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Haji Saeed Khan And Others v. State Of U.P And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 30-3-1995 for acquisition of land in Village Dhimri Pargana, District Moradabad for a “Planned Development Scheme” to be executed by the Moradabad Development Authority. The State simultaneously invoked the urgency clause under Section 17(4), dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry. Local publications and newspaper notices followed in May 1996, with corrigenda issued on 26-3-1996 and 1-8-1996. A declaration under Section 6 was published on 18-12-1997.
Only some of the affected landholders challenged the acquisition by filing Writ Petitions Nos. 4558, 4736, 709 and 12607 of 1998 before the Allahabad High Court. On 29-5-1998 the High Court upheld the proceedings and vacated an interim stay that had been operating since 19-2-1998. The State took possession on 15-6-1998, which is now undisputed.
The writ petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court. Four statutory appeals and a connected contempt petition (C) No. 62 of 1999 were heard together. During the hearing, Respondents 5, 6 and 7 were transposed as petitioners in SLP (C) No. 10343 of 1998.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the State validly invoked the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, thereby dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry.
- Whether the declaration under Section 6 was issued within the statutory time-limit.
- Consequent upon the above, whether the acquisition proceedings should be quashed or, alternatively, whether justice could be served by shifting the operative date of the Section 4(1) notification to a later date for the limited purpose of determining compensation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Challenged the legality of invoking Section 17(4) and the consequential denial of the Section 5-A hearing.
- Contended that statutory timelines under Section 6 were not adhered to, vitiating the acquisition.
Respondents' Arguments
- Relied on prior Supreme Court decisions to justify invocation of Section 17(4) and compliance with Section 6.
- Suggested, by citing Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44, that if any infirmity were found, the Court could postpone the effective date of the Section 4(1) notification rather than annul the entire acquisition, thereby avoiding further delay and prejudice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 | The Supreme Court may, in the interests of justice, postpone the effective date of a Section 4(1) notification instead of quashing the acquisition. | The Court adopted the same approach, shifting the Section 4(1) date to 15-6-1998 for determining market value, rather than invalidating the acquisition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court noted that actual possession had already been taken on 15-6-1998 and that quashing the acquisition for the limited parcels owned by the appellants would disrupt a larger public housing project and restart protracted litigation. Drawing on Ram Chand and similar earlier rulings, the Bench suggested—suo motu—that justice could be balanced by treating 15-6-1998 (the date of possession) as the notional date of the Section 4(1) notification for purposes of compensation alone.
Both sides accepted the suggestion. The Court therefore:
- Upheld the legality of the acquisition proceedings;
- Fixed 15-6-1998 as the revised Section 4(1) date exclusively for calculating market value for the present appellants;
- Dispensed with the need for a fresh Section 6 declaration, as only the valuation date was modified;
- Directed the Land Acquisition Collector to complete the award inquiry expeditiously.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISPOSED OF; HIGH COURT JUDGMENT MODIFIED.
The acquisition is upheld, possession remains with the State/Town Development Authority, and compensation for the appellants will be determined as if the Section 4(1) notification was issued on 15-6-1998. The benefit is confined to the present appellants; intervenor applications are dismissed; the contempt petition is dismissed as not pressed; and no order as to costs is made. The ruling resolves the dispute without setting a broad new precedent, but demonstrates the Court’s willingness to adjust notification dates to balance equities when possession has already passed to the State.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. Application by Respondents 5, 6 and 7 for being transposed as petitioners, in SLP (C) No. 10343 of 1998 is allowed.
3. These four appeals are filed by the appellants herein questioning the correctness of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 29-5-1998 in a group of writ petitions. The appeals before us arise out of the Writ Petitions Nos. 4558, 4736, 709 and 12607 of 1998. Along with these appeals, Contempt Petition (C) No. 62 of 1999 is also listed.
4. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 30-3-1995. A local publication was made on 17-5-1996 and the notification was published in two newspapers on 19-5-1996 and on 21-5-1996, in the locality. Thereafter, two corrigenda, one on 26-3-1996 and another on 1-8-1996 were also issued. In respect of the second corrigendum, there was local publication on 10-2-1997. A declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made in the Gazette on 18-12-1997.
5. It may here be noticed that though a vast extent of land was acquired in the abovesaid land acquisition proceedings, the writ petitions mentioned above were filed only by a few among the persons whose lands were acquired. In these appeals, we are concerned only with the land belonging to these limited group of appellants.
6. The High Court upheld the land acquisition proceedings and dismissed the writ petitions by judgment dated 29-5-1998. It appears that the stay which was granted by the High Court pending the writ petitions, on 19-2-1998, stood vacated on 29-5-1998 and thereafter, possession of the lands was taken on 15-6-1998.
7. In fact, there is a certificate on record that possession was so taken by the Government. Though there was earlier some dispute in this behalf, these facts are not now in dispute. Land was acquired for purposes of construction of a housing colony under the “Planned Development Scheme” in village Dhimri Pargana, District Moradabad, Moradabad by the Moradabad Development Authority, Moradabad. At the time when the notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 30-3-1995, the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act were invoked and inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was dispensed with. The High Court held that the urgency clause was properly invoked and that a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued within the time-limit prescribed under Section 6 of the Act.
8. In these appeals, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants have argued some of the questions which were raised in the High Court. On behalf of the respondents, we heard Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Additional Solicitor-General and other counsel appearing for the respondents.
9. During the course of arguments, several issues concerning the interpretation of Sections 6 and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act were raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. Learned Additional Solicitor-General relied upon certain decisions of this Court to contend that these contentions raised by the appellants could not be accepted. He has also suggested postponement of the date of Section 4(1) notification rather than quashing the proceedings for that would entail delay and he relied upon the decision of this Court in Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44. In that case, this Court had postponed the date of notification under Section 4(1), instead of quashing the proceedings.
10. In the abovesaid case, such a course was, in fact, adopted, and a reference was made to several judgments of this Court in earlier cases, where this Court in the interests of justice, postponed the date of Section 4(1) notification. Particularly in cases where possession had already been taken, the adoption of a similar procedure appeared in some cases to be necessary.
11. After considering the various contentions that were raised before us, we felt it reasonable that, having regard to the peculiar facts of these cases, interests of justice would be met if the date of issue of Section 4(1) notification is shifted from 30-3-1995 to 15-6-1998, for purposes of fixing the market value of the land owned or possessed by the appellants before us. When the suggestion came from the Bench, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants as well as the learned Additional Solicitor-General appearing for the State of U.P as well as the other counsel for the Town Development Authority also felt that this suggestion was reasonable.
12. The reason why the Court made the above suggestion is that possession has already been taken from the appellants on 15-6-1998. Any fresh direction at this stage might prejudice the interests of both sides. We wanted to avoid fresh litigation. Already there has been litigation for nearly ten years when earlier notifications were questioned or lapsed. Therefore, instead of deciding the matter on merits, we suggested to the counsel on both sides that it would be reasonable if they agreed that the market value of the property could be fixed treating 15-6-1998 as the date of notification under Section 4(1). In fact, out of a large extent of land that was sought to be acquired, the appellants are interested only in small pieces of land and in the event the proceedings being quashed, so far as these small pieces of land are concerned, that would upset the entire purpose of the land acquisition. These were the reasons why we tried to put an end to further litigation and suggested the parties to accept 15-6-1998 as the date of fixing the market value.
13. We are glad that the counsel appearing on both sides has accepted the suggestion from the Court with a view to avoid future litigation.
14. In the circumstances, the judgment of the High Court is modified to the limited extent that the land acquisition proceedings which have been taken in this case are upheld, will be finalised on the basis that Section 4(1) notification was issued on 15-6-1998 and possession which is with the Government and now with the Town Planning Authority is confirmed and is not disturbed. We may also clarify that there is no need to issue any further declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act as we are only fixing a fresh date for Section 4(1) notification. The only step that is required is that the Land Acquisition Collector will proceed with the award inquiry and pass the award in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
15. We may, however, request the Collector to pass the award within a reasonable time. It is also made clear that the benefit of treating 15-6-1998 as the date of Section 4(1) notification is applicable only to the appellants before us and not to others covered by the land acquisition proceedings.
16. So far as the applications for intervention/impleadment in SLP (C) No. 11288 of 1998 is concerned, we are not inclined to allow these applications. They are accordingly dismissed.
17. So far as the contempt petition is concerned, having regard to the reasonable attitude taken by the respondents, the petitioners are not pressing the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.
18. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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