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Balkrishan v. Satyaprakash And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (plaintiff) sued for a declaration of title and a permanent injunction with respect to agricultural land bearing Survey/Khasra No. 1216 (1.902 hectares) situated in Village Guna, Madhya Pradesh. He asserted that although his 1960 sale-deed was held invalid in an earlier suit, he had remained in continuous possession and consequently perfected title by adverse possession.
After an attachment and revenue auction in 1963, Rajendra Singh (through his father Mohan Singh) obtained an order from the Tahsildar under Section 250 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code directing delivery of possession. That order was never executed, and the appellant stayed on the land. When Rajendra Singh sold the property to Respondents 2 and 4 (their husbands being Respondents 1 and 3), they resisted the appellant’s possession.
The trial court decreed the suit, finding uninterrupted, open possession since 23-12-1966 and holding that the appellant had become bhumiswami by adverse possession. The first appellate court affirmed that decree. On second appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court reversed, reasoning that an unexecuted ejectment order vitiated the claim of continuous adverse possession. The appellant obtained special-leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an unexecuted order of the Tahsildar directing delivery of possession interrupts the continuity of possession necessary to perfect title by adverse possession.
- Consequently, whether the High Court erred in overturning concurrent trial and first-appellate findings that the appellant had perfected title by adverse possession.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Both lower courts had found continuous, open and hostile possession sufficient to perfect title; the High Court wrongly disregarded those factual findings.
- The mere existence of an unexecuted revenue order does not amount to dispossession or legal interruption of possession.
Respondents' Arguments
- The appellant’s earlier civil suit was dismissed, and the Tahsildar’s order required him to hand over possession; therefore his possession lacked the continuity required for adverse possession.
- Because possession was not peaceful or uninterrupted, the High Court correctly rejected his claim of perfected title.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254; (1964) 6 SCR 780 | Elements of adverse possession (nec vi, nec clam, nec precario) and need for continuity, publicity and extent. | Set the governing standard that the appellant’s possession had to satisfy. |
| Singaravelu Mudaliar v. Chokkalinga Mudaliar, AIR 1923 Mad 88; ILR 46 Mad 525 | An adjudication confirming true owner’s title does not interrupt a possessor’s actual adverse possession unless dispossession occurs. | Used to show that the Tahsildar’s order (or a decree) in favour of the true owner does not break continuity when not executed. |
| Sk. Mukbool Ali v. Sk. Wajed Hossein, (1876) 25 WR 249 | A decree against a possessor does not stop limitation unless he is physically dispossessed. | Reinforced that limitation keeps running despite an adverse decree. |
| A.S.S. Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohd. Mustafa Maracayar, AIR 1923 PC 175 | Declaration of another’s title does not affect the “adverse” quality of existing possession. | Illustrated that mere declaratory relief without execution leaves adverse possession intact. |
| Soni Lalji Jetha v. Soni Kalidas Devchand, AIR 1967 SC 978; (1967) 1 SCR 873 | Approved the Privy Council decision in Subbaiya Pandaram. | Cited to lend Supreme Court authority to the Privy Council principle. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reiterated that adverse possession must be continuous, open and hostile for the statutory period. It accepted the concurrent findings of the trial and first-appellate courts that the appellant satisfied those requirements from 4-9-1973 to 4-9-1985. The Court held that:
- Mere issuance of an order of ejectment does not constitute dispossession or discontinuation of possession; actual, physical interruption is required.
- The Tahsildar’s order was never executed; hence the appellant’s possession remained uninterrupted and public.
- Precedents from the Madras High Court, Calcutta High Court, the Privy Council and this Court confirm that declarations or decrees in favour of the true owner, absent execution, do not break continuity for purposes of adverse possession.
Consequently, the High Court’s conclusion that the appellant’s possession was “not sufficient in the eye of law” was held to be legally erroneous.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside and trial-court decree restored.
The appellant is declared bhumiswami owner of the suit land by reason of perfected adverse possession, and the permanent injunction against the respondents is reinstated. The decision clarifies that unexecuted administrative or judicial orders do not interrupt possession for the purpose of adverse-possession claims. No new doctrine is announced, but existing principles are reaffirmed; costs were not awarded to either side.
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.— This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Bench at Gwalior) in Civil Second Appeal No. 161 of 1991 dated 1-9-1994. The plaintiff in the suit (Case No. 51-A/85 in the Court of Second Civil Judge, Class I, Guna, Madhya Pradesh) is the appellant. He laid the suit for declaration of his title on the ground that by adverse possession he perfected his title to the agriculture land bearing Survey No. 1216, admeasuring 1.902 hectares (Khasra No. 1216, area 9 bighas 2 biswas) situated in Village Guna, Tehsil and District Guna, Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as “the suit land”) and for permanent injunction against Respondents 1 to 4 on 6-12-1986.
2. The following facts need to be noticed for understanding the controversy between the parties:
The appellant claimed that he purchased the suit land for a consideration of Rs 451 from Sukhlal and Phulchand who were said to be the owners thereof on 25-8-1960. The suit land was under attachment by orders of the Tahsildar, Guna and in the auction that followed the attachment, one Mohan Singh purchased it in the name of his minor son Rajendra Singh in 1963. Rajendra Singh through his guardian — his father Mohan Singh — filed an application under Section 250 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, before the Tahsildar, Guna, against the appellant claiming restoration of possession of the suit land. On the alleged ground of interference in his possession, the appellant instituted a suit (for declaration praying for declaration and injunction) (Civil Suit No. 82-A of 1964) in the Court of Civil Judge, Class II, against Rajendra Singh and Mohan Singh and his vendors (Sukhlal and Phulchand) in 1964. On 23-12-1966 the suit was dismissed holding that the sale in his favour was not valid. Notwithstanding the dismissal of that suit, he remained in possession of the suit land. On 20-6-1971 the Tahsildar ordered the appellant to put the said Rajendra Singh in possession of the suit land. Against that order the appellant filed an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer who dismissed the appeal on 4-9-1973. While so Rajendra Singh sold the suit land to Respondents 2 and 4; Respondent 1 is the husband of Respondent 2 and Respondent 3 is the husband of Respondent 4. The appellant, however, continued to remain in the possession of the suit land. The said respondents resisted the suit denying the possession of the appellant and pleading that Mohan Singh and Rajendra Singh were in continuous possession of the suit land and that the appellant acquired no title to the suit land. They stated that the appellant failed in the civil court, revenue court, and before the Executive Magistrate and, therefore, that suit was also liable to be dismissed.
3. After considering the evidence placed before it the trial court found that the appellant had been in continuous possession of the suit land and perfected his title by adverse possession. Accordingly, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed by the trial court. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court, Respondents 1 to 4 filed appeal (Civil Appeal No 97-A of 1990) before the IInd Additional District Judge, Guna. On 30-7-1991 the first appellate court dismissed the appeal. The said respondents filed Civil Second Appeal No. 161 of 1991 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Bench at Gwalior), which was allowed, setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, by the impugned judgment and decree.
4. Mr Niraj Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that inasmuch as the trial court as well as the first appellate court found that the appellant had perfected his title by adverse possession, the High Court erred in reversing the well-considered judgments of the lower courts on the ground that possession of the appellant was not sufficient in the eye of law to confer the title by adverse possession.
5. Mr M.P Verma, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents, contended that the earlier suit of the appellant was dismissed and that there was an order of the Tahsildar directing him to hand over the possession of the suit land to the respondents, therefore, the appellant could not claim to be in continuous uninterrupted possession, as such the High Court rightly held that the appellant did not perfect his title by adverse possession and dismissed the suit of the appellant.
6. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is: Whether the High Court erred in holding that the appellant had not perfected his title by adverse possession on the ground that there was an order of a Tahsildar against him to deliver possession of the suit land to the auction-purchasers.
7. The law with regard to perfecting title by adverse possession is well settled. A person claiming title by adverse possession has to prove three nec — nec vi, nec clam and nec precario. In other words, he must show that his possession is adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent. In S.M Karim v. Bibi Sakina AIR 1964 SC 1254, (1964) 6 SCR 780 speaking for this Court Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed thus:
“Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.”
8. In the instant case, the trial court on appreciating the evidence produced by the parties recorded the following among other findings:
“(i) Accordingly, it is decided that since 23-12-1966 negativing the title of actual bhumiswami, the plaintiff has been in continuous, uninterrupted and open possession of the suit land;
(ii) As a result the plaintiff had acquired the rights of bhumiswami on the basis of the adverse possession of the suit land.”
9. The first appellate court on reappraisal of the evidence on record found that the appellant was in continuous possession from the date of the purchase i.e, 25-8-1960 but as the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, Rajendra Singh, initiated the proceedings under Section 250 of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1959 before the Tahsildar, Guna, against the appellant for recovery of possession the period from 25-8-1960 till initiation of proceedings and from 1-12-1964 to 4-9-1973 during which the proceedings remained pending, cannot be counted for perfecting the title of the plaintiff so his adverse possession would commence from 4-9-1973 and the period of 12 years was completed on 4-9-1985 before the purchase of the suit land by the respondents on 11-12-1985. The present suit was filed on 6-12-1986, therefore, the appellant perfected his title by adverse possession.
10. The High Court while accepting those findings of the courts below, however, held:
“In spite of the fact that the plaintiff continued in possession in spite of the order against him in proceedings under Section 250 M.P LR Code, his possession cannot be said to be sufficient in the eye of law to confer a title upon him by adverse possession, as claimed.”
11. In our view this conclusion of the High Court is erroneous. The fact remained that in spite of the order of the Tahsildar against the appellant which was not acted upon, nor executed, the appellant continued in possession of the suit land and, therefore, the continuity of his possession of the suit land was neither interrupted nor lost. Mere passing of an order of ejectment against a person claiming to be in adverse possession neither causes his dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession which alone breaks the continuity of possession.
12. The fact that under Section 250(2) of the M.P LR Code read with Section 38 thereof, the Tahsildar was bound to restore possession of the suit land would, in our view, make no difference and it is difficult to accept the contention that failure of the Tahsildar in handing over possession would have the effect of causing discontinuation of possession of the suit land by the appellant so as to prevent such possession from ripening into adverse possession after the statutory period.
13. In Singaravelu Mudaliar v. Chokkalinga Mudaliar AIR 1923 Mad 88 (2), ILR (1923) 46 Mad 525 the Madras High Court took the view that an adjudication that the true owner had a good title to possession is entirely consistent with the fact that actual possession is with the party who ousted the true owner and has been holding possession as against the true owner on his own behalf. It is difficult to understand as to how a decree which negatived the first defendant's right could possibly be regarded in the nature of an interruption of the continuity of possession.
14. In Sk. Mukbool Ali v. Sk. Wajed Hossein (1876) 25 WR 249 the High Court held:
“Whatever the decree might have been, the defendant's possession could not be considered as having ceased in consequences of that decree, unless he were actually dispossessed. The fact that there is a decree against him does not prevent the statute of limitation from running.”
15. In our view, the Madras High Court correctly laid down the law in the aforementioned cases.
16. It will be apt to note here the decision of the Privy Council in A.S.S Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohd. Mustafa Maracayar AIR 1923 PC 175 which was approved by this Court in Soni Lalji Jetha v. Soni Kalidas Devchand AIR 1967 SC 978, (1967) 1 SCR 873. In that case, in 1913 a suit was brought by the appellant against the respondents for possession of immoveable property in question. In 1890 the appellant's grandfather created a trust of his properties including the property in question. That property was purchased by the respondents in execution of a decree against the appellant's father in 1898. The purchaser and other respondents claiming under him had been in possession since the date of purchase. In a subsequent suit, filed in 1904 in which the respondents were parties, a decree was passed declaring that the trust created by the appellant's grandfather was valid. However, no steps were taken pursuant to the decree to dispossess the respondents prior to filing of the suit by the appellant. The Privy Council negatived the contention that the decree in the suit holding the property as trust property was res judicata as against the respondents so as to preclude them from asserting title in the property. The Privy Council observed as follows:
“At the moment when it was passed the possession of the purchaser was adverse and the declaration that the property had been subject to a trust disposition, and therefore ought not to have been seized, did not disturb or affect the quality of his possession; it merely emphasised the fact that it was adverse. No further step was taken in consequence of that declaration until the present proceedings were instituted, when it was too late.”
17. From the above discussion it follows that the judgment and decree of the High Court under challenge cannot be sustained. They are accordingly set aside and the judgment and decree of the first appellate court confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances of the case without costs.
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