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Siddappa Vasappa Kuri And Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
Possession of Survey No. 311/3 measuring 2 acres 16 guntas in Village Hirenandi, Gokak Taluk, Belgaum District, Karnataka was taken from the appellants on 1 June 1977 for construction of an irrigation channel. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was later issued on 8 March 1991, followed by a Section 6 declaration and invocation of Section 17. An award dated 6 February 1993 fixed compensation at Rs 10,000 per acre. On reference, the District Judge enhanced the rate to Rs 50,000 per acre, which the High Court reduced to Rs 41,400 per acre.
During execution, the executing court granted additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) for the period 1 June 1977 – 8 March 1991. In revision the High Court limited the period to 8 March 1991 – 6 February 1993. The present appeal challenged that limitation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does Section 23(1-A) permit calculation of additional compensation from the date of taking possession when that date precedes publication of the Section 4(1) notification?
- Which of the conflicting Supreme Court interpretations—Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D. Schemes, Vijayawada v. M.A. Jabbar or Asstt. Commr., Gadag Sub-Division v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa—correctly states the law on this point?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Section 23(1-A) should be applied from 1 June 1977 (actual possession) to 8 March 1991 (Section 4 notification), because depriving owners of enjoyment before formal notification warrants compensation.
- The decision in Mathapathi Basavannewwa (1995 6 SCC 355) was cited to contend that a literal reading causes hardship and defeats the legislative object, so the phrase “whichever is earlier” must be interpreted to include advance possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D. Schemes, Vijayawada v. M.A. Jabbar (1995 2 SCC 142) | Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) runs from the Section 4 notification to the earlier of award or possession; if possession predates the notification, the starting point remains the notification date. | Followed and affirmed as laying down the correct law. |
| Asstt. Commr., Gadag Sub-Division v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa (1995 6 SCC 355) | Interpreted Section 23(1-A) to allow compensation from the date of advance possession, to avoid hardship to landowners. | Overruled as incorrectly decided. |
| State of H.P. v. Dharam Das (1995 5 SCC 683) | Referred to in the referral order; no specific reasoning extracted. | Held to have laid down the law incorrectly. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a textual analysis of Section 23(1-A). The provision mandates that the additional amount at 12% per annum be calculated “for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) … to the date of the award … or the date of taking possession … whichever is earlier.” According to the Court:
- The “starting point” is unambiguously the date of the Section 4(1) notification.
- The “terminal point” is the earlier of (a) the award or (b) possession. Where possession predates the notification, that terminal is unavailable, leaving the award date as the only endpoint.
- The language admits of no ambiguity; therefore, principles of liberal or equitable construction cannot be invoked to extend the period backwards to an earlier possession date.
- Because the statutory text is clear, the interpretation in M.A. Jabbar must prevail, and the contrary approach in Mathapathi Basavannewwa and Dharam Das must be rejected.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The appellants are entitled to additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) only for the period 8 March 1991 – 6 February 1993, as held by the High Court.
Implications: The decision settles the conflict in precedent, confirming that when possession precedes the Section 4(1) notification, the calculation of the 12% additional amount must still commence from the notification date. The ruling reinforces a strict textual approach to Section 23(1-A) and does not create any new compensatory rights beyond those expressly provided by statute.
S.P Bharucha, J.— This appeal has been referred to a Bench of three Judges by reason of the contrary views taken by two Benches of two learned Judges in Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D Schemes v. M.A Jabbar (1995) 2 SCC 142 on the one hand and in Asstt. Commr., Gadag Sub-Division v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa (1995) 6 SCC 355 on the other. (The referral order also makes a reference to State of H.P v. Dharam Das (1995) 5 SCC 683 but no reasoning can be discerned therein.)
2. We are required to consider the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the context of the following facts: possession of land bearing Survey No. 311/3, admeasuring 2 acres and 16 guntas, situated at Village Hirenandi, Gokak taluk, Belgaum district, Karnataka was taken by the respondents from the appellants, who were the owners thereof, on 1-6-1977 for the purposes of the construction of an irrigation channel. On 8-3-1991, a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act in relation to the said land. It was followed by a notification under Section 6. The provisions of Section 17 were thereafter applied. On 6-2-1993, an award was made and compensation was awarded to the appellants at the rate of Rs 10,000 per acre. On a reference made by the appellants, the District Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs 50,000 per acre. The Land Acquisition Officer and the State preferred appeals before the High Court. Therein, compensation was reduced to Rs 41,400 per acre. The decree so passed was put in execution. Before the executing court the question of additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) arose. The executing court granted to the appellants additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) from the date on which possession of the land was taken, namely, 1-6-1977 to the date on which the Section 4 notification was issued, namely, 8-3-1991. The High Court, before whom a revision petition was presented by the LAO, took the view that the appellants were entitled to the additional compensation from the date of the Section 4 notification, namely, 8-3-1991, to the date of the award, namely, 6-2-1992. Against this order of the High Court, this appeal has been filed.
3. Section 23(1-A) reads thus:
“23. (1-A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation.—In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded.”
4. It is the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants are entitled to compensation for the period 1-6-1977 to 8-3-1991 i.e from the date on which possession of the said land was taken till the date of publication of the Section 4(1) notification. He finds sustenance for this contention in the decision of this Court in Mathapathi Basavannewwa case (1995) 6 SCC 355 where a similar contention was upheld. The provisions of Section 23(1-A) were analysed but, said the Court, “strict construction leads to unjust result, hardship to the owner and defeats legislative object”. In its view, therefore, the expression “whichever is earlier” in Section 23(1-A) had to be construed in that backdrop and the claimant was entitled to the additional amount from the date of taking possession. Since advance possession was taken before the publication of the notification under Section 4(1), “the claimants, by necessary implication are entitled to the payment of the additional amount by way of compensation from the date of taking over the possession for loss of enjoyment of the land”.
5. This Court in Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D Schemes v. M.A Jabbar (1995) 2 SCC 142 quoted Section 23(1-A) and said:
“In other words, the owner of the land who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by having been parted with possession, the Act intended that the owner be compensated by awarding an additional amount calculated at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on the enhanced market value for the period between the date of notification and the date of award or date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier. Admittedly, possession having already been taken on 15-2-1965, before publication of the notification under Section 4(1) on 6-3-1980, the award of additional amount for the period from 6-3-1980 to 30-9-1983, i.e, the date of making the award under Section 11 is perfectly correct.”
6. It is, as we see it, clear from Section 23(1-A) that the starting point for the purposes of calculating the amount to be awarded thereunder, at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on the market value, is the date of publication of the Section 4 notification. The terminal point for the purpose is either the date of the award or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier. In the present case, possession of the land having been taken prior to the publication of the Section 4 notification, that terminal is not available. The only available terminal is the date of the award. The High Court, therefore, was in no error in holding that the appellants were entitled to the additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) for the period 8-3-1991 to 6-2-1993.
7. Section 23(1-A) admits of no meaning other than the meaning that we have placed upon it. There is no room here for any construction other than that given above. It is only where a provision is ambiguous that a construction that leads to a result that is more just can be adopted. Having regard to its clear terms, Section 23(1-A) must receive the only construction it can bear. We are of the view, therefore, that the law has been correctly laid down in the decision in Special Tahsildar (LA), P.W.D Schemes v. M.A Jabbar (1995) 2 SCC 142 and that it has not been correctly laid down in Asstt. Commr., Gadag Sub-Division v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa (1995) 6 SCC 355 and, for that matter in State of H.P v. Dharam Das (1995) 5 SCC 683.
8. The appeal is dismissed.
9. No order as to costs.
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