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Suryanarayana v. State Of Karnataka .
Factual and Procedural Background
Saroja, an unmarried woman who had an extramarital relationship with the appellant, gave birth to a male child. After the birth, the relationship deteriorated; the appellant suspected Saroja of further illicit affairs and subjected her to cruelty. Eight days before her death she left the appellant’s home and stayed with her brother Ravi (PW-1).
On 22-09-1993, while Saroja and Ravi’s four-year-old daughter Bhavya (PW-2) were washing clothes at a village tank, the appellant approached and stabbed Saroja multiple times, causing her death. Bhavya immediately informed her parents, and an FIR was lodged on Ravi’s complaint. During investigation, the appellant made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of the knife (MO-1) and blood-stained clothes.
The appellant was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Court convicted him and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹1,000. The High Court dismissed his appeal. The present decision arises from the appellant’s further challenge by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained primarily on the sole testimony of a child witness who was about four years old at the time of the incident and six years old at trial.
- Whether alleged discrepancies in the child witness’s testimony and the absence of a clear motive raise a reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- It is unsafe to base a conviction solely on the testimony of a very young child; corroboration is necessary.
- Purported discrepancies in the child’s deposition undermine her reliability.
- Because the appellant’s relationship with his lawful wife was cordial, he lacked motive to maintain an illicit relationship with the deceased or to kill her.
- Defence evidence, including testimony of the appellant’s wife (DW-1), casts doubt on the prosecution story.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177 | Child witness testimony must be evaluated with caution; susceptibility to tutoring. | Used as guiding authority on the standard of scrutiny required for PW-2’s evidence. |
| Prakash v. State of M.P., (1992) 4 SCC 225 | Need for adequate corroboration of child witness evidence as a matter of prudence. | Reaffirmed that corroboration is desirable but not an absolute legal requirement. |
| Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 667 | Practical wisdom underlying corroboration of child testimony. | Cited to underscore the approach adopted in examining PW-2’s statements. |
| Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 287 | Same principle regarding careful evaluation of child witnesses. | Relied on to justify reliance on PW-2 after close scrutiny. |
| Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341 | Precautionary rule of prudence in accepting child witness evidence. | Strengthened the court’s cautious but affirmative acceptance of PW-2’s testimony. |
| State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC 70 | Reiteration of the standards for assessing child witness credibility. | Reinforced the court’s analytical framework in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court acknowledged that Bhavya (PW-2) was the sole eyewitness and therefore applied enhanced scrutiny to her evidence. It reiterated that testimony of a child witness is not to be discarded per se, but must be assessed for inherent reliability, possibility of tutoring, and consistency.
PW-2’s deposition identified the appellant as “uncle Suryanarayana” who stabbed her “aunt” Saroja with a knife. Cross-examination did not expose any material infirmity; she firmly denied defence suggestions that she had not witnessed the stabbing. Her presence at the scene was natural, and her account was found spontaneous and consistent with:
- Immediate naming of the appellant in the FIR lodged right after the incident.
- The inquest statement recorded by the Tahsildar, mirroring her trial testimony.
- Medical evidence confirming stab wounds compatible with MO-1.
- Forensic reports showing blood on the recovered weapon and the appellant’s clothes.
The Court held that minor discrepancies, unsurprising for a child of such tender age, did not touch the core of her narration. There was no allegation or indication of tutoring. Defence evidence and suggestions regarding motive or cordial marital relations were found insufficient to dilute the prosecution case.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC affirmed.
Direct implications: the appellant continues to serve a life sentence and pay the imposed fine. The decision reinforces existing jurisprudence that a credible, carefully scrutinised child-witness testimony can on its own sustain a conviction; it sets no new legal precedent but consolidates earlier Supreme Court principles on the subject.
R.P Sethi, J.— Ms Saroja, the deceased had developed intimacy and extramarital relations with the appellant, as a result of which she gave birth to a male child. After the birth of the child differences arose between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant started suspecting the deceased of having illegal connections with other persons. She was subjected to cruelty and harassment. Unable to bear the cruelty of the appellant, the deceased left the residence of the appellant 8 days' prior to her death and started living in the house of her brother Ravi (PW 1). On 22-9-1993 the deceased accompanied by Bhavya (PW 2), the female child of Ravi (PW 1), who was about four years of age, went to the village tank in the afternoon for washing the clothes. While she was washing clothes, the appellant came and stabbed Saroja with a knife, inflicting injuries on her neck, chest and other parts of the body causing severe bleeding resulting in her death. Immediately the child, Bhavya (PW 2) rushed to the house and informed her parents about the occurrence specifically mentioning that the appellant had stabbed the deceased.
2. On the complaint of Ravi (PW 1) an FIR was registered against the appellant and investigation commenced. The Tahsildar P.H Krishnappa (PW 14) prepared the inquest mahazar on the dead body of the deceased and in that process recorded the statement of Bhavya (PW 2). She is stated to have made the deposition in Malyalam which was translated to the investigating officer in Kannada. During the course of the investigation the appellant made voluntary statement Exhibit P-13. In consequence of the disclosure statement made by the appellant, the knife (MO 1), shirt (MO 5), lungi (MO 6) and towel (MO 7) were recovered at the instance of the accused from his house. After completion of the investigation a charge-sheet was submitted before the Judicial Magistrate who committed the accused to the Sessions Court for standing trial for offences under Section 302 IPC. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses. Upon the conclusion of the trial the Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty of the commission of offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life besides paying a fine of Rs 1000. In default of the payment of the fine the appellant was directed to undergo further imprisonment of 30 days. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court vide the judgment impugned in this appeal by special leave.
3. Before appreciating the rival contentions addressed at the Bar, it has to be noticed that the whole of the prosecution case is mainly based upon the statement of the child witness, Bhavya (PW 2). The witness was related both to the accused and the deceased. Shardamma (PW 3) is the sister of PW 1 and wife of the appellant. Deceased Saroja and Smt Nalini are the other sisters of Ravi (PW 1). Bhavya (PW 2) is the daughter of PW 1. The deceased was not married and was earlier residing with her parents who died about 4 or 5 years before the date of occurrence. After the death of her parents the deceased started residing in the house of her sister Nalini. For sometime she also resided with her brother Ravi (PW 1). While the deceased was residing in the house of her sister Nalini, the accused took her to his house where they developed intimacy as a result of which a male child was born to the deceased.
4. Both the courts below have concurrently held that the deceased Saroja met with homicidal death on 22-9-1993 at about 2.00 p.m near Keremane water tank of Village Kanoor. Relying upon testimony of PW 2 it has been held that the appellant had inflicted the fatal blows on the body of the deceased which resulted in her death. The relationship of the witnesses and the illicit relations between the appellant and the deceased have not seriously been disputed by the learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the appellant as amicus curiae. She has, however, stated that it would not be safe to base conviction on the sole testimony of the child witness. She has also pointed out to certain discrepancies in the depositions of the said witness to impress upon us that the prosecution has not proved the case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. Relying upon the defence evidence led in the case it has been argued that as the relationship between the appellant and his wife were cordial, there was no cause or occasion for the appellant to develop intimacy with the deceased, and on alleged breaking of the relationship, cause her death. It is to be noticed that Shardamma, sister of the deceased who was initially cited as a prosecution witness appeared as defence witness (DW 1) besides the appellant (DW 2) himself.
5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of occurrence was about four years of age, is the only solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath. The time and place of the occurrence and the attending circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other person as an eyewitness. The evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base conviction by accepting the statement of the child witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age. The fact of PW 2 being a child witness would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under the normal circumstances, would like to mix-up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony of such witness for the purposes of holding the accused guilty or not.
6. This Court in Panchhi v. State of U.P (1998) 7 SCC 177 held that the evidence of the child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus an easy prey to tutoring. The evidence of the child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied upon, as the rule of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law (vide Prakash v. State of M.P (1992) 4 SCC 225; Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala 1993 Supp (3) SCC 667; Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 287; Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341).
7. To the same effect is the judgment in State of U.P v. Ashok Dixit (2000) 3 SCC 70.
8. In this case Bhavya (PW 2) when appeared before the trial court was of 6 years of age. After questioning the witness, the Sessions Judge found, “though the girl is 6 years old she is active and she understands everything”. Without administering the oath to the witness her statement was recorded wherein she stated:
“I know Saroja, I call her as ammayi, she is my aunt. The person sitting in the court box is my uncle. His name is Suryanarayana. Since I call him as uncle, he is my uncle.
My aunt Saroja is now dead. I know how she died. Several days back after taking lunch my ammayi i.e my aunt Saroja and myself went to the lake to wash the clothes and to take bath. On that day, my uncle Suryanarayana sitting in the court pierced with a knife the stomach and neck of my ammayi. Hence she suffered injuries and her entire body covered with blood. My ammayi while running after being injured, fell down, I screamed. Immediately I ran and told my father and mother that uncle killed the aunt. If the knife is shown I can identify (a white cloth bag sealed, was opened). I have seen the knife now. With the same knife that day my uncle pierced my ammayi (this was marked as Ext. P-01) on that day. Police asked me as to what happened, I have told everything to the police.”
9. In her cross-examination the witness stated that before the date of occurrence the deceased was living with her (witness) parents. At the time of occurrence the witness used to go to aanganwadi school. The witness denied the suggestion that she had not gone with the deceased to wash the clothes. Nothing favouring the defence could be extracted out of her in the cross-examination. She denied the suggestion that “my uncle did not pierce my aunt with the knife. It is not correct that I have not seen the knife in the hands of my uncle”. The trial court as well as the High Court accepted her testimony as no inherent defect was pointed out by the defence. We also find no reason to take a contrary view. The mere fact that her mother had told that she did not know any other language except Malyalam and that the words spoken to by her were not in that language cannot be used as a ground to reject her testimony. The child and her parents conversed in Malyalam language at their residence which was explained to the investigating officer in the language which was understood by him. There is no ground of doubting the veracity of the testimony of this child witness as we find that her name is mentioned in the FIR which is proved to have been recorded immediately after the occurrence. P.H Krishnappa, the Tahsildar who prepared the inquest report is also proved to have recorded the statement of this child witness, wherein, she is shown to have made similar deposition. Otherwise also there is sufficient corroboration on record to rule out the possibility of PW 2 being tutored or used for ulterior purposes by some alleged interested persons. In the absence of any inherent defect we do not find any substance in the plea to reject the testimony of this child witness. The statement of PW 2 shows that the deceased and the appellant were living together as husband and wife and she used to address them as uncle and aunt. Her testimony to the effect of the deceased living with PW 1 is sufficiently corroborated by the other evidence led in the case. The factum of the deceased having received stabbed wound with a knife is proved by the medical evidence. The recovery of the knife at the instance of the appellant, in consequence of his disclosure statement, leaves no doubt to believe her statement. The place of occurrence being near the water tank has not been seriously disputed. The report received from FSL as per Exhibit P-15 shows that blouse (MO 2), towel (MO 3) and the bangle pieces (MO 4) of the deceased and the knife (MO 1) which was used in the commission of the crime, the towel (MO 7), lungi (MO 6) and shirt (MO 5) of the appellant were found to be stained with blood. Dr Ram Dass (PW 12) has opined that the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased could be caused with a weapon like MO 1.
10. On appreciation of evidence in the light of various pronouncements the High Court rightly held:
“The version of PW 2 Bhavya is so truthful that it was rightly believed by the court below. The criticism levelled against the evidence of PW 2 that she was tutored etc. are wholly baseless and are unwarranted.”
11. The defence evidence produced in the case also does not weaken any part of the statement of Bhavya (PW 2). No suggestion was made to the witness for allegedly making a false or tutored statement.
12. Under the circumstances of the case and relying upon the testimony of PW 2 which is found to be not suffering from any infirmity and is corroborated in all material particulars, we find no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed upholding the judgment of the trial court and the High Court.
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