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Bachan Singh v. Kartar Singh And Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1981, the present respondents filed Suit No. 1365 of 1981 seeking a declaration that they had become owners of certain land by adverse possession. The present appellant, who was the defendant in that suit, filed a written statement admitting the respondents’ claim, leading the trial court to pass a consent decree on 13 November 1981. No appeal or application to set aside that decree was filed, and it became final.
In 1982, the same party (now the appellant) instituted a fresh suit asserting that the 1981 decree was a nullity because it had been procured by fraud. The trial court dismissed this second suit, but the first appellate court reversed that decision on 30 July 1987, holding the decree to be invalid on the ground that it amounted to an unregistered sale intended to evade the Indian Registration Act.
The respondents then filed a second appeal. The High Court allowed the appeal and reinstated the original consent decree. The present appeal challenges the High Court’s judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the consent decree dated 13 November 1981 was void on the ground of fraud and therefore liable to be avoided under Section 44 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether a consent decree that reflects an admission of title requires registration under the Indian Registration Act, and if not registered, is it a nullity.
- Whether the High Court erred in overturning the first appellate court’s finding that the decree was invalid.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The 1981 consent decree was obtained by fraud and is therefore void; Section 44 of the Evidence Act permits the decree to be challenged on that basis.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents’ legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court observed that the 1981 decree was based solely on the appellant’s explicit admission of the respondents’ claim. If the appellant believed the decree was tainted by fraud, the appropriate remedy was to file an appeal or move an application to set aside the decree; neither step was taken.
The Court noted that in the first appellate proceedings the appellant had expressly conceded that no fraud was involved. The first appellate court nevertheless invalidated the decree, reasoning that it amounted to a sale intended to circumvent the Indian Registration Act. The present Court rejected that reasoning, emphasizing that a consent decree passed by a court does not require registration under the Indian Registration Act.
Consequently, the High Court was correct in restoring the validity of the 1981 decree. The appellant’s reliance on Section 44 of the Evidence Act was found meritless because no substantiated allegation of fraud existed.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed.
The dismissal leaves the 1981 consent decree intact, confirming the respondents’ ownership of the land. No costs were awarded. The decision reiterates that a consent decree, even if it affects immovable property, is not subject to compulsory registration, but the judgment sets no new precedent beyond the parties involved.
1. Earlier defendant respondents herein brought suit No. 1365 of 1981 for declaration that they have become owners of he land on the basis of adverse possession. In para 5 of the plaint, it was averred that the defendants in the suit were paid a sum of Rs.1,98,000/- in equal share. The defendants also agreed to get the necessary correction made in the record in favour of the plaintiff with regard to the suit land, but they have now refused to admit the claim of the plaintiff. A written statement was filed by the plaintiff-appellant herein, who was the defendant in suit No. 1365 of 1981 wherein the claim of the plaintiff in the said suit was admitted. On the basis of the said admission, the suit was decreed by the trial Court on 13.11.1981. It is also admitted between the parties that neither any appeal was preferred against the judgment of the trial Court nor any application to set aside the decree was filed by the defendant in the said suit and the decree has attained finality. Subsequently, in the year 1982, the plaintiff-appellant herein, brought a suit for declaration that decree passed in suit No.1365 of 1981 was void and nullity on the ground that it was obtained by fraud. The trial Court dismissed the suit. However, on appeal, the first Appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-appellant on 30.7.1987. Against the said judgment, the defendant preferred a second appeal. The High Court allowed the second appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the first Appellate Court. It is against the said judgment, the appellant has preferred this appeal.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the decree passed in a suit No.1365 of 1981 was void, having been obtained by fraud and, therefore, it could be avoided under Section 44 of the Evidence Act. We do not find any merit in the argument. It may be stated that the plaintiff was the defendant in the suit No.1365 of 1981 filed by the respondents. In the said suit, the claim of the respondents was admitted by the present plaintiff-appellant and on the basis of the said admission, the suit was decreed. In case the present appellant was not satisfied with the decree, either he could have filed an appeal or moved an application for setting aside the decree alleged to have been obtained by fraud. Before the first Appellate Court, the plaintiff-appellant stated that there was no fraud in passing the decree in suit No.1365 of 1981, but the Appellate Court set aside the decree of the trial Court on the ground that the decree was a sale only to overcome the provisions of the Indian Registration Act. This view of the Appellate Court was not correct. A consent decree passed by the Court is not required to be registered under the provisions of the Indian Registration Act and therefore, the view taken by the first Appellate Court was not legally correct and has been rightly set aside by the High Court. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken-by the High Court.
3. Consequently, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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