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Parmanand v. Nagar Palika, Dehradun And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was employed by Nagar Palika, Dehradun, and his services were terminated on 31-10-1987 without notice, domestic enquiry or stated reason. He raised an industrial dispute under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which was referred to the Labour Court, Dehradun.
The first respondent (Municipality) objected to the Labour Court’s jurisdiction, contending that it was not an “industry” and that the appellant was not a “workman.” It further asserted that: (i) two brothers could not hold equivalent posts in the Nagar Palika; (ii) the appellant was still a probationer, appointed on 16-12-1986 for one year, and terminated before the expiry of that period; and (iii) Section 6-N of the Act therefore did not apply because his service was unsatisfactory during probation.
The Labour Court rejected these objections, held the Municipal Engineering Department to be an “industry,” found the appellant to be a “workman,” and ordered reinstatement with full back wages.
On writ petition, the High Court reversed the award, relying on Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi v. State of Bihar (1997) 4 SCC 391, and held that because the appointment was governed by statutory service rules and the appellant’s work was allegedly unsatisfactory, the termination during probation was valid.
The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, whose decision is summarised here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Nagar Palika, Dehradun, constitutes an “industry” within the meaning of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- Whether the appellant qualifies as a “workman” entitled to the protective provisions of the Act, including Section 6-N.
- Whether the termination of the appellant’s services during probation complied with Rule 9 of the Nagar Palika Service Rules and Section 6-N of the Act.
- Whether an alleged rule barring siblings from simultaneous municipal employment could lawfully justify the termination.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Numerous Supreme Court decisions hold that, barring a few departments, a municipality is an “industry” under the Industrial Disputes Act.
- No valid rule prohibits two brothers from holding equivalent municipal posts.
- Rule 9 of the Service Rules and Section 6-N were not followed before terminating the appellant.
- No evidence was produced to show the appellant’s work was unsatisfactory during probation.
Respondent's Arguments
- Post-Seventy-Fourth Constitutional Amendment, municipalities have become “constitutional creatures” performing governmental functions and should not be treated as industries.
- The appellant was a probationer; under the Service Rules his employment could be terminated before the probationary period ended.
- The appellant’s termination was justified because two brothers cannot hold equivalent posts in the Municipality.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi v. State of Bihar (1997) 4 SCC 391 | Concept that where appointments are governed by statutory rules, such employment may fall outside “industry.” | Relied on by the High Court; Supreme Court found it inapplicable and declined to follow it. |
| Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675; (1960) 2 SCR 942 | Muncipal activities (except specified regulatory functions) constitute an “industry.” | Supreme Court reiterated this decision to hold Nagar Palika is an industry. |
| Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) 2 SCC 213 | Expanded and affirmed the broad definition of “industry.” | Cited as reaffirmation that municipal services fall within the definition of “industry.” |
| Samishta Dube v. City Board, Etawah (1999) 3 SCC 14 | Applied the “industry” test specifically to U.P. municipalities. | Used to reinforce that inclusion of municipalities in the Constitution does not remove them from the Act’s ambit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Status of the Municipality as an Industry: The Court held that constitutional recognition of municipalities does not alter earlier jurisprudence defining them as industries. The authoritative line of cases beginning with Corporation of the City of Nagpur and reiterated in Bangalore Water Supply and Samishta Dube remains good law. Accordingly, Nagar Palika, Dehradun, is an “industry” under the Act.
2. Probation and Service Rules: Although the appellant was on probation, Rule 9 of the Nagar Palika Service Rules required procedural compliance before termination. The Municipality failed to show such compliance.
3. Evidence of Unsatisfactory Work: The sole witness for the Municipality admitted ignorance of the appellant’s work performance, and no documentary material was produced. Consequently, the plea of unsatisfactory performance lacked evidentiary support.
4. Sibling Employment Argument: No rule prohibiting employment of siblings was produced, while the appellant demonstrated that other related employees were on the rolls. This ground was thus baseless.
5. Conclusion: The Labour Court’s award of reinstatement with full back wages was based on correct application of law and evidence. The High Court erred in overturning it without material justification.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; Labour Court award of reinstatement with full back wages restored. Costs of Rs 10,000 awarded to the appellant.
Implications: The decision reaffirms that municipal bodies in Uttar Pradesh remain “industries” under the Industrial Disputes Act despite constitutional status, ensuring that their employees can invoke industrial dispute remedies. It directly reinstates the appellant with monetary relief but does not create a new legal precedent beyond reinforcing existing authority.
Order
1. The appellant before us is working in the first respondent Nagar Palika, Dehradun. He claimed that his services were terminated on 31-10-1987 without any prior notice or information or after holding a domestic enquiry, much less based on any reason and raised a dispute under the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The said dispute was referred to the Labour Court at Dehradun.
2. After notice, the first respondent raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to hear the matter on the ground that it is not an “industry” for the purpose of the Act and the appellant did not fall within the definition of “workmen”. It is also contended that (i) there is a rule of the Nagar Palika that two brothers cannot be employed to equivalent posts and the appellant's brother was also working in a similar post held by the appellant; (ii) the appellant was a probationer on the date of his termination; he had been appointed on 16-12-1986, placed on probation for a period of one year and his services had been terminated on 31-10-1987. Before the expiry of that period his services had been put an end to. Hence the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act would not be attracted. The Municipality also contended that the work of the appellant was not satisfactory during the probation period.
3. The Labour Court examined the matter on all aspects raised before it. It held that the Engineering Department of the first respondent was engaged in an activity which can be termed to be an industry and therefore held that the appellant fell within the definition of “workmen”. So far as the termination of services of the appellant on the basis that his brother was also employed, it was noticed that there was no rule available in the Nagar Palika to terminate such service. Even otherwise, it was held that the workman being retrenched should comply with Section 6-N of the Act. The Labour Court also noticed that the evidence tendered through DW 1 (an officer of the Municipality) on behalf of the employer that he himself was not aware whether the appellant's work was satisfactory or not during the probation period. No other material was produced before the Labour Court to show that his services had been terminated on that ground. Therefore, the Labour Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and passed an award accordingly.
4. The High Court on a writ petition being presented against that award took the view that the concept of industry should be excluded to the extent the appointments are regulated by statutory rules in a department and relied upon a decision of this Court in Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi v. State of Bihar (1997) 4 SCC 391 and further held that the appellant's work had not been found satisfactory, as such, his services were terminated on 31-10-1987 before the expiry of the period of probation which was in accordance with the Service Rules and therefore action of the first respondent could not have been upset by the Labour Court and allowed the writ petition quashing the award made by the Labour Court. Hence this appeal.
5. Shri Bharat Sangal, learned advocate for the appellant at the very outset pointed out that there are several decisions of this Court holding that a municipality except in relation to certain departments should certainly be treated as an industry for the purpose of the Act. Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate for the first respondent submitted that now the municipalities have become constitutional creatures and their position stands elevated to the status of State and they are carrying on certain governmental functions and therefore the decisions rendered earlier which are not taking note of this position should not influence us in reaching the conclusion that the first respondent is an industry or not. This aspect need not detain us long for the purpose for which municipality or its activities when brought within the purview of the Constitution was entirely different and such inclusion does not take it out of the definition of industry for the activities carried on by that institution is an industry. This Court held in Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Employees AIR 1960 SC 675, (1960) 2 SCR 942 the activity of Municipal Corporation carried on in any of the departments except those dealing with assessment and levy of house tax, assessment and levy of octroi, removal of encroachment and removal and pulling down of dilapidated houses, prevention and control of food adulteration and maintenance of cattle pounds, to fall within the definition of “industry” as arising under the Industrial Disputes Act. This decision was reiterated in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) 2 SCC 213. It is further explained by this Court in Samishta Dube v. City Board, Etawah (1999) 3 SCC 14 with reference to municipalities in the State of U.P In that view of the matter we do not think inclusion of the municipalities in the Constitution by itself would dilute the effect of the decisions referred to by us. Hence we do not think the High Court is justified in holding that Nagar Palika is not an industry for the purpose of the Act.
6. So far as the question raised that the appellant's services have been terminated on the basis that he was a probationer does not merit serious consideration for Rule 9 of the Service Rules of the Nagar Palika has not been complied with before putting an end to his service. We may also as a matter of fact note that no material was made available before the Labour Court to show that the work of the appellant was not satisfactory during the period of probation. On the other hand the sole witness examined on behalf of the Nagar Palika admitted that he is not aware of the fact that the service of the appellant was in any way unsatisfactory. The order putting an end to the services of the appellant is also not made available to us to find out as to on what basis his services have been put to an end. In the absence of any material, we are surprised, as to how the High Court could have reached such a conclusion. On the aspect regarding the siblings being not allowed to work in the same Municipality, no rule is made available but on the other hand the appellant produced material to show that there were several employees on the rolls of the municipalities who are related to one another either as brothers or father and son or in some other manner. In the circumstances, we find that none of the reasons given by the Municipality have any basis therefore the Labour Court was perfectly justified in setting aside the order of termination and directing his reinstatement with full back wages. We have no hesitation to set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Labour Court. The appeal is allowed with costs quantified at Rs 10,000.
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