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Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani And Others v. Hpa International And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondent 2 initially entered into an agreement dated 26-06-1977 with Respondent 1 (plaintiff) to transfer his life interest in the disputed property. On 29-12-1979, however, Respondent 2 sold the same interest to the present defendant-appellants for a consideration of Rs 4.40 lakhs, making them subsequent purchasers. Respondent 1 sued for specific performance of the 1977 agreement. The trial court decreed the suit, and the Madras High Court, by judgment dated 24-01-1994, affirmed the decree. The defendant-appellants have therefore appealed to the Supreme Court.
Before the High Court, the hearing concluded on 22-03-1989, but the judgment was delivered nearly five years later. During the pendency of the Supreme Court appeal, interim relief was refused, allowing Respondent 2 to execute a sale deed in favour of Respondent 1, who has since remained in possession of the property.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the nearly five-year delay between conclusion of arguments and pronouncement of judgment by the Madras High Court vitiates its decision and warrants setting aside the decree for specific performance.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The inordinate delay of almost five years in delivering the High Court judgment is, by itself, sufficient ground to set it aside.
- Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Kunwar Singh v. Sri Thakurji Maharaj, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 125, to support the proposition that such delay undermines the integrity of judicial decision-making.
Respondent 1's Arguments
- Senior Counsel Shri K. Parasaran did not seriously dispute that the prolonged delay could give rise to doubts about whether the submissions were properly considered.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kunwar Singh v. Sri Thakurji Maharaj, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 125 | Long, unexplained delay in pronouncement of judgment can justify setting aside the decision. | Invoked by appellants; the Court, while not elaborating on the precedent, accepted that the delay created sufficient doubt to remit the matter for fresh adjudication. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court declined to consider the broader jurisprudential question raised but acknowledged that a substantial delay in delivering a judgment can foster speculation about whether the parties’ submissions were adequately appreciated. Given that Respondent 1’s counsel did not contest this concern, the Court concluded that the High Court judgment should be set aside on this limited ground alone. It therefore remitted the case to the Madras High Court for de novo consideration on merits and requested an expedited disposal, ideally within six months.
The Court further addressed the interim situation: Respondent 1, having obtained possession through a sale deed executed after interim relief was refused, shall remain in possession as the lawful owner while the decree stands. However, by consent of both parties, he must: (a) refrain from creating any third-party interests in the property during the pendency of the remanded appeal, and (b) deposit net rent or income (after maintenance expenses and taxes) with the High Court, subject to the ultimate outcome of the appeal.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment dated 24-01-1994 set aside; matter remitted to the Madras High Court for fresh decision on merits.
Direct effects include:
- The High Court must rehear and decide the appeal, preferably within six months.
- Respondent 1 remains in possession but is restrained from alienating the property and must deposit rental income as directed.
- No costs were awarded, and all interlocutory applications were disposed of.
The Supreme Court did not lay down a new legal principle; its order is confined to the specific procedural irregularity in this case.
Order
1. The defendant-appellants, who are the subsequent purchasers, are in appeal. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Madras High Court dated 24-1-1994 whereby the decree for specific performance of the agreement passed by the trial court was affirmed.
2. On 26-6-1977 Respondent 2 entered into an agreement with first respondent herein, for transfer of his life interest in the property in dispute. On 29-12-1979, Respondent 2 transferred the rights in favour of the defendant-appellants who are the subsequent purchasers for consideration of Rs 4.40 lakhs. Under such circumstances, plaintiff-Respondent 1 brought a suit for specific performance, which was decreed by the trial court and the appeal preferred to the High Court was dismissed. It is in this way the defendant-appellants are before us.
3. Learned Attorney General appearing for the appellants urged that, before the High Court, the hearing of the appeal was concluded on 22-3-1989 but the judgment was delivered on 24-1-1994 — nearly five years after the hearing was concluded, and this long delay in delivery of judgment by itself is sufficient to set aside the judgment under appeal. Learned Attorney General has also relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kunwar Singh v. Sri Thakurji Maharaj 1995 Supp (4) SCC 125. At present, we are not disposed to go into this broad question as urged by the learned Attorney General. However, it is correct to this extent that a long delay in delivery of judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations in the minds of parties to a case. Moreover, the appellants whose appeals have been dismissed by the High Court may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the Bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment — nearly after five years. This is fairly not disputed by learned Senior Counsel, Shri K. Parasaran appearing for Respondent 1. We, therefore, on this short question, set aside the judgment under appeal without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and remit the case to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh, on merits. In view of the fact, that the matter has been pending for a considerable period of time, we request the High Court to decide the matter expeditiously, if possible, within six months.
4. Before we part with the case, we would like to observe that when this appeal was filed in this Court, the interim relief prayed for by the appellants was refused. As a consequence, Respondent 2 executed a sale deed in favour of Respondent 1 and Respondent 1 came in possession of the property and since then, he continues to be in possession. Under such circumstances, Respondent 1 being the lawful owner, so long the decree remains intact, is entitled to continue in possession over the property in dispute. Learned Attorney General urged that in case Respondent 1 is to continue in possession over the property, the interest of the appellants may also be protected. It is then, learned counsel for the parties made an agreed statement that during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court Respondent 1 shall not create any third-party right in respect of the property in dispute and further, shall deposit the rent/income received from that property in the High Court after deducting the maintenance charges and tax liabilities which shall be subject to the decision of the appeal in the High Court. We order accordingly.
5. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. All the IAs are disposed of accordingly.
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