Puran v. Rambilas And Another

S.N Variava, J.— Leave granted.

2. Heard parties.

3. These two appeals are against an order dated 24-1-2001, by which the High Court has cancelled bail, which had been granted to the petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, by his order dated 13-11-2000.

4. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

The petitioner got married to one Puja Agrawal on 24-11-1999. On 2-9-2000 i.e within a year of the marriage the said Puja Agrawal met with her death. The petitioner has been charged with offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. Along with the petitioner three other ladies had also been charged. Those ladies were granted bail by an order dated 11-9-2000. A petition challenging that order has been rejected on 20-10-2000.

5. The evidence prima facie suggests the following:

At the time of the marriage there was a demand of dowry for Rs 5 lakhs including Rs 2 lakhs in cash; that the father of the deceased had spent Rs 7 lakhs on marriage; that about a month prior to the death of the said Puja a demand of Rs 1 lakh was made; that the father of the said Puja had offered Kisan Vikas Patra worth Rs 30,000 to the petitioner, which had been refused; that whenever the deceased came to her parents' home she was not wearing any ornaments; that even at the time of her death she was not wearing any ornaments, not even her “mangalsutra”. The deceased was eight months' pregnant at the time of her death. From the scene of offence, two handkerchiefs, two small cotton balls and one bigger cotton ball were found. Pieces of broken bangles were found. The wire of the telephone was found broken. The telephone was found on the bed. There were electric-burn injuries over the left index finger, middle finger, thumb, palms and back of palms up to the base. Bone of the left index finger was exposed and charred. Base of the left index finger was swollen, distal part of the left index finger was bluish in colour, surrounded by reddish area. There were electric-burn injuries over right supramammary region, oval-shaped, 7 cm × 4½ cm. Centre of the burnt area was blackened and hard measuring 5 cm × 3½ cm. Blisters were found present over lateral aspect of left thigh, upper 1/3rd, 5 cm × 1½ cm and 2 cm. Anterior to this injury, as also over lateral aspect of right thigh, upper 1/3rd. Besides this, abrasions were found on the right side of back, over infrascapular region.

6. We have heard the parties. Mr Lalit has argued this appeal at great length. We have given anxious consideration to his submissions, but for reasons set out hereafter are unable to accept them.

7. Mr Lalit submitted that one of the reasons why the High Court set aside bail was that the Additional Sessions Judge had not referred to any material circumstance on record and had not given any reasons. He submitted that the High Court was wrong in so observing. He submitted that the same Additional Sessions Judge had earlier granted bail to the ladies by his order dated 11-9-2000. He pointed out that whilst so granting bail, the Additional Sessions Judge had given very cogent reasons. He submitted that against that order a petition had been filed in the High Court. He submitted that even though the High Court rejected the petition, the High Court observed as follows:

“I agree with the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant that while granting bail the learned Judge ought not to have ventured to discuss the merits or demerits of the evidence collected against the accused persons. Probably he was not aware or he was not reminded of the advice given by the Apex Court in the case of Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote (1980) 2 SCC 559, AIR 1980 SC 785 wherein detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case while passing orders on bail application was deprecated.”

8. He submitted that in view of these observations the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not give reasons whilst granting bail. He submitted that in these circumstances the Additional Sessions Judge cannot be faulted. He submitted that the High Court could not cancel bail on this ground. We see no substance in this contention. Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or demerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case has not to be undertaken. What the Additional Sessions Judge had done in the order dated 11-9-2000 was to discuss the merits and demerits of the evidence. That was what was deprecated. That did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated.

9. Mr Lalit next submitted that the High Court has itself not given reasons but has mechanically set aside the order of the bail. We see no substance in this submission. The High Court has correctly not gone into merits or demerits of the matter. The High Court has noted that the evidence prima facie indicated demand of dowry. The High Court has briefly indicated the evidence on record and what was found at the scene of the offence. The High Court has indicated that the evidence prima facie indicated that a demand for Rs 1 lakh was made just a month prior to the incident in question. The High Court has stated that the material on record suggested that the offences under Sections 498-A and 304-A (sic 304-B) were prima facie disclosed. The High Court has concluded that the material on record, the nature of injuries, demand for Rs 1 lakh and the other circumstances were such that this was not a fit case for granting bail. Thus the High Court has given very cogent reasons why bail should not have been granted and why this unjustified erroneous order granting bail should be cancelled.

10. Mr Lalit next submitted that once bail has been granted it should not be cancelled unless there is evidence that the conditions of bail are being infringed. In support of this submission he relies upon the authority in the case of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349. In this case it has been held that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. It has been held that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail already granted. It has been held that generally speaking the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. It is, however, to be noted that this Court has clarified that these instances are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. One such ground for cancellation of bail would be where ignoring material and evidence on record a perverse order granting bail is passed in a heinous crime of this nature and that too without giving any reasons. Such an order would be against principles of law. Interest of justice would also require that such a perverse order be set aside and bail be cancelled. It must be remembered that such offences are on the rise and have a very serious impact on the society. Therefore, an arbitrary and wrong exercise of discretion by the trial court has to be corrected.

11. Further, it is to be kept in mind that the concept of setting aside the unjustified illegal or perverse order is totally different from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts requiring such cancellation. This position is made clear by this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 1 SCC 118, AIR 1978 SC 179. In that case the Court observed as under:

“If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arisen which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior court under Section 439(2) to commit the accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existing, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Session vis-à-vis the High Court.”

12. It must be mentioned that in support of the above submission Mr Lalit had also relied upon the authorities in the cases of Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra 2000 SCC (Cri) 1508, 1999 Cri LJ 4063, State (Delhi Admn.) v. Sanjay Gandhi (1978) 2 SCC 411 and Bhagirathsinh v. State of Gujarat (1984) 1 SCC 284. These need not be dealt with separately as they are of no assistance in a case of this nature where bail has been cancelled for very cogent and correct reasons.

13. Our view is supported by the principles laid down in the case of Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 1 SCC 118, AIR 1978 SC 179. In this case it has been held by this Court that under Section 439(2), the approach should be whether the order granting bail was vitiated by any serious infirmity for which it was right and proper for the High Court, in the interest of justice, to interfere.

14. Mr Lalit next submitted that a third party cannot move a petition for cancellation of the bail. He submitted that in this case the prosecution has not moved for cancellation of the bail. He pointed out that the father of the deceased had moved for cancellation of the bail. He relied upon the cases of Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 653, AIR 1993 SC 280 and Janata Dal v. H.S Chowdhary (1991) 3 SCC 756. Both these cases dealt with petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India whereunder a total stranger challenged the conviction and sentence of the accused. This Court held that neither under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code nor under any other statute is a third-party stranger permitted to question the correctness of the conviction and sentence imposed by the court after a regular trial. It was held that the petitioner, who was a total stranger, had no locus standi to challenge the conviction and the sentence awarded to the convicts in a petition under Article 32. The principle laid down in these cases has no application to the facts of the present case. In this case the application for cancellation of bail is not by a total stranger but it is by the father of the deceased. In this behalf the ratio laid down in the case of R. Rathinam v. State by DSP (2000) 2 SCC 391 needs to be seen. In this case bail had been granted to certain persons. A group of practising advocates presented petitions before the Chief Justice of the High Court seeking initiation of suo motu proceedings for cancellation of bail. The Chief Justice placed the petitions before a Division Bench. The Division Bench refused to exercise the suo motu powers on the ground that the petition submitted by the advocates was not maintainable. This Court held that the frame of sub-section (2) of Section 439 indicates that it is a power conferred on the courts mentioned therein. It was held that there was nothing to indicate that the said power can be exercised only if the State or investigating agency or a Public Prosecutor moves a petition. It was held that the power so vested in the High Court can be invoked either by the State or by any aggrieved party. It was held that the said power could also be exercised suo motu by the High Court. It was held that, therefore, any member of the public, whether he belongs to any particular profession or otherwise could move the High Court to remind it of the need to exercise its power suo motu. It was held that there was no barrier either in Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code or in any other law which inhibits a person from moving the High Court to have such powers exercised suo motu. It was held that if the High Court considered that there was no need to cancel the bail then it could dismiss the petition. It was held that it was always open to the High Court to cancel the bail if it felt that there were sufficient reasons for doing so.

15. Mr Lalit next relied upon the authorities in the cases of Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat (1988) 2 SCC 271, Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 137, AIR 1977 SC 2185 and India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A Baker (1977) 4 SCC 587, AIR 1978 SC 45. Relying on these he submitted that an order granting bail was an interlocutory order and the High Court could not exercise powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and thus could not cancel the bail. Mr Lalit submitted that Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the power of cancellation of bail both to the Sessions Court and the High Court. He submitted that thus the High Court and the Sessions Court were coordinate courts under this section. He submitted that the High Court could not thus sit in appeal or revision over an order of the Court of Session. He submitted that under Section 439(2), it is only the orders of the Magistrate, which could be set aside by the High Court or the Court of Session.

16. We see no substance in this submission. In the hierarchy of courts, the High Court is the superior court. A restrictive interpretation which would have the effect of nullifying Section 439(2) cannot be given. When Section 439(2) grants to the High Court the power to cancel bail, it necessarily follows that such powers can be exercised also in respect of orders passed by the Court of Session. Of course cancellation of bail has to be on principles set out hereinabove and only in appropriate cases.

17. Further, even if it is an interlocutory order, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is not affected by the provisions of Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 on the basis of self-imposed restriction is a different aspect. It cannot be denied that for securing the ends of justice, the High Court can interfere with the order which causes miscarriage of justice or is palpably illegal or is unjustified (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 and Krishnan v. Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241).

18. In this case, as indicated above, bail has been cancelled for very valid and cogent reasons.

19. Accordingly we see no substance in these appeals. The same stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.