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Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant issued a cheque for Rs 20,00,000 in favour of Respondent 1. The cheque was returned unpaid on 2-8-1996 with the remark “insufficient fund.” Within fifteen days, Respondent 1 served a statutory demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the Act”). Because the appellant failed to honour the demand, Respondent 1 filed Complaint Case No. C/1661 of 1996 before the XVIth Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta.
The Magistrate held that the notice was invalid because the demand exceeded the cheque amount, relying on an earlier Calcutta High Court decision, and therefore declined to proceed. Respondent 1 challenged that order in Criminal Revision No. 1611 of 1997 before the Calcutta High Court. On 3-10-1997, the High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order, holding the notice valid as it specifically demanded the cheque amount. The present appeal before the Supreme Court sought reversal of the High Court’s decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the statutory notice issued under proviso (b) to Section 138 is invalid when, in addition to the cheque amount, it also claims incidental and notice charges.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 138 is a penal provision and must be construed strictly; therefore, the statutory notice should demand only the cheque amount and nothing more.
- The inclusion of additional sums (incidental charges and notice charges) vitiates the notice, failing the requirement of demanding the “said amount of money.”
- The presumption under Section 139 operates only where the notice strictly complies with Section 138; a notice making excess demand should not attract the presumption.
Respondent 1's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of Respondent 1’s specific submissions; the court’s reasoning reflects acceptance of the notice’s validity.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 SC 1116; 1963 Supp (2) SCR 724 | Strict construction of penal statutes. | Relied upon to acknowledge that Section 138, being penal, should be construed strictly but still according to its clear language. |
| Dyke v. Elliott (1872) 4 PC 184 | Caution against straining or narrowing the language of penal enactments when the words are clear. | Quoted to reinforce that courts must apply the “fair commonsense meaning” where the statutory language is unambiguous. |
| Central Bank of India v. Saxons Farms (1999) 8 SCC 221; JT (1999) 8 SC 58 | Purpose of statutory notice is to provide the drawer an opportunity to make good the payment before prosecution. | Used to illustrate that payment of the cheque amount within 15 days absolves criminal liability even if additional sums are claimed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the phrase “said amount of money” in proviso (b) and (c) of Section 138 and held that it unmistakably refers to the cheque amount mentioned in the main provision. The Court reaffirmed the principle that a notice must be read as a whole. It laid down the following analytical steps:
- If a notice omits demand for the cheque amount, it is defective.
- If the notice specifies the cheque amount and, in a separable manner, also claims interest, costs, or incidental charges, the additional claims are “superfluous” but do not invalidate the notice.
- An omnibus demand that lumps all sums together without specifying the cheque amount could be fatal, but that situation did not arise here.
- The statutory presumption under Section 139 extends only to the cheque amount; inclusion of other claims does not alter this position.
Applying these principles, the Court reproduced the impugned notice, observing that it expressly demanded Rs 20,00,000 (the cheque amount) and separately mentioned Rs 1,500 (incidental charges) and Rs 340 (notice charges). These additional sums were held severable, leaving the core demand fully compliant with Section 138.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Calcutta High Court’s decision, declaring the notice valid and allowing the criminal complaint to proceed. The ruling clarifies that a statutory notice under Section 138 NI Act is not vitiated merely because it includes separately itemised claims for incidental or notice charges, provided the cheque amount is distinctly demanded. The judgment affects only the interpretation of notice requirements and sets no broader precedent beyond reinforcing the existing principle of severability of ancillary demands.
S.N Phukan, J.— Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 3-10-1997 passed by the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1611 of 1997. By the impugned judgment, the High Court set aside the order of the XVIth Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta passed in Case No. C/1661 of 1996.
3. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:
The appellant issued a cheque for Rs 20,00,000 (Rupees twenty lakhs) in favour of Respondent 1. The cheque was presented to the banker which was returned on 2-8-1996 with the remark “insufficient fund”. Thereafter within 15 days of return of the cheque, Respondent 1 gave a notice of demand as required under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as amended (for short “the Act”). As the appellant failed to meet the demand, a complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate. On a perusal of the above notice, the Magistrate was of the view that the demand made in the notice being higher than the amount of the cheque, the notice was bad in view of an earlier decision of the High Court. Respondent 1 approached the High Court by filing the revision petition which was allowed by the impugned order and the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate was set aside. The High Court was of the view that the decision of the High Court on which reliance was placed by the Magistrate was distinguishable. The High Court held that as in the notice, Respondent 1 clearly demanded the cheque amount, the notice was a valid one and accordingly set aside the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate.
4. We have heard Dr Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr Sanjiv Sen, learned counsel for Respondent 1 and Mr Dilip Sinha, learned counsel for Respondent 2 State of West Bengal.
5. The only question for consideration by us is whether the notice in question issued under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act was valid or not. We extract below Sections 138 and 139 of the Act:
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a)***
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. We have to ascertain the meaning of the words the “said amount of money” occurring in clauses (b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 138. Reading the section as a whole we have no hesitation to hold that the above expression refers to the words “payment of any amount of money” occurring in the main Section 138 i.e the cheque amount. So in a notice, under clause (b) to the proviso, demand has to be made for the cheque amount. Dr Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel has urged that Section 138 being a penal provision has to be construed strictly. We may refer the decision of this Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala AIR 1963 SC 1116, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 724. This Court considered the rule of construction of a penal provision and quoted with approval the following passage of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Dyke v. Elliott (1872) 4 PC 184. The passage runs as follows:
“No doubt all penal statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included if thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument.”
7. There is no ambiguity or doubt in the language of Section 138. Reading the entire section as a whole and applying common sense, from the words, as stated above, it is clear that the legislature intended that in a notice under clause (b) to the proviso, the demand has to be made for the cheque amount. According to Dr Dhavan, the notice of demand should not contain anything more or less than what is due under the cheque.
8. It is a well-settled principle of law that the notice has to be read as a whole. In the notice, demand has to be made for the “said amount” i.e the cheque amount. If no such demand is made the notice no doubt would fall short of its legal requirement. Where in addition to the “said amount” there is also a claim by way of interest, cost etc. whether the notice is bad would depend on the language of the notice. If in a notice while giving the break-up of the claim the cheque amount, interest, damages etc. are separately specified, other such claims for interest, cost etc. would be superfluous and these additional claims would be severable and will not invalidate the notice. If, however, in the notice an omnibus demand is made without specifying what was due under the dishonoured cheque, the notice might well fail to meet the legal requirement and may be regarded as bad.
9. This Court had occasion to deal with Section 138 of the Act in Central Bank of India v. Saxons Farms (1999) 8 SCC 221, JT (1999) 8 SC 58 and held that the object of the notice is to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission. Though in the notice demand for compensation, interest, cost etc. is also made the drawer will be absolved from his liability under Section 138 if he makes the payment of the amount covered by the cheque of which he was aware within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice or before the complaint is filed.
10. In Section 138 the legislature clearly stated that for the dishonoured cheque the drawer shall be liable for conviction if the demand is not met within 15 days of the receipt of notice but this is without prejudice to any other provision of the Act. If the cheque amount is paid within the above period or before the complaint is filed the legal liability under Section 138 will cease and for recovery of other demands as compensation, costs, interest etc., a civil proceeding will lie. Therefore, if in a notice any other sum is indicated in addition to the “said amount” the notice cannot be faulted, as stated above.
11. Drawing our attention to Section 139 of the Act, Mr Dhavan has urged that if in the notice in addition to “said amount” other demands are made the presumption as contemplated under Section 138 would operate. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned Senior Counsel as Section 139 has to be read with Section 138 and reading both the sections together it would appear that the presumption would arise only in respect of the “said amount”.
12. We extract below the relevant portion of the notice:
“I, therefore, by means of this notice call upon you to pay the amount of Rs 20,00,000 along with the incidental charges of Rs 1500 spent on the cheque on its presentation and also Rs 340 as notice charges within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt thereof, failing which my clients shall take necessary legal steps against you holding you liable for all costs and consequences thereof, which please note.”
13. In the notice in question the “said amount” i.e the cheque amount has been clearly stated. Respondent 1 had claimed in addition to the cheque amount, incidental charges and notice charge. These two amounts are severable. In the notice it was clearly stated that on failure to comply with the demand necessary legal steps will be taken up. If Respondent 1 had paid the cheque amount he would have been absolved from the criminal liability under Section 138. Regarding other claims, a civil suit would be necessary.
14. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the present appeal and accordingly it is dismissed.
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