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Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondent 1, an advocate, alleged that the appellant and others conspired to force him to withdraw from representing certain clients by implicating him and his clients in false criminal cases. He claimed to have been illegally detained and tortured by police personnel acting at the behest of the appellant and Respondent 8. After his written complaint of 14-12-1998 elicited no action, he filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) before the Punjab & Haryana High Court seeking directions for registration of an FIR and an inquiry by a judicial officer.
On 07-01-1999, a Single Judge disposed of that petition, directing the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Roopnagar, to conduct a preliminary inquiry and, if warranted, register a case; conversely, if the allegations were found false, the SSP was to prosecute the advocate under Section 182 IPC.
Subsequently, Respondent 1 filed a miscellaneous petition (Criminal Misc. M-15 of 1999). Without issuing notice to the appellant or other respondents, the same Single Judge, on 30-04-1999, directed the SSP not to comply with the earlier order because Respondent 1 had meanwhile filed a private criminal complaint before a Judicial Magistrate.
The appellant moved Criminal Misc. No. 20653 of 1999 to quash the 30-04-1999 order, contending it amounted to an impermissible review. That application was dismissed on 21-07-1999. The present Supreme Court appeals challenge the orders dated 30-04-1999 and 21-07-1999.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after finally disposing of a petition under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain a miscellaneous petition and issue fresh directions that effectively review or alter the earlier final order.
- Whether the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC can be invoked to bypass the express bar on review contained in Section 362 CrPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The orders dated 30-04-1999 and 21-07-1999 constitute an impermissible review of the final order dated 07-01-1999, contrary to Section 362 CrPC.
- After disposal of the original petition, no lis remained pending; consequently, the High Court became functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the miscellaneous petition.
- The procedure adopted—passing directions without notice to the affected respondents—violated basic principles of natural justice and criminal procedure.
Respondent 1's Arguments
- The High Court has broad inherent powers to pass “any order in any proceeding at any stage” to secure the ends of justice and to ensure a fair trial.
- Reliance was placed on Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376, to justify exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376 | Scope of High Court’s inherent powers under Section 561-A (now 482) CrPC, including cancellation of bail. | Court distinguished the case; held that inherent powers must be exercised sparingly and cannot override explicit statutory prohibitions such as the bar on review in Section 362 CrPC. |
| State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, (1979) 2 SCC 305 | High Court cannot review or revise its own final criminal judgment; Section 561-A/482 cannot be used to circumvent the Code. | Relied upon as direct authority that no review lies once a criminal matter is finally disposed of. |
| Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1208 | Sections 369 and 424 CrPC prohibit an appellate court from altering or reviewing its judgment once signed, except for clerical errors. | Cited to reinforce that the High Court became functus officio after 07-01-1999. |
| Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706 | Re-application for quashing is distinguishable from a prohibited review, yet confirms absence of review power. | Used to underline that although fresh petitions may lie in certain circumstances, a direct review of a concluded order is barred. |
| Lala Jairam Das v. King-Emperor, (1944-45) 72 IA 120 | Earlier Privy Council view on cancellation of bail and inherent powers. | Mentioned in discussion; not determinative of the present ratio. |
| Chopra case, AIR 1955 SC 633 | Judgment once pronounced cannot be reviewed by the same court under criminal jurisdiction. | Quoted as supporting authority for the bar on review. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court characterized the impugned High Court orders as “an abuse of the process of the court.” The analysis proceeded as follows:
- Status of Proceedings: The petition under Section 482 had been finally disposed of on 07-01-1999; accordingly, no matter was pending thereafter.
- Statutory Bar on Review: Section 362 CrPC expressly prohibits any court from altering or reviewing its final judgment or order, save for clerical or arithmetical errors. Once the High Court signed its order, it became functus officio.
- Limits of Inherent Power: Section 482 cannot be invoked to do what the Code expressly forbids. The Court referenced multiple precedents to affirm that inherent powers are supplementary and cannot override substantive provisions.
- Procedural Irregularities: The High Court entertained a miscellaneous petition not referable to any provision of CrPC or court rules and issued directions without notice to the affected parties, contrary to basic criminal law principles.
- Conclusion: Because the impugned directions effectively reviewed and nullified the earlier final order without jurisdiction, they were void.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeals are allowed; the High Court’s orders dated 30-04-1999 and 21-07-1999 are quashed, and the original order dated 07-01-1999 is restored.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that Section 362 CrPC bars criminal courts, including High Courts, from reviewing or altering final orders except for clerical errors, and that Section 482 cannot be used to bypass this prohibition. The ruling cautions against the practice of filing miscellaneous petitions to secure fresh directions after final disposal, underscoring that courts become functus officio once judgment is signed.
R.P Sethi, J.— Leave granted.
2. Respondent 1 who is a practising advocate filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana with prayers:
“(i) call for the records of the case for the purpose of perusal,
(ii) direct Respondent 6 i.e Station House Officer of Police Station Kharar, District Roopnagar as well as Senior Superintendent of Police, Roopnagar (Respondent 3) to register a case on the basis of complaint dated 14-12-1998 (Annexure P-4) lodged by the petitioner as well as MLR dated 11-12-1998 (Annexure P-3) of the petitioner without any further delay.
(iii) direct any judicial officer to hold inquiry/investigation in the aforesaid case in view of the serious allegations levelled by the petitioner against senior police officer of District Roopnagar.
(iv) direct Respondent 2 (DGP, Punjab) to immediately transfer Respondents 4, 5 and Inspector Jasdev Singh, who is presently posted as SHO of Police Station Kharar, District Roopnagar, so that free, fair and impartial investigation/inquiry may be conducted by some judicial officer in view of the peculiar facts of the case under reference.”
3. In his petition Respondent 1 contended that he was conducting several civil/criminal cases filed by M/s Falcon Breeders Private Limited as well as its Directors against the appellant and Respondent 8. It was alleged that with a motive to compel Respondent 1 Advocate to withdraw as counsel of the said company and its Directors, the appellant and Respondent 8 hatched a criminal conspiracy to implicate him in false and fabricated criminal cases. They were alleged to have mixed up with one Ranjit Singh, Deputy District Attorney (Legal) attached with the Office of Senior Superintendent of Police, District Roopnagar, Punjab and managed the registration of a case against Respondent 1 and his clients being FIR No. 151 dated 10-12-1988 at Police Station Kharar for various offences under the Indian Penal Code. In furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, a raid was conducted on 11-10-1988 in the house of one Ravnit Singh, a client of Respondent 1. Respondent 1 reached the house of Ravnit Singh, when called, and found there a contingent of police. It is alleged that the moment Respondent 1 came out of his car, he was roughed up and thrown in an open truck. He was taken to police station, Sector 11, Chandigarh where DDR No. 24 dated 11-10-1988 was registered. He further alleged that, thereafter, he was whisked away to Police Station Kharar. His arms were tied behind his back and a piece of cloth was tied around his eyes. He was thereafter taken to an unknown destination and was pushed into an isolated room where the appellant herein and Respondent 8 were already waiting. He was subjected to criminal torture by using third-degree methods for about 2-3 hours. Respondent 6 was also alleged to have caused injuries upon the said Advocate with a sharp knife below the knees, without provocation. Red chillies are stated to have been sprinkled on his fresh wounds with the object to harm, injure and terrorise him. He was threatened to be eliminated by the police personnel and the appellant. After the torture process, the eyes of Respondent 1 were again blindfolded and he was brought back to Police Station Kharar where his wife Mrs Gursharan Kaur had reached by that time. Upon her raising hue and cry he was sent to Civil Hospital, Kharar for conduct of his medical examination where he was examined by Dr Balwinder Singh. He was stated to have been released on 11-10-1998 after about 3 hours by the orders of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kharar. He claimed to have filed a written complaint in Police Station Kharar for registration of FIR against the alleged culprits. The copies of the complaint are stated to have been sent to Chief Minister, Punjab, Chief Secretary, Punjab, Principal Secretary, Punjab, the Director General of Police, Police SSP, Roopnagar, Chief Justice of India and the Home Minister of India. As no action was taken on his complaint, he filed a petition in the High Court with prayers as noted hereinabove.
4. After hearing Respondent 1, who appeared in person, the learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of his petition on 7-1-1999 with directions:
“After hearing the petitioner, who is an Advocate himself, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case for direct registration of the case is made out and a preliminary inquiry is required. In these circumstances, the present petition is disposed of with the directions to the SSP, Roopnagar to look into the allegations of the petitioner and if he comes to the conclusion that some cognizable offence has been committed by Respondent 7 or 8 or anybody else, he shall order for the registration of the case. If the allegations of the petitioner are found to be false, the petitioner shall be prosecuted under Section 182 IPC. The petitioner can lead such evidence in support of his case before the SSP who shall conclude the investigation within 3 months from the receipt of the copy of the order.”
5. After the disposal of the petition filed by Respondent 1 and consequently action taken in pursuance to the directions issued against the SSP, Roopnagar, Respondent 1 again filed a miscellaneous petition which was registered as Criminal Miscellaneous No. M-15 of 1999 and disposed of on 30-4-1999 by the same learned Single Judge, apparently without notice to the appellant herein or any other respondent in that petition, with directions:
“The petitioner submits that he has filed a criminal complaint on 9-3-1999 in the Court of Mrs Neelam Arora JMTC, Kharar and she has taken cognizance and in this view of the matter, he does want to prosecute his allegations with the SSP, who may be directed not to take any action because the matter is already sub judice before the competent court of jurisdiction. Therefore, now directions are given to SSP, Roopnagar not to comply with the directions dated 7-1-1999 and not to file any calendra (sic) under Section 182 IPC against the petitioner.”
6. The appellant herein, also filed a Criminal Miscellaneous No. 20653 of 1999 on 31-5-1999 with prayer for quashing the court order dated 30-4-1999 on the ground of it being illegal, against the well-established principles of law and being a review of order dated 7-1-1999 not permissible under the criminal law. The said application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 21-7-1999. The present appeals have been filed with prayer for quashing the orders passed by the learned Single Judge on 30-4-1999 and 21-7-1999 mainly on the ground of the orders being without jurisdiction.
7. Respondent 1 who appeared in person tried to justify the impugned orders with submissions that the High Court has the power to pass any order in any proceeding at any stage, in the interests of justice to eliminate any threat to a fair trial. In support of his contention he relied upon a judgment of this Court in Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar AIR 1958 SC 376, 1958 Cri LJ 701, 1958 SCR 1226.
8. We have noted with disgust that the impugned orders were passed completely ignoring the basic principles of criminal law. No review of an order is contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. After the disposal of the main petition on 7-1-1999, there was no lis pending in the High Court wherein the respondent could have filed any miscellaneous petition. The filing of a miscellaneous petition not referable to any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the rules of the court, cannot be resorted to as a substitute of fresh litigation. The record of the proceedings produced before us shows that directions in the case filed by the respondents were issued apparently without notice to any of the respondents in the petition. Merely because Respondent 1 was an Advocate, did not justify the issuance of directions at his request without notice of the other side. The impugned orders dated 30-4-1999 and 21-7-1999 could not have been passed by the High Court under its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuance of fresh directions in such miscellaneous petitions by the High Court are unwarranted, not referable to any statutory provision and in substance the abuse of the process of the court.
9. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorising the High Court to review its judgment passed either in exercise of its appellate or revisional or original criminal jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code. This Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala (1979) 2 SCC 305, AIR 1979 SC 87 held
“20. Before concluding we will very briefly refer to cases of this Court cited by counsel on both sides. Talab Haji Hussain AIR 1958 SC 376, 1958 Cri LJ 701, 1958 SCR 1226 relates to the power of the High Court to cancel bail. The High Court took the view that under Section 561-A of the Code, it had inherent power to cancel the bail, and finding that on the material produced before the Court it would not be safe to permit the appellant to be at large cancelled the bail, distinguishing the decision in Lala Jairam Das v. King-Emperor (1944-45) 72 IA 120, AIR 1945 PC 94 and stated that the Privy Council was not called upon to consider the question about the inherent power of the High Court to cancel bail under Section 561-A. In Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P AIR 1962 SC 1208, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 817, (1962) 2 Cri LJ 288 this Court held that Section 369 read with Section 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a court. The accused applied before a succeeding Sessions Judge for re-hearing of an appeal. The learned Judge was of the view that the appellate court had no power to review or restore an appeal which has been disposed of. The Supreme Court agreed with the view that the appellate court had no power to review or restore an appeal. This Court, expressing its opinion that the Sessions Court had no power to review or restore an appeal observed that a judgment, which does not comply with the requirements of Section 367 of the Code, may be liable to be set aside by a superior court but will not give the appellate court any power to set it aside itself and re-hear the appeal observing that ‘Section 369 read with Section 424 of the Code makes it clear that the appellate court is not to alter or review the judgment once signed, except for the purpose of correcting a clerical error’. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B v. Mohan Singh (1975) 3 SCC 706, AIR 1975 SC 1002 by Mr Patel, learned counsel for the respondent wherein it was held that rejection of a prior application for quashing is no bar for the High Court entertaining a subsequent application as quashing does not amount to review or revision. This decision instead of supporting the respondent clearly lays down, following Chopra case AIR 1955 SC 633, 1955 Cri LJ 1410 that once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. This Court entertained the application for quashing the proceedings on the ground that a subsequent application to quash would not amount to review or revise an order made by the Court. The decision clearly lays down that a judgment of the High Court on appeal or revision cannot be reviewed or revised except in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provisions of Section 561-A of the Code cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code.”
10. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error. The reliance of the respondent on Talab Haji Hussain case AIR 1958 SC 376, 1958 Cri LJ 701, 1958 SCR 1226 is misconceived. Even in that case it was pointed that inherent powers conferred on High Courts under Section 561-A (Section 482 of the new Code) has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is not disputed that the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code had been finally disposed of by the High Court on 7-1-1999. The new Section 362 of the Code which was drafted keeping in view the recommendations of the 41st report of the Law Commission and the Joint Select Committees appointed for the purpose, has extended the bar of review not only to the judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment.
11. The impugned orders of the High Court dated 30-4-1999 and 21-7-1999 which are not referable to any statutory provisions, having been passed apparently in a review petition in a criminal case are without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, the appeals are allowed and the impugned order of the High Court dated 30-4-1999 and 21-7-1999 are set aside restoring its original order dated 7-1-1999.
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