand sits in judgment over the same to find out whether the method of valuation adopted by the Department one way or the other is correct or not. He does not hold one way or the other as to the impact of the order of sale made by this Court.

5. This Court in Appropriate Authority v. Sudha Patil (1998) 8 SCC 237 held that merely because no appeal is provided for against the order of the appropriate authority directing the compulsory acquisition by the Government, the supervisory power of the High Court would not get enlarged nor can the High Court exercise an appellate power while examining the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by such Tribunal. On the materials, if two views are possible, even then it would not be possible for the High Court to substitute its conclusion for that of the Tribunal. It is trite to say that the proceedings arising under Article 226 of the Constitution are in the nature of judicial review and such review could be only in respect of the process of decision and not the decision itself. In the case on hand, the appropriate authority had adopted the comparison of the market sales approach considering the location of the property. The approach of the High Court that in cases where the property is a tenanted property and is being sold the Department cannot adopt the stand of invoking the provisions of Chapter XX-C may not be correct. Having given due deductions towards tenancy arising in respect of the property and on comparison with similar properties situated elsewhere though not tenanted but after discounting for the tenancy if the mode of valuation is adopted by the Department, the High Court could not have termed the same as illegal, irrational or arbitrary.

6. The basis of the valuation had been disclosed to the party concerned in the show-cause notice in sufficient detail. Even if other records such as the valuation reports were not disclosed or made available that may not affect the decision itself. The non-supply of the valuation report itself may not be vital to the case for in this case the Department has given the details of the report in the show-cause notice itself which was issued and other materials having been made available to the party concerned, we do not think that there is justification for the High Court to interfere with the same on that ground.

7. The grievance of the petitioners before the High Court was that not one of the methods but the combination of different methods of valuation such as comparative sales, cost or income or rent or developer's approach should have been adopted. The High Court, in fact, examined the facts, materials and the valuation report of the appropriate authority to come to the conclusion that the comparisons made were wrong or otherwise but that was not the procedure to be adopted as indicated in Sudha Patil case (1998) 8 SCC 237. Thus, the order made by the High Court needs to be set aside.

8. Though, serious arguments have been advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties in this Court as to the mode of valuation, nature of the power under Chapter XX-C of the Act, scope of judicial review, the requirements to be taken note of in the valuation and a large number of decisions are referred to, we do not think there is any need for us to advert to the same for the principles stated therein are identical to what we have stated in the course of this order.

9. There is one other factor which is very significant, namely, that this Court having allowed the auction of the property in question ending confirmation of the same and that order having become final, now to allow the order made by the appropriate authority to be set aside and to permit the parties to work out in appropriate proceedings for restitution of the property would lead to a serious anomalous position. When the transferor without demur allowed the property to be sold pursuant to the orders of this Court and that sale having taken place and this Court having affirmed the same and the proceedings by way of SLP filed under Article 136 of the Constitution coming to an end as having become infructuous, the High Court could not have brushed aside that sale in the manner it has been done. The impact of such decision ought to have been taken note of by the High Court. Indeed in K. Basavarajappa v. Tax Recovery Commr. (1996) 11 SCC 632 this Court has held that an agreement to sell creates no interest in the property and in the absence of a decree of specific performance of an agreement even though authorized by the general power-of-attorney holder of the original owner of the property (sic the purchaser, the appellant therein) had no locus standi to move an application for setting aside the auction-sale on offer to deposit full tax dues. If we extend the said principle to the present facts, we find it hardly possible to come to the conclusion the High Court has arrived at. It is possible that the writ proceedings were still pending before the High Court but those writ proceedings were not at the instance of the owner of the subject property and the agreement-holder did not have any interest other than what was indicated in K. Basavarajappa case (1996) 11 SCC 632. In that view of the matter, we do not think the High Court should have ignored the effect of the same.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow these appeals, set aside the order made by the High Court and restore that of the appropriate authority in the proceedings arising under Chapter XX-C of the Act. No costs.