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Chandra Shekhar Bind And Others v. State Of Bihar .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 3 June 1989, while several villagers—including Parshuram Bind and his father Sita Ram Bind—were sitting outside Parshuram Bind’s house, a group of 22–23 armed assailants opened fire. Both victims suffered fatal gun-shot injuries; a third villager, Tungnath Mistri, was wounded. The prosecution attributed the attack to prior enmity over fishing rights and rival political affiliations (the deceased aligned with the Bharatiya Janata Party; the assailants with the IPF).
Following the First Information Report lodged by PW 4, police investigated and charge-sheeted 18 persons. On 10 September 1991 the trial court convicted 11 accused under Section 302 IPC and 7 others under Section 302/149 IPC, sentencing all to life imprisonment. During pendency of their appeal before the High Court one accused (Suresh Bind) died. On 9 January 1998 the High Court dismissed the remaining appeals. Fifteen of the convicted persons sought further relief before the Supreme Court, resulting in the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the convictions could be upheld on the basis of the testimony of two eyewitnesses (PWs 5 and 6) when two other eyewitnesses turned hostile.
- In a large-scale assault involving numerous offenders, should the “two-witness theory” be applied so that an accused is liable only if identified by at least two reliable witnesses?
- Whether a plea under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Some appellants (particularly Accused 5) relied on an alibi supported by DWs 1 and 2.
- DWs 3, 4 and 5 testified that PWs 5 and 6 did not name any assailant immediately after the incident, attacking the credibility of these eyewitnesses.
- At a later stage of the hearing, counsel attempted to invoke the Juvenile Justice Act, contending that one or more appellants were juveniles at the time of the offence.
Prosecution’s Arguments
- PWs 5 and 6 were natural, trustworthy eyewitnesses whose presence at the scene was undisputed and who bore no motive to falsely implicate the accused.
- The injuries to PWs 1 and 4, though they turned hostile, corroborated occurrence of the armed assault.
- The defence alibi was unsubstantiated and had been correctly rejected by the trial court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202 | Adoption of a prudential “two-witness” test in cases involving a large unlawful assembly; conviction must normally be supported by at least two reliable witnesses. | The Court applied this test to evaluate identification evidence and concluded that benefit of doubt should go to accused identified by only one witness. |
| Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283 | Though quality of evidence prevails over quantity, in large assemblies it is prudent to insist on at least two reliable identifying witnesses. | Used to reinforce reliance on the two-witness principle and justify acquittal of appellants whom only one eyewitness identified. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court independently reviewed the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 and agreed with the lower courts that both were “trustworthy and reliable.” Because the incident involved many assailants, the Court considered it “prudent” to adopt the two-witness test endorsed in Masalti and Binay Kumar Singh. Applying that test, the Court noted:
- PW 5 identified Accused 1–8 and 11–18 but not Accused 12.
- PW 6 identified Accused 1–8, 11–18 but not Accused 9 and 10.
Because Accused 9, 10 and 12 were each identified by only one eyewitness, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to them and set aside their convictions. The alibi evidence for Accused 5 was rejected as it had been disbelieved by both lower courts. On the plea under the Juvenile Justice Act, the Court held the issue was a mixed question of fact and law not raised in either the trial court or High Court, and therefore refused to entertain it at the Supreme Court stage.
Holding and Implications
Convictions of Accused 9, 10 and 12 were set aside and they were ordered to be released forthwith, while the convictions and life sentences of the remaining appellants were affirmed.
Immediate Effect: Three appellants gain acquittal; the others remain liable to serve life imprisonment. Broader Implications: The judgment reiterates the prudential use of the two-witness rule in cases with large unlawful assemblies but sets no new legal precedent beyond existing Supreme Court jurisprudence.
S.N Variava, J.— These appeals are against the judgment dated 9-1-1998 by which the High Court has dismissed the criminal appeals filed by the appellants herein.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows:
According to the prosecution, on 3-6-1989 Tungnath Mistri, Parshuram Bind, Shiv Nath Bind, Ram Vinod Bind and certain other villagers were sitting in front of the house of Parshuram Bind. All of a sudden, 22 to 23 persons came running from the western gali armed with rifles, guns, country-made pistols, pasulis and lathis and started firing from the firearms. It is the case of the prosecution that these assailants started firing at Parshuram Bind. Appellant 1 (Chandra Shekhar Bind) fired at Tungnath Mistri causing injuries on his left elbow. One Suresh Bind also fired at Tungnath Mistri causing injury on his right hand. It is the case of the prosecution that when Parshuram Bind tried to enter his house, he was chased by the assailants who caught him and brought him out and then he was assaulted with a pasuli. It is the case of the prosecution that Sita Ram Bind, father of Parshuram Bind, came out of the house and he was also fired at. It is the case of the prosecution that as a result of this, Parshuram Bind and his father Sita Ram Bind died and the assailants then fled away. It is the case of the prosecution that the motive behind this was previous enmity as well as a dispute between Parshuram Bind and the assailants for catching fish in an ahar. It is the case of the prosecution that Parshuram Bind was a supporter of Bharatiya Janata Party and the appellants were members of IPF, being a rival political party.
3. As a result of the first information report lodged by PW 4, investigation was taken up. Ultimately 18 persons were charge-sheeted. The trial court convicted on 10-9-1991, 11 persons under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and 7 other persons under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. All were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.
4. All the accused filed appeals before the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal (before the High Court) Suresh Bind died. The High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the appeals.
5. The original Accused 6 and 13 have not filed any SLP before this Court. The other 15 accused have filed these criminal appeals.
6. In order to prove its case the prosecution has examined 10 witnesses. PWs 1, 4, 5 and 6 are the eyewitnesses. PWs 1 and 4 turned hostile and refused to identify any of the accused in court. They, however, confirmed that the incident, as alleged, had taken place. PWs 5 and 6 have supported the prosecution. The prosecution also examined two doctors. PW 7 carried out the post-mortem on both the deceased persons and proved that their death was homicidal as a result of gunshot injuries. PW 9 proved injuries on PWs 1 and 4.
7. The defence examined 5 witnesses. DWs 1 and 2 were examined in order to try and prove an alibi set up by Appellant 5. Both the courts below have disbelieved this evidence. Both the courts below have disbelieved the case of alibi. The other three defence witnesses deposed that after the incident they came to the house of the deceased and that at that time neither PW 5 nor PW 6 had named anybody. However, when PWs 5 and 6 had given evidence it had not been put to them that they had not named any person to DWs 3, 4 and 5. Thus the evidence of these witnesses has rightly not been accepted by the trial court and the High Court.
8. Both the trial court and the High Court have based the conviction on the evidence of PWs 5 and 6. We have gone through the evidence of PWs 5 and 6. We are in agreement with the trial court and the High Court that both these witnesses are trustworthy and reliable witnesses. Their presence on the scene could not be denied. There is absolutely no reason why they should falsely implicate the accused. All the accused were known to these witnesses and, therefore, they could identify the accused.
9. However, this is an incident in which a large number of accused had participated. The Constitution Bench of this Court has, in the case of Masalti v. State of U.P AIR 1965 SC 202, (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226 held that under the Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence given by a single witness would be enough to convict the accused persons, whereas evidence given by half-a-dozen witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough to sustain the conviction. It was held that where a criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the commission of an offence involving a large number of offenders, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident. It was held that in a sense, the test may be described as mechanical, but it cannot be treated as irrational or unreasonable. It was held that even though it is the quality of the evidence that matters and not the number of witnesses, still it is useful to adopt such a mechanical test.
10. This two-witness theory has also been adopted by this Court in the case of Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (1997) 1 SCC 283. It is held that there is no rule of evidence that no conviction can be based unless a certain minimum number of witnesses have identified a particular accused as a member of the unlawful assembly. It is held that it is axiomatic that evidence is not to be counted but only weighed and it is not the quantity of evidence but the quality that matters. It is held that even the testimony of one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to establish the identification of an accused as a member of an unlawful assembly. It is held that all the same, when the size of the unlawful assembly is quite large and many persons would have witnessed the incident, it would be a prudent exercise to insist on at least two reliable witnesses to vouchsafe the identification of an accused as a participant in the rioting.
11. PWs 1 and 4 were injured witnesses and their injuries had been proved. PW 4 was also the informant who had lodged the first information report. Yet, as stated above, PWs 1 and 4 turned hostile and refused to identify any person. They, however, confirmed that the incident had taken place. On a careful reading of the evidence of PWs 5 and 6, we find that PW 5 has identified Accused 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, whereas PW 6 has identified Accused 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. Thus PW 5 has not identified Accused 12 and PW 6 has not identified Accused 9 and 10. However, PWs 5 and 6 have both identified all the other accused.
12. In our view, considering the large number of people involved, it would be prudent in this case to adopt the two-witness theory. On the basis of this two-witness theory, benefit of doubt would have to be and is given to Accused 9, 10 and 12 inasmuch as more than one witness has not identified them.
13. Mr Mishra, who came in at a later stage, sought to make a submission on the basis of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. We, however, find that it had not been argued before the trial court that any of the accused was a juvenile. No such point had been taken before the High Court. No such point has been taken in the SLP filed before this Court. In our view, this is not a pure question of law which can be taken up for the first time in this Court. It is a mixed question of law and fact. We, therefore, do not permit Mr Mishra to take up this point and do not deal with this aspect.
14. In this view of the matter, we set aside the conviction of Accused 9, 10 and 12. They shall be set free forthwith unless they are required in some other case. The appeals of the other appellants are dismissed. Their conviction, as passed by the High Court, stands confirmed. They shall serve out their sentences.
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