- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Boramma v. Krishna Gowda And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns agricultural land measuring 2 acres 20 guntas in Survey No. 56/7 at Kuruvanka Village, Chaunarayapatna Taluk, Hassan District. On 30-11-1970, Respondent 3, acting as guardian for the minor Respondents 1 and 2, sold the suit property to the appellant. The same day, the appellant executed an agreement (dated 10-12-1970, Exhibit P-1) to reconvey the land to the respondents.
Alleging that they had always been ready and willing to complete the reconveyance while the appellant was not, the respondents filed OS No. 32 of 1973 in the Court of Munsiff, Chaunarayapatna, seeking specific performance. The trial court framed issues including (i) execution of the agreement, (ii) readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs, and (v) entitlement to specific performance. On 29-3-1975 it found in favour of the respondents on Issues (i) and (ii) but dismissed the suit on Issue (v).
The respondents appealed in Regular Appeal No. 27 of 1978 before the District Judge, Hassan. The appellate court affirmed the trial court, additionally noting non-compliance with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.
The respondents then filed a second appeal before the High Court of Karnataka. The High Court framed a substantial question of law regarding compliance with Section 16(c). On 29-10-1990 it allowed the appeal, set aside the lower courts’ decisions, and decreed specific performance in favour of the respondents. The present civil appeal by special leave challenges that High Court judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs had averred and proved continuous readiness and willingness to perform their obligations as required by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
- Whether, in light of the findings on readiness and willingness, the High Court’s interference with concurrent findings of the trial and first appellate courts in a second appeal was warranted.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The High Court’s consideration was perfunctory and ignored adverse evidence, especially the testimony of PW 2.
- Although the lower courts found readiness and willingness before suit filing, evidence (PW 2’s statement) showed the respondents were not ready or willing thereafter.
- Because the respondents allegedly failed to meet Section 16(c) requirements post-suit, the High Court should not have decreed specific performance.
Respondents' Arguments
- Both the trial court and first appellate court had already found the respondents ready and willing to perform their part of the contract (Issue (ii)).
- The only live issue before the High Court was the sufficiency of the plaint averments under Section 16(c), which the respondents satisfied.
- Consequently, the High Court correctly reversed the dismissal and granted specific performance.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court’s sole task in the second appeal was to decide whether the plaint complied with Section 16(c) and, consequently, whether the plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance (Issue (v)).
It noted that both lower courts had already found the respondents ready and willing to perform their contractual obligations (Issue (ii)), and the appellant provided no substantive material to overturn that concurrent finding.
Regarding the appellant’s reliance on PW 2’s cross-examination—specifically the witness’s admission of not tendering or depositing the purchase money—the Court pointed to the Explanation to Section 16(c), which states that actual tender or deposit is unnecessary unless directed by the court. Therefore, PW 2’s statement did not negate readiness and willingness.
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court correctly held the plaint averments sufficient and that its interference in second appeal was justified. Finding no legal error, the Court declined to disturb the decree of specific performance.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decree directing specific performance in favour of the respondents. The immediate consequence is that the appellant must reconvey the suit property to the respondents. The judgment turns on application of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and does not articulate any broader doctrinal development beyond reaffirming the statutory requirement of pleading and proving readiness and willingness.
Order
1. This appeal is from the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, decreeing the suit filed by the respondents for specific performance of contract for sale of the suit land executed by the appellant-defendant in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs on 10-12-1970 (Exhibit P-1).
2. It appears that the agricultural land measuring 2 acres 20 guntas of Survey No. 56/7 situate at Kuruvanka Village, Chaunarayapatna Taluk, Hassan District (referred to in this judgment as “the suit property”) belonged to Respondents 1 and 2, who were minor and under the guardianship of Respondent 3. On 30-11-1970, Respondent 3, as guardian of Respondents 1 and 2, sold the suit property in favour of the appellant and, in turn, the appellant executed an agreement for sale (reconveyance deed) in favour of Respondents 1 and 2. Alleging that they have been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract but the appellant was not willing to reconvey the property in their favour, the respondents filed a suit, OS No. 32 of 1973, in the Court of Munsiff, Chaunarayapatna in 1973. The appellant contested the suit, inter alia, on the grounds: (1) that the agreement (Exh. P-1) was not executed by him; and (2) that the plaintiffs have not been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and there is no averment to that effect in the plaint. The parties went on trial on issues framed by the trial court, of which the material issues for purposes of this appeal are as follows:
“(i) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the 1st defendant has executed an agreement dated 10-12-1970 agreeing to recovery of (sic reconvey) the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs and the 2nd defendant.
(ii) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract as per the agreement dated 10-12-1970.
(iii)-(iv)***
(v) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to specific performance of the agreement dated 10-12-1970.”
3. After the parties led their evidence, the trial court held Issues (i) and (ii) in favour of the appellants but it held Issue (v) against them and dismissed the suit on 29-3-1975. The appellants went in appeal before the District Judge, Hassan in Regular Appeal No. 27 of 1978. The learned District Judge confirmed the findings of the trial court on the said three issues. Indeed, the learned District Judge added that the averments in the plaint do not conform to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and thus dismissed the appeal. In the second appeal filed by the respondents before the High Court, the following substantial question of law was framed:
“Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below were justified in denying the relief of specific performance in spite of the averments in the plaint that the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.”
4. Having noticed the findings recorded by the trial court as well as the first appellate court, the suit notice and having extracted the relevant paragraph in the plaint, the High Court concluded that the respondents complied with the requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and allowed the second appeal, setting aside the judgment of the learned District Judge confirming the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit of the respondents on 29-10-1990. It is that judgment that is appealed against in this appeal by special leave.
5. Ms Meera Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously contended that the consideration of the case by the High Court has been perfunctory; the trial court as well as the appellate court found on consideration of the evidence of PW 2 that the respondents have not been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It is further submitted that the findings recorded by the trial court on Issues (i) and (ii) and confirmed by the first appellate court, pertained to the period before the filing of the suit but thereafter they were not ready and willing to perform, as is evident from the statement of PW 2, as such the High Court ought not to have interfered in the second appeal.
6. Shri Sanjay R. Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the respondents invited our attention to the findings recorded by the trial court as well as the first appellate court on Issue (ii) and submitted that once it was found that the respondents had been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, the only question which the High Court was called upon to consider was whether the averments in the plaint conformed to the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and in the light of that submission that the High Court had recorded its findings and reversed the judgment of the trial court.
7. The short question that arises for consideration is whether interference by the High Court in second appeal was unwarranted.
8. From a perusal of the question framed by the High Court in second appeal, quoted above, it is plain that the only point before the High Court was whether the trial court and the first appellate court were right in deciding Issue (v), namely, whether the plaintiffs have proved that they are entitled to specific performance of the agreement dated 10-12-1970. On Issue (ii), the trial court as well as the first appellate court held that the respondents were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. In view of this finding, the contention that they were ready on the date of filing of the suit but not thereafter, without any material to dislodge that finding, cannot be accepted.
9. As the contention of the appellant in the second appeal was that the averments in the plaint do not satisfy the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, the High Court had to consider that aspect only. Clause (c) of Section 16 provides that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. A perusal of the extract of the plaint found in the judgment of the High Court clearly indicates readiness and willingness of the respondents to perform their part of the contract. No exception can be taken to the findings recorded by the High Court that there has been compliance with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.
10. Ms Agarwal has read to us the statement of PW 2. In the cross-examination, PW 2 stated that he had not offered at any time to Boramma the amount and that he had not deposited any amount in court. Explanation to clause (c) of Section 16 makes it clear that where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money, except when so directed by the court. So the said portion of the statement of PW 2 is inconsequential and does not in any way show that the plaintiffs have not been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. There is yet another sentence to which great importance is attached by the learned counsel to contend that the respondents have not been ready after the filing of the suit and it reads: “I am unable to deposit the amount.” In our view it will not be a sound rule of appreciation of evidence to pick up an answer from the cross-examination of a witness and draw inference taking it in isolation. The court must see as to how consistent the testimony of the witness is and as to how that answer fits in with the rest of the evidence and probabilities of the case. From this sentence stated in the cross-examination where the question is also not recorded, we are unable to infer inability of the respondents in performing their part of the contract after filing of the suit nor can we say that the findings recorded by the trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court that the plaintiffs have been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract have been erroneously arrived at.
11. In the result, we find no illegality in the judgment under appeal. The civil appeal is, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, without costs.
Alert