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State Of Delhi v. Gyan Devi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
An FIR was lodged regarding the death of Smt. Sudesh, the daughter-in-law of Respondent 1 and wife of Respondent 2. After investigation, the police filed a challan under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma, framed charges on 19-02-1996 under Sections 498-A/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against all three respondents and under Sections 304/34 IPC against Respondents 1 and 2.
The accused sought revision (Criminal Revision No. 113 of 1996) before the High Court, which directed the trial court to record medical evidence first and temporarily exempted Respondents 1 and 2 from personal appearance. Four doctors (PWs 1-4) were examined. When the prosecution stated that no further medical evidence would be adduced, the accused moved for discharge; the trial court rejected the request on 14-05-1999.
Invoking Section 482 CrPC, the accused again approached the High Court, which on 07-12-1999 quashed the charge under Sections 304/34 IPC. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the charge framed under Section 304 read with Section 34 IPC against Respondents 1 and 2.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State)
- The High Court erred by evaluating the sufficiency of evidence at a premature stage.
- Interference with a charge before the completion of the prosecution’s evidence is contrary to settled principles governing Section 482 CrPC.
Respondents
- The High Court correctly assessed the medical evidence and found no causal link between the injury and the deceased’s meningitis, justifying quashing of the charge.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Radhey Shyam v. Kunj Behari, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 572 | Court should not prematurely assess evidence at the charge stage; quashing charges under Section 482 CrPC is warranted only in rare cases. | Cited to illustrate that the High Court’s premature evaluation of evidence was impermissible. |
| Mohd. Akbar Dar v. State of J&K, 1981 Supp SCC 80 | Reaffirmed limited scrutiny at the time of framing charges. | Referenced through Radhey Shyam to reinforce the above principle. |
| State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 | Test for framing charges: whether the evidence, if unrebutted, makes out a prima facie case. | Used to show the High Court misapplied this standard. |
| Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142 | High Court’s power to quash charges is to be exercised only in exceptional cases; cannot rely on materials beyond those permissible under Sections 239 & 240 CrPC. | Relied upon to condemn the High Court’s detailed appraisal of affidavit and medical evidence. |
| State of M.P. v. S.B. Johari, (2000) 2 SCC 57 | At the charge stage, court must only see if a prima facie case exists; meticulous weighing of evidence is improper. | Cited to emphasise that the High Court’s detailed scrutiny of medical testimony was legally flawed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court re-iterated that, at the stage of framing charges, the trial court merely tests whether the materials disclose a prima facie case; it is not to examine the sufficiency or reliability of evidence. When an accused petitions under Section 482 CrPC to quash a charge, interference is permissible only to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice, and even then only in rare, exceptional situations.
The High Court, however, sifted through the testimony of four doctors and the post-mortem report to conclude that the stated injury had no nexus with the cause of death (meningitis). Such an evaluation amounted to a premature adjudication on the merits. Moreover, the prosecution had not closed its evidence, and the High Court did not identify any exceptional circumstance warranting immediate intervention. By effectively conducting a mini-trial, the High Court overstepped the limits of its inherent jurisdiction.
Applying the principles from the precedents listed above, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was vitiated by an erroneous approach and could not be sustained.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s order quashing the charge under Sections 304/34 IPC is set aside. The trial court is directed to proceed with the case in accordance with law.
Implications: The criminal trial against Respondents 1 and 2 for culpable homicide not amounting to murder will continue. The judgment reinforces the narrow scope of High Court interference under Section 482 CrPC at the charge-framing stage and does not create new substantive precedent but affirms existing jurisprudence on this procedural issue.
D.P Mohapatra, J.— Leave granted.
2. The limited question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the High Court committed any illegality/error in quashing the charge framed under Section 304 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) against Respondents 1 to 3 by the Sessions Judge in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”).
3. On receipt of a report regarding the murder of one Smt Sudesh, who was the daughter-in-law of Respondent 1 and wife of Respondent 2, the police made an investigation and laid a challan against the three respondents under Section 173(2) CrPC. The Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma, on consideration of the challan and the papers filed along with it, framed charges under Sections 498-A/34 IPC against all the three respondents and under Sections 304/34 IPC against Respondents 1 and 2 vide the order dated 19-2-1996. The charge under Sections 304/34 IPC which is relevant for the purpose of this proceeding is to the following effect:
“And secondly, that you Veer Bhan Gulati and Smt Gyan Devi, on or about 26-11-1991 at H.N.N-11B/II, Dilshad Garden, both in furtherance of common intention caused the death of Sudesh with the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death or with the knowledge that your act was likely to cause her death and thereby committed an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 IPC read with 34 IPC and within my cognizance.”
Shortly after the said order was passed, the accused persons filed a revision being Criminal Revision No. 113 of 1996 in the High Court seeking quashing of the charge under Sections 304/34 IPC which was disposed of by the order passed on 12-12-1997. On a perusal of the said order it appears that the High Court disposed of the revision petition accepting the suggestions made by the counsel for the petitioners (accused) and the counsel representing the State that the Additional Sessions Judge may be directed to proceed to first record the medical evidence in the case and till the recording of such evidence, presence of Gyan Devi and Raj Sehgal i.e Respondents 1 and 2 herein in Court be exempted as they would not be required for the purposes of identification and they can be effectively defended even in their absence. The learned Single Judge accepted the suggestion and accordingly issued direction to the Additional Sessions Judge to record the medical evidence first and till that part of the prosecution evidence is concluded to exempt the aforementioned accused persons from personal appearance in court. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:
“In view of what has been ordered above the learned counsel for the petitioners prays that without prejudice to the pleas which the petitioners may like to take after the recording of the medical evidence, the present petition be dismissed as withdrawn. Consequently, it is dismissed as withdrawn.”
In compliance with the direction in the High Court order, the Additional Sessions Judge recorded the evidence of the doctors i.e Dr S.K Verma (PW 1), Dr Nagendra Prasad (PW 2), Dr V.V Gupta (PW 3) and V.P Gupta (PW 4). Thereafter, the Public Prosecutor representing the State informed the court that the prosecution has no other medical evidence to be led in the case. Thereafter an application was filed on behalf of the accused persons before the learned trial Judge seeking their discharge from the offence under Sections 304/34 IPC which was dismissed by the order dated 14-5-1999. Thereafter, the accused persons filed an application under Section 482 CrPC assailing the legality of the order of the Additional Sessions Judge and also seeking quashing of the charge under Sections 304/34 IPC framed against them. The said petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and the charge framed under Sections 304/34 IPC against Respondents 1 and 2 was quashed by the order passed on 7-12-1999. The said order is under challenge in this appeal filed by the State.
4. From the discussions in the order under challenge, it is patent that the learned Single Judge has sifted the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 in the light of the autopsy report — Ext. PW 1.A, discussed the testimony of the doctors, taken note of the order-sheet dated 3-7-1999 of the trial court in which the statement made by Ms Lata Sharma, APP appearing for the State that no other medical evidence is to be produced by the prosecution and has recorded the finding which reads
“obviously there is absolutely no evidence on record to suggest that aforesaid Injury No. 4 in Ext. PW 1.A was in any way responsible for causing meningitis which disease has been opined by PW 1 to be the cause of death of said Smt Sudesh. That being so, charge under Sections 304/34 IPC could not have been legally framed against the said two petitioners and the same to secure the ends of justice, needs to be quashed under Section 482 CrPC”.
5. Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the appellant, contended that the High Court has clearly erred in passing the order quashing the charge as it has approached the case as if to determine whether the said charge framed against Respondents 1 and 2 will succeed or not. This question, according to the learned Additional Solicitor General, should not have been considered at a stage when before the entire prosecution evidence has not come on record.
6. Shri S.L Aneja, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand contended that the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, has rightly quashed the charge under Sections 304/34 IPC against Respondents 1 and 2.
7. In the backdrop of the factual position discussed above, the question formulated earlier arises for our consideration. The legal position is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. At the stage of charge the court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused persons. It is also well settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC seeking for the quashing of charge framed against them the court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the process of the court a charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the trial court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional cases.
8. In this connection we may refer to the case of Radhey Shyam v. Kunj Behari 1989 Supp (2) SCC 572 in which a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court referring to the decision in Mohd. Akbar Dar v. State of J&K 1981 Supp SCC 80 pointed out that at the stage of framing of charges meticulous consideration of evidence and materials by the court is not required. This Court further observed:
“9. The High Court has also deemed it necessary to quash the charge against Respondents 1 to 3 because in its opinion the evidence proposed to be adduced by the prosecution, even if fully accepted, cannot show that Respondents 1 to 3 committed any offence and referred in that behalf to the decision in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39. We find that the High Court's conclusion about the inadequacy of the evidence against Respondents 1 to 3, besides being a premature assessment of evidence, is also attributable to the wrong premises on which the High Court's reasoning is based.
10. We, therefore, find that there was no warrant for the High Court to quash the charge against Respondents 1 to 3 in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC.”
9. In the case of Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar (1994) 4 SCC 142 this Court considered the question of quashing of charge by the High Court in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. In that context, this Court made the following pertinent observations:
“To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.
Apart from the infirmity in the approach of the High Court in dealing with the matter which we have already noticed, we further find that instead of adverting to and confining its attention to the documents referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC the High Court has dealt with the rival contentions of the parties raised through their respective affidavits at length and on a threadbare discussion thereof passed the impugned order. The course so adopted cannot be supported; firstly, because finding regarding commission of an offence cannot be recorded on the basis of affidavit evidence and secondly, because at the stage of framing of charge the Court cannot usurp the functions of a trial court to delve into and decide upon the respective merits of the case.”
10. In a recent decision in State of M.P v. S.B Johari (2000) 2 SCC 57 this Court, adverting to the question of quashing of charges in the light of the provisions contained in Sections 227 and 288, 401 and 397 and 482 CrPC did not favour the approach of the High Court in meticulously examining the materials on record for coming to the conclusion that the charge could not have been framed for a particular offence. This Court, while quashing and setting aside the order passed by the High Court, made the following observations:
“After considering the material on record, learned Sessions Judge framed the charge as stated above. That charge is quashed by the High Court against the respondents by accepting the contention raised and considering the details of the material produced on record. The same is challenged by filing these appeals.
In our view, it is apparent that the entire approach of the High Court is illegal and erroneous. From the reasons recorded by the High Court, it appears that instead of considering the prima facie case, the High Court has appreciated and weighed the materials on record for coming to the conclusion that charge against the respondents could not have been framed. It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed. The charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the particular offence. In such case, there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.”
Judged in the light of the settled position of law as reiterated in the decisions noted above, the order under challenge in the present case does not stand the scrutiny. The High Court has erred in its approach to the case as if it was evaluating the medical evidence for the purpose of determining the question whether the charge under Sections 304/34 IPC framed against the accused-Respondents 1 and 2 was likely to succeed or not. This question was to be considered by the trial Judge after recording the entire evidence in the case. It was not for the High Court to pre-judge the case at the stage when only a few witnesses (doctors) had been examined by the prosecution and that too under the direction of the High Court in the revision petition filed by the accused. The High Court has not observed that the prosecution had closed the evidence from its side. There is also no discussion or observation in the impugned order that the facts and circumstances of the case make it an exceptional case in which immediate interference of the High Court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is warranted in the interest of justice. On consideration of the matter we have no hesitation to hold that the order under challenge is vitiated on account of erroneous approach of the High Court and it is clearly unsustainable.
11. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order under challenge is set aside. The trial court is directed to proceed with hearing of the case in accordance with law.
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