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Punjab State Electricity Board And Another v. Punjab Pre-Stressed Concrete Works .

Supreme Court Of India
Nov 16, 2000
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Punjab State Electricity Board (“the appellant”) entered into a purchase order-cum-contract dated 21-7-1984 with the respondent for the supply of 41,500 reinforced cement-concrete poles (8-metre) at Rs 353 per pole and 3,750 poles (9-metre) at Rs 440 per pole. The contract expressly stated that prices were “firm and subject to no variation whatsoever on any account.”

Alleging failures in supply, the appellant deferred deliveries until 22-4-1985. The respondent later sought price increases citing higher raw-material costs and changes in excise duty, which the appellant rejected, invoking the price-variation prohibition. Various disputes—including claims for price escalation, excise duty differentials, damages and interest—were referred to arbitration pursuant to the contract.

On 10-6-1988 the Chief Engineer (Research & Arbitration) of the appellant made a non-speaking (non-reasoned) award for Rs 17.71 lakhs with interest. The Senior Sub-Judge, Patiala, set aside the award on 6-3-1991, but the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, in FAO No. 860 of 1991 dated 3-6-1992, reversed that decision and made the award a rule of court. The appellant Board and its Chief Engineer appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a non-speaking arbitral award that grants a lump-sum amount can be sustained when part of the underlying claims (here, Claim I for price escalation) is barred by an express “firm price” clause and therefore outside the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in upholding such an award without determining if impermissible claims formed part of the awarded sum.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Claim I (price escalation: Rs 16.50 lakhs + Rs 2.25 lakhs) was non-arbitrable because the contract fixed “firm” prices; the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to allow any increase.
  • Regarding Claim II (excise duty), only Rs 0.95 lakh—representing the admitted difference—was payable.
  • No factual or legal basis existed for Claim III (Rs 12 lakhs) and Claim IV (Rs 4 lakhs) for damages, or Claim V (unspecified relief).
  • The lump-sum award of Rs 17.71 lakhs, being non-reasoned, made it impossible to discern whether impermissible items were included; such an award must be set aside, relying on “T.N. Electricity Board v. Bridge Tunnel Constructions”.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The arbitrator made underlying calculations—produced in court—at least for Claim I.
  • The “firm price” clause ceased to bind once the appellant postponed the original delivery schedule; hence price escalation was arbitrable.
  • A non-speaking award is immune from judicial interference on merits; courts cannot dissect the award to see how the lump-sum figure was arrived at.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T.N. Electricity Board v. Bridge Tunnel Constructions (1997) 4 SCC 121; JT (1997) 3 SC 467 A non-speaking lump-sum arbitral award is vulnerable if it possibly includes amounts on matters outside the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. The Court relied on this decision to hold that because Claim I was non-arbitrable, and the award was non-speaking, the entire award had to be set aside.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that the contract unequivocally fixed firm prices for the poles and prohibited any variation. Consequently, Claim I—seeking increased prices—was untenable. Because the award was non-speaking, the Court could not determine whether, or to what extent, the Rs 17.71 lakhs awarded related to Claim I. Relying on its own precedent in “Bridge Tunnel Constructions”, the Court held that where a lump-sum, non-reasoned award may encompass claims outside the arbitrator’s authority, the proper course is to set it aside.

The Court rejected the respondent’s contention that postponement of delivery nullified the firm-price clause, finding no contractual basis for that argument. Given the inseparability of the various claims within the non-speaking award, the entire award was vitiated. However, rather than deny all relief, the Court opted to remit the remaining disputes (Claims II–VI, excluding Claim I) for fresh arbitration, emphasising the necessity of a reasoned award.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; award and High Court judgment set aside; matter remitted to a newly appointed arbitrator (Justice K.S. Bhalla, retired) to decide Claims II–VI by a reasoned award within approximately four months; no order as to costs.

Immediate effect: the prior non-speaking award is nullified, and the parties must participate in a fresh arbitration limited to issues other than price escalation. Broader implication: the decision reinforces that non-speaking awards may be invalidated where they potentially include sums on non-arbitrable matters, underscoring the judicial preference for reasoned awards when jurisdictional objections exist.

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Judgment

1. This is an appeal preferred by the Punjab State Electricity Board against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 3-6-1992 in FAO No. 860 of 1991. By the said judgment the High Court has set aside the decree passed by the Senior Sub-Judge, Patiala, on 6-3-1991. The learned Senior Sub-Judge had set aside the award dated 10-6-1988 made by the Chief Engineer, Research and Arbitration, Punjab State Electricity Board, Chandigarh. The result of the judgment of the High Court is that the award was held valid and was directed to be made a rule of court.

2. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the Electricity Board and Chief Engineer have preferred this appeal.

3. There was a purchase order-cum-contract agreement entered into between the appellant Electricity Board and the respondent dated 21-7-1984 under which the respondent was to supply 41,500 poles 8-metre long @ Rs 353.00 per pole and another set of 3750 poles, each 9-metre long @ Rs 440.00 per pole. The terms and conditions of the contract stipulated that the prices were to be firm and were subject to “no variation whatsoever on any account”. The payment, schedule of delivery thereof was also specified. It was, however, stated that the prices would be paid and excise duty was not applicable but if excise duty was levied, the prices would be Rs 353 per pole subject to production of documentary proof along with certain certificates. Under clause 9 of the contract 95% of the contract value was to be paid against receipt and balance 5% of the contract value of each consignment should be paid within 30 days of the receipt of material/acceptance by the consignee in good condition. Clause 9 related to the mode of delivery of goods. Delivery was to commence after 45 days after the receipt of the firm order and the whole quantity was to be completed within 12 months thereafter. Clause 13 stated that during the pendency of the contract/purchase order if any performance in whole/part by either party was delayed for the specified cause mentioned therein, or on account of any other cause beyond their reasonable control, neither of the two parties shall be made liable for losses or damages.

4. The respondent, it is alleged, failed to supply and that, therefore, the appellant deferred supplies up to 22-4-1985. On 30-3-1986 the respondent requested the appellant to increase the price of the poles as the prices of raw material had also increased and the respondent requested the appellant to enhance the rate of the poles 8-metre long at Rs 50 per pole and Rs 75 per pole 9-metre long. On 22-4-1985 the appellant Board decided to lift the ban imposed on the respondent. On 9-5-1985 the appellant wrote to the respondent that prices in the purchase order were firm and subject to “no variation whatsoever on any account” and that request of the respondent for enhancement in prices of poles could not be acceded to. On 17-10-1985 the respondent claimed payment of excise duty as per the increase made in the budget of that year. On 7-12-1987 the respondent issued a notice to the appellant on various disputes.

5. Thereafter, the matter was referred to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. On 16/18-1-1988 the respondent filed its claim statement before the arbitrator seeking a sum of Rs 18.75 lakhs in Claim I in respect of increase in value of the poles. There were other claims. The total claim was for Rs 39.50 lakhs. The appellant Board filed its reply refuting the claim of the respondent and also contended that disputes were not arbitrable or there was no liability.

6. The arbitrator passed an award on 10-6-1988 for a sum of Rs 17.71 lakhs with interest. Objections were filed by the appellant to the said award. The learned Sub-Judge by his judgment dated 6-3-1991 set aside the award. But the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal on 3-6-1992 and directed the award to be made a rule of court.

7. It is this judgment against which the Board has preferred this appeal.

8. In this appeal, we have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Claim I which consisted of two parts in respect of which the respondent made a claim of Rs 16.50 lakhs and Rs 2.25 lakhs, related to the increase in the price of the poles and that in view of the definite clause in the contract the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to go into the question of increase of the price or award for any excess amount. So far as Claim II relating to excise duty is concerned, he contended that the difference in a sum of Rs 0.95 lakh alone was payable. So far as Claim III for Rs 12.00 lakhs and Claim IV for Rs 4.00 lakhs are concerned, the counsel contended that no case is made out for grant of damages. So far as Claim V is concerned, the counsel contended that the respondent is not entitled to any relief. Claim VI is relating to interest.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the award was not a reasoned award and that it was not possible to find out if the total amount of Rs 17.71 lakhs as awarded by the arbitrator related to Claim I which according to the appellant was not within the purview of the arbitrator. It is also not known on what basis any of the other claims were awarded and whether any amount was awarded for items for which the arbitrator had no jurisdiction. Learned counsel in that connection relied upon T.N Electricity Board v. Bridge Tunnel Constructions (1997) 4 SCC 121, JT (1997) 3 SC 467 and contended that such an award granting a lump sum amount without reasons where some of the items are not arbitrable, was liable to be set aside.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that certain calculations were made by the arbitrator. Counsel produced some record of the said computations but we find that it only related to Claim I. It was also stated that award could be passed for Claim I as the clause not permitting a higher rate would have been applicable only if the original delivery schedule was not postponed by the appellant. The award is not a reasoned one and it could not be interfered with by the court.

11. After hearing counsel on both sides, we are of the view that the award is liable to be set aside because when it is a non-speaking one, it is not known whether any part of the award made by the arbitrator related to Claim I. In our view, the price of the poles was firm and not liable to be increased. The fact that the delivery schedule was changed cannot be a ground to get over the clause prohibiting increase in the price of the poles. Once Claim I is not tenable, the award has to be set aside inasmuch as it is not possible to say that the award did not relate to Claim I. This is a sufficient reason for setting aside the award and remitting the matter back to the arbitrator.

12. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and we also set aside the judgment of the Senior Sub-Judge, we remit the matter to the arbitrator for his decision on the other claims, i.e other than Claim I.

13. We are of the view that the arbitrator who is now to deal with the matter afresh, must pass a reasoned award after taking into consideration the points raised in the claim petition of the respondent (other than Claim I) and the objections raised by the appellant in its reply filed before the arbitrator. The parties are also agreed that a retired Judge of the High Court would be now appointed as the arbitrator.

14. We hereby appoint Justice K.S Bhalla, retired Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Modern Housing Complex, Manimajra, Chandigarh, as the arbitrator to deal with the dispute between the appellant and the respondent as per the reference already made in the case earlier.

15. The arbitrator is requested to complete the award expeditiously as this is an old dispute between the parties which has been pending for quite a long time. We request the arbitrator as far as possible to complete the award within four months from the date of the first hearing. It will be for the arbitrator to stipulate his fee for the conduct of the arbitration proceedings and for passing the award. The award is to confine other than Claim I (Parts I and II). The arbitrator will pass the reasoned award on the basis of the material already on record.

16. The appeal is allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.