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G. Kaushalya Devi (Smt) v. Ghanshyamdas .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent–landlord purchased the non-residential suit premises on 4-11-1991 to start an independent business. He initiated eviction proceedings against the appellant–tenant under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (“the Act”) on three grounds: (1) wilful default in rent payment; (2) bona fide requirement for personal occupation; and (3) tenant’s alternative accommodation. During the Rent Controller’s hearing the third ground was not pressed.
The Rent Controller found the appellant in rent default and accepted the landlord’s bona fide need, ordering eviction. The Appellate Authority affirmed. In revision under Section 22 of the Act, the High Court set aside eviction on the “wilful default” ground but upheld it on “bona fide requirement.” The tenant then filed the present civil appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, a landlord who already conducts business from leased premises in the same town is precluded from seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide personal requirement.
- How the expression “to the possession of which he is entitled” in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) should be construed—does it include premises merely held as a tenant or only those owned or otherwise held with a superior legal right?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Tenant)
- The eviction order contravenes Section 10(3)(a)(iii) because the landlord is already in possession of non-residential premises (a shop run in partnership as M/s Seetha Traders) in the same town; therefore the statutory pre-condition of the landlord “not occupying” such premises is unmet.
- The statutory phrase “to the possession of which he is entitled” is immaterial to the nature of occupation; even occupation as a tenant brings the landlord within the mischief of the proviso.
- A separate shop purchased by the landlord’s mother (with funds loaned by the landlord) should also be treated as premises to which the landlord is “entitled,” defeating the plea of need.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent-landlord’s specific arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M. Padmanabha Setty v. K.P. Papiah Setty, AIR 1966 SC 1824; (1966) 3 SCR 868 | Interpretation of the phrase “to the possession of which he is entitled” in rent-control legislation (Mysore Act) analogous to Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Act. | The Court adopted the Constitution Bench’s view that “entitled to possession” conveys a positive, ownership-like right and does not encompass mere tenancy; therefore a landlord in occupation as a tenant is not barred from seeking eviction under the clause. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Court compared Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Act with Section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Mysore Act, finding them pari materia.
2. Relying on M. Padmanabha Setty, the Court held that a person merely occupying premises as a tenant cannot be said to be “entitled to possession” within the meaning of the clause. The phrase denotes a superior right akin to ownership.
3. Consequently, the respondent’s occupation of leased premises (as a partner in M/s Seetha Traders) does not bar him from invoking Section 10(3)(a)(iii).
4. The Court noted that all other statutory conditions were undisputedly satisfied and that concurrent factual findings of bona fide requirement by the Rent Controller, Appellate Authority, and High Court were neither perverse nor based on irrelevant material.
5. The contention that the respondent could avail a shop purchased in his mother’s name was rejected by the High Court, and the Supreme Court found no reason to differ, observing that the Act does not attribute possession of premises held by family members to the landlord for this purpose.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The tenant must vacate the premises by 31-10-2000 upon filing the usual undertaking within four weeks. No order as to costs.
Implications: The decision reaffirms that, under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Act, a landlord’s occupation of other premises merely as a tenant does not defeat a claim of bona fide personal requirement. It aligns the interpretation of the Andhra Pradesh statute with the Constitution Bench ruling under the Mysore Act, clarifying that “entitled to possession” refers to ownership or similar superior rights. The ruling affects only the parties and does not create a new precedent beyond this interpretative confirmation.
D.P Wadhwa, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant is a tenant. His eviction from the suit premises has been affirmed by the High Court in a revision filed by him. Feeling aggrieved, he has filed this appeal.
3. The respondent landlord filed an eviction petition against the appellant under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short “the Act”) on three grounds, namely, (1) wilful default in payment of rent; (2) bona fide requirement for personal occupation; and (3) the tenant does not require the premises as he had secured an alternative accommodation. The premises are non-residential. During the course of proceedings before the Rent Controller, the ground of securing alternative accommodation was not pressed. The Rent Controller held that there was default in payment of rent and also that the premises were required bona fide by the landlord for conducting his business. He ordered eviction of the appellant. The Appellate Authority under the Act affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller upholding the eviction of the appellant. Against that order, the appellant filed a revision in the High Court under Section 22 of the Act. The High Court by the impugned judgment was of the view that there was no wilful default in payment of rent by the appellant and on that finding the order of eviction on that ground was set aside. On the remaining ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord, the High Court concurred with the findings of both the courts. This finding has been assailed before us by the appellant.
4. Mr Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the order of eviction of the appellant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord was bad in law as it was contrary to the provisions of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act. He said the landlord was already in occupation of certain shop premises, though on lease, in the same city where he was running his business in partnership. It was, therefore, submitted that the landlord was thus entitled to remain in possession of the shop premises. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act provides for eviction of the tenant when it is found that the landlord requires the building, whether residential or non-residential, for his own occupation. This section, in relevant part, we set out as under:
“10. Eviction of tenants.—(1)-(2)***
(3)(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building—
(i)-(ii)***
(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise—
(a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application; or
(b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence:
Provided that a person who becomes a landlord after the commencement of the tenancy by an instrument inter vivos shall not be entitled to apply under this clause before the expiry of three months from the date on which the instrument was registered:
Provided further that, where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause—
(i) in case he has obtained possession of a residential building, for possession of another residential building of his own;
(ii) in case he has obtained possession of a non-residential building, for possession of another non-residential building of his own.
(b)-(e)***
(4)-(8)***”
5. The suit premises were purchased by the respondent landlord by sale deed dated 4-11-1991 wherein it was provided that the respondent was purchasing the premises to provide accommodation for himself for the purpose of carrying on his own independent business. Admittedly the respondent was already having an established business dealing in ready-made garments in the name and style of M/s Seetha Traders in partnership in the premises which were leased by the partnership. It was thus submitted that since the respondent was already in possession of a non-residential premises in the very same town, ground for eviction as contained in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was not available to him. It was submitted that it was immaterial whether the respondent was in possession of the premises as a tenant or otherwise. We do not think the expression “to the possession of which he is entitled” would mean possession otherwise than as an owner or in that capacity or having a superior right or under any of the grounds under the Act. The expression “to the possession of which he is entitled” was construed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in M. Padmanabha Setty v. K.P Papiah Setty AIR 1966 SC 1824, (1966) 3 SCR 868.
6. This expression was also found in the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 and was the subject-matter of interpretation in the case of M. Padmanabha Setty v. K.P Papiah Setty AIR 1966 SC 1824, (1966) 3 SCR 868. In that case, the landlord filed an application under Section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Mysore Act for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he required the premises in dispute for his own right and occupation. This section in the Mysore Act is as under:
“(3)(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d) apply to the court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house—
(i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of a member of his family and if he or such member, as the case may be, is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned;
(ii) in case it is a non-residential building, if the landlord requires it for a business which he or a member of his family is carrying on and if for the purposes of the said business is not in occupation of a non-residential building which is owned by or to the possession of which the landlord or such member, as the case may be, is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise.
Provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession of a house for his own use or occupation or for the use or occupation of a member of his family under this clause he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause—
(i)***
(ii) for possession of another non-residential building of his own, for himself or for the same member of his family, in case he has obtained possession of a non-residential building.”
The Court held:
“A tenant who can be evicted under the conditions prescribed in Section 8(2) of the Act cannot be said, in our view, to be entitled to the possession of the premises of which he is a tenant. No doubt he cannot be evicted till one or more of the conditions prescribed by the section are fulfilled, but it is difficult to equate his right to stay in the premises till he is evicted to an entitlement of the possession of the premises. Section 8(3)(a)(ii) deals with two types of cases; first where the landlord is in occupation of a non-residential building which is owned by him, and secondly, a non-residential building of which he is in occupation not as a landlord but otherwise. The object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable evictions of tenants. Can it be said that the legislature is considering it to be unreasonable for a landlord to shift to his own premises while he is in occupation of tenanted premises over which he has not an absolute right of possession but only a right to remain in possession till one of the conditions in Section 8(2) is satisfied, and over one of which he has no control? For instance, the landlord may require the premises for repairs or reconstruction or the neighbours may complain that the tenant is guilty of nuisance or annoyance, or the landlord may think that the tenant has committed some acts of waste as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the house. If any of these conditions is proved, he is liable to be evicted. In our view, in the context the words ‘entitled to possession’ have a more positive content and are more akin to the right of possession which an owner has in respect of the building owned and occupied by him.”
7. It will be seen that the provisions of Section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Mysore Act are quite in pari materia with the provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the appellant that since the respondent is already having his business in a leased premises of which he is in possession, he cannot seek eviction of the appellant. It is not disputed that other conditions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) are satisfied in favour of the landlord. A contention was also raised that another shop had been purchased by the mother of the respondent with the amount loaned by the respondent and that on that ground it could also be said that the respondent was entitled to possession of that shop as well. This contention has been repelled by the High Court and rightly so. The High Court upheld the finding of the courts below that the respondent required the suit premises for his personal occupation for conducting the business and that these findings were neither perverse nor based on any extraneous or irrelevant material. The High Court was also of the view that the Act did not prohibit eviction of the tenant by the landlord if the members of the family of the landlord possessed other non-residential premises. Even though the respondent and his brothers were conducting business on partnership basis in M/s Seetha Traders, yet it was no ground to contend that the requirement of the respondent is not bona fide. We agree. No other submission has been made before us to take any different view other than that taken by the High Court.
8. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. However, with the consent of both the parties, we grant time up to 31-10-2000 for the appellant to vacate the suit premises on his filing the usual undertaking within four weeks from today. There will be no order as to costs.
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