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Yadala Venkata Subbamma v. Yadalla Chinna Subbaiah (Dead) By Lrs. And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Thummalapenta Nagayya originally owned the suit property. By a will dated 4-6-1927 he intended that, after his death, the property would pass to his daughter Pitchamma and his nephew/son-in-law Yadalla Lakshmaiah, while also making provision for his wife Polamma (Defendant 4) and younger daughter Narayyamma. When Nagayya died, the contemplated marriage between Pitchamma and Lakshmaiah took place, but both daughters died shortly thereafter. Consequently, Lakshmaiah became absolute owner of the entire estate. He remarried twice; his last marriage was to the present plaintiff, who was left a widow without children after Lakshmaiah’s death.
The plaintiff continued to reside with her husband’s brothers (Defendants 1 and 2) until 1949. Following disagreements, a panchayat settlement led to a series of documents: Exhibit B-1 (cash/jewellery settlement), Exhibit B-2 (settlement deed in plaintiff’s favour) and Exhibit B-3 (plaintiff’s deed of relinquishment). Subsequent disputes prompted the plaintiff to file a suit seeking declaration of title and possession over the property. The trial court dismissed the suit. A learned Single Judge allowed the first appeal, but a Division Bench, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 82 of 1982, reversed that decision. The plaintiff obtained special leave, leading to the present Supreme Court appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Lakshmaiah had blended the property he inherited under Nagayya’s will with the joint family properties.
- Whether Exhibit B-3 constituted a relinquishment by the plaintiff of the property inherited by her husband.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Beni Bai (Smt) v. Raghubir Prasad, (1999) 3 SCC 234 | A widow who elects to live separately becomes full owner of the share allotted to her under the Hindu Succession Act. | Relied upon to uphold that Defendant 4 acquired full ownership of a half-share in the property when she chose to live apart from the joint family. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
No blending of property. Both the trial court and the High Court had concurrently found, on clear evidence, that Lakshmaiah never blended the property received under the will with joint family assets. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the record, affirmed this factual finding.
Scope of Exhibit B-3. The operative clause of the relinquishment deed states, “I hereby relinquish the 1/4th share I have in the properties under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act….” The Court observed that this language affects only the plaintiff’s statutory ¼ share in joint family property; it contains no specific relinquishment of the separate property Lakshmaiah had inherited. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s rights over her late husband’s property remained intact.
Rights of Defendant 4 (widow of Nagayya). Because Defendant 4 chose to reside separately, she became full owner of one-half of the estate under the terms of the will, a conclusion reinforced by the precedent in Beni Bai. Her title survived unaffected by later events or statutory changes.
Combining these conclusions, the Court determined that the estate must now be divided equally between the plaintiff and the legal heirs of Defendant 4.
Holding and Implications
PARTLY ALLOWED – The Supreme Court modified the decree as follows:
- The plaintiff and Defendant 4 (now her legal heirs) are each entitled to a one-half share of the suit property.
- Neither side may alienate any portion of the property without first offering it to the other.
Each party is to bear its own costs.
Implications are confined to the parties: the decision affirms that (i) property bequeathed under a will remains separate unless clearly blended, (ii) a widow’s relinquishment must be explicit to affect inherited property, and (iii) widows electing separate residence obtain absolute ownership of their allotted share. No new precedent of broad application was set.
S.N Phukan, J.— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 82 of 1982. The appellant who was the original plaintiff has challenged the impugned judgment in this appeal.
2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows (it will be convenient to refer to the parties in the judgment according to their position in the original suit):
One Thummalapenta Nagayya was the owner of the suit property and through his first wife he got a daughter, Subbamma who was married to Defendant 1. After the death of his first wife, Nagayya married Defendant 4, Polamma and through her he got two daughters, Narayyamma and Pitchamma. On 4-6-1927, Nagayya executed a will and shortly thereafter he died. In the will it was recorded by him that he wanted to give his daughter Pitchamma in marriage to his nephew, Yadalla Lakshmaiah and wanted to give all his properties to him, whom he brought to his house two years back from the date of the will. As he could not perform their marriage during his lifetime, the marriage should be performed after his death in his house and all properties except the properties given to his grandson, Defendant 3 should go to his daughter Pitchamma and the said Lakshmaiah. He declared that both his daughter and son-in-law shall be entitled to all his outstanding properties and liable for his debts, if any. He stated that his second wife Polamma, Defendant 4 should be looked after properly by his daughter and son-in-law. Regarding their daughter Narayyamma, he stated that she should be married after attaining proper age and that at the time of marriage she should be given 30 cents of land and further in case his wife Polamma did not wish to reside with his daughter and son-in-law, she would be entitled to be in possession of the house property then available and shall have life interest in such property and these properties shall devolve upon his daughter and son-in-law after the death of his wife Polamma, Defendant 4. After the death of Nagayya his daughter Pitchamma was married to Lakshmaiah but she died within about two years of her marriage. Narayyamma, the other daughter of Nagayya died soon after the death of Nagayya with the result that all the suit properties came to devolve upon Yadalla Lakshmaiah who married a second time, but his second wife also died soon. Thereafter Lakshmaiah married the plaintiff and died soon after without leaving any issue through the plaintiff.
3. At the time of death, Lakshmaiah was living with his brothers, defendants herein and after the death of Lakshmaiah, the plaintiff continued to live with her husband's family until about 1949. Some disputes arose and the plaintiff expressed her desire to live separately. There was a panchayat in that connection and a document Exhibit B-1 was executed by which cash, jewellery, etc. were agreed to be given to the plaintiff and another widow of the family by the name of Yellamma. After a few months two other documents were executed namely Exts. B-2 and B-3. Exhibit B-2, which was a settlement deed, was executed by Defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff. In this deed, an arrangement was made by which some properties were given to the plaintiff which were to revert back to the family of Defendants 1 and 2. By Exhibit B-3 executed by the plaintiff, some properties were relinquished in favour of Defendants 1 and 2. The 4th defendant also wanted to live separately in the house, which was given to her by her husband as per the will. As there were disputes between the parties, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and possession of the suit property. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. The learned Single Judge allowed the first appeal, which was set aside by the impugned judgment. Hence this appeal.
4. In this appeal two questions need our consideration namely:
(1) whether there was blending by the husband of the plaintiff of his separate property which he inherited by virtue of the will with the joint family properties; and
(2) whether by the deed of relinquishment Ext. B-3, the plaintiff relinquished the property inherited by her husband.
5. The learned Single Judge in the first appeal gave a clear finding that there was no blending of property which was affirmed by the impugned judgment. We have perused the judgment and we hold that the concurrent finding by the two courts is based on clear evidence. Therefore, we accept the above finding.
6. Regarding the second question, we extract below the operative portion from the deed of relinquishment Ext. B-3 executed by the plaintiff, which has been quoted in the impugned judgment:
“I hereby relinquish the 1/4th share I have in the properties under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act and….”
7. From the above extracts we have no hesitation to hold that what was relinquished by the plaintiff was the 1/4th share which she had in the joint property under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act. It is true that in the deed of relinquishment Ext. B-3, mention has been made regarding the property inherited by the husband of the plaintiff but there was no specific relinquishment of the said property. We, therefore hold that the plaintiff did not relinquish the property inherited by her husband.
8. We extract below the following portion of the will by which maintenance was provided by the testator for his wife, Defendant 4:
“If at any future time my wife Polamma is not agreeable to live under the care and protection of Lakshmaiah and Pitchamma, she should be given a half-share in the moveable and immovable properties to be enjoyed by her during her life without any right of alienation and after her lifetime, the said property given to Polamma, should revert back to my daughter Pitchamma and my son-in-law Lakshmaiah.”
9. In the impugned judgment there is a clear finding that when Defendant 4 decided to live separately, she shifted her residence from the joint family and, therefore, it has been held clearly that she acquired title to half-share of the property left by her husband as the full owner thereof and her title has not been affected in any manner in view of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. This is the correct view taken in view of the decision of this Court in Beni Bai v. Raghubir Prasad (1999) 3 SCC 234.
10. Thus, we hold that there was no blending of property inherited by the husband of the plaintiff through the will and that the plaintiff has not relinquished the said property by the deed of relinquishment Ext. B-3. We also find that Defendant 4 has become the full owner in respect of the half-share of the suit property.
11. In the result and to adjust the equity, we allow the appeal partly and the decree is modified in the following terms:
(1) Both the plaintiff and Defendant 4 (now her legal heirs) shall be entitled to half-share each of the suit property.
(2) Neither party shall alienate the property or any part thereof by sale, mortgage or otherwise without giving first option to the other party.
12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs.
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