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Hasan Khan Ibne Haider Khan v. R.H Mendonca And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai issued a detention order dated 12 April 1999 against the appellant under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981, as extended by Government Order dated 30 March 1999. The stated purpose was to prevent the appellant from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The appellant filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court challenging the detention. The High Court rejected the petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the alleged activities of the appellant—extortion, threats and assaults—amounted merely to breaches of “law and order” or rose to the level of disturbing “public order,” thereby justifying preventive detention.
- Whether ancillary objections raised by the appellant (the bailable nature of prior offences, reference to a past conviction under the MRTP Act, and alleged delay in issuing the detention order) rendered the detention illegal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The incidents relied upon were isolated and therefore did not disrupt public order; at most they constituted ordinary law-and-order issues.
- The prior criminal case cited in the grounds involved only bailable offences under the Indian Penal Code, underscoring that the conduct was not grave enough to justify preventive detention.
- Reference to the appellant’s conviction under the MRTP Act was irrelevant and could not support a preventive detention order.
- There was undue delay between completion of the inquiry (late February 1999) and issuance of the detention order on 12 April 1999.
Respondent's Arguments
- The appellant was a “notorious goonda” who, together with associates, routinely extorted money from local traders at knifepoint, thereby frightening the public and disturbing the even tempo of community life.
- Mention of the MRTP Act conviction served only to establish the appellant’s criminal history, not as an independent ground for detention.
- The interval between completion of the inquiry and issuance of the detention order was reasonable because the matter had to be examined at multiple administrative levels before the Commissioner of Police passed the final order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (1999) 5 SCC 613 | Clarified that conduct must disturb the even tempo of societal life, extending beyond ordinary law-and-order problems, to qualify as prejudicial to public order. | The Court applied this test to hold that the appellant’s extortionate and threatening activities affected the community at large and thus disturbed public order. |
| Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police (1995) 3 SCC 237 | Distinguished between “law and order” and “public order”; preventive detention is warranted only when ordinary criminal law is inadequate to curb activities impacting society’s even tempo. | Reinforced the reasoning that the appellant’s activities surpassed ordinary law-and-order infractions, justifying preventive detention. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court adopted the test articulated in Amanulla Khan and Mustakmiya Shaikh to determine whether the appellant’s conduct disrupted public order. The detention materials showed that the appellant, armed with deadly weapons, habitually extorted money from local vendors, assaulted resisters, and instilled such fear that bystanders would not intervene or inform the police. These facts demonstrated that his activities affected the “even tempo of life” in the locality, thereby constituting a threat to public order rather than isolated breaches of law.
The Court rejected the claim that the use of bailable IPC sections indicated a minor disturbance, noting that the community’s unwillingness to assist victims out of fear illustrated the broader societal impact. Reference to the MRTP Act conviction was deemed permissible as part of the appellant’s criminal history, not as an independent detention ground. On the alleged delay, the Court found the six-week period between completion of the inquiry and issuance of the detention order reasonable because the file required scrutiny at multiple administrative tiers before the Commissioner approved the detention.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Bombay High Court’s decision and upheld the detention order. The appellant remains in preventive detention under the 1981 Act. The judgment reiterates the distinction between “law and order” and “public order” and confirms that sustained extortion and intimidation that paralyse a locality justify preventive detention. No new legal doctrine was created, but the decision reinforces existing precedent on assessing public-order disruptions.
S.N Phukan, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant challenged the order of detention dated 12-4-1999 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 read with Government Order, Home Department (Special) dated 30-3-1999, detaining the appellant with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order before the High Court of Bombay by filing a writ petition which was dismissed and hence this appeal.
3. Before the High Court, the detention order was challenged on two grounds, namely, (1) the documents supplied to the appellant were illegible, and (2) if the alleged prejudicial activities of the detenu were accepted on their face value, they would demonstrate a breach of law and order and not public order. The High Court rejected both the grounds. Before this Court only Ground 2 has been canvassed.
4. We may refer to some of the grounds of detention which require our consideration in view of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant.
5. In the grounds of detention, reference had been made to a criminal proceeding registered against the appellant and his associates with reference to an occurrence which took place on 9-12-1998. Harishchandra Gupta went near his place of business and noticed that his younger brother was being assaulted by the appellant and his associates and when he rushed to see his brother, the appellant and his associates assaulted him and when Harishchandra Gupta and his brother sought for help, none dared to come forward to their help.
6. The gist of the statements of Witnesses A and B recorded have been stated in the grounds of detention and their entire statements have also been produced before this Court. From the statement of Witness A, we find that the appellant is a notorious goonda of the locality and with his associates moved about armed with deadly weapons and collected money from the residents and assaulted those who refused to pay. The appellant with his associates went to the fruit-stall of this witness and took out a chopper and started threatening him by using filthy language and on seeing the incident the nearby vegetable and fruit-vendors started running away with their baskets. The passers-by also ran away due to fright. From the statement of Witness B, we find that the appellant and his associates used to collect money from the businessmen on threats of assault and out of fear of the appellant none could dare to inform the police.
7. This Court in Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (1999) 5 SCC 613 considered the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” and referring to an earlier decision of this Court in Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M Mehta, Commr. of Police (1995) 3 SCC 237 held that the fallout and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society and it is the degree of disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which determines whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to a breach of “law and order” or it amounts to a breach of “public order”.
8. Mr Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has urged that the above activities of the appellant were stray incidents and as such did not disturb the public order.
9. Applying the above ratio to the grounds of detention, we find that the appellant extorted money from businessmen and also gave threats to the people at the public place and thereby undoubtedly affected the even tempo of life of the society, therefore, such activities cannot be said to be a mere disturbance of law and order. The contention of Mr Jain has no force.
10. Mr Jain has further urged that the criminal proceeding which was started on the complaint of Harishchandra Gupta was under Sections 341, 323, 334, 504, 506(II) and 34 IPC and all these sections were bailable and in fact bail was granted and, therefore, this act cannot be said to disturb public order. From the grounds of detention, we find that when Harishchandra Gupta and his brother sought for help, none came forward to their help out of fear of the appellant and this fact would show that the activities of the appellant disturbed the life of the people of that area.
11. In the grounds of detention, reference was made to the conviction of the appellant under the MRTP Act. According to Mr Jain, this cannot be a ground for detention of the appellant. Mr Dhabe, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has rightly submitted that reference was made to the above conviction only to show the past criminal history of the appellant.
12. Mr Jain has further submitted that there was delay in passing the detention order. We find that the inquiry was completed during the last part of February at the level of Deputy Commissioner of Police and the final order was passed on 12-4-1999. It cannot be said that there was undue delay and action was being taken in a routine manner, as after completion of inquiry the matter had to be examined at various levels and finally the orders were passed by the Commissioner.
13. For the reasons stated above we hold that the High Court rightly dismissed the petition and we find no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court.
14. The appeal is dismissed.
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