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Nawab Singh v. Inderjit Kaur .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant filed a suit seeking a permanent preventive injunction to restrain the defendant-respondent from interfering with his possession of a shop. He claims to be a tenant inducted by the respondent under a rent note dated 23-9-1994, a tenancy relationship the respondent vehemently denies.
During trial, after taking approximately fourteen adjournments to lead evidence, the appellant moved an application requesting the court to direct the respondent to produce the original rent note. The trial court rejected this request. On the very next hearing date, the appellant sought leave to produce secondary evidence of the rent note; this request was also rejected. The appellant challenged that order before the High Court in civil revision, but the High Court dismissed the revision. The present appeal is from that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 65(a) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the appellant was entitled to lead secondary evidence of the rent note when the original was alleged to be in the respondent’s possession.
- Whether the trial court acted properly in rejecting the appellant’s application solely on the ground that the copy of the rent note appeared of doubtful authenticity without first permitting the appellant to adduce secondary evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The original rent note is in the custody of the respondent; hence secondary evidence is admissible under Section 65(a) of the Evidence Act.
- The trial court prematurely assessed the genuineness of the copy without giving the appellant an opportunity to prove it.
Respondent's Arguments
- The appellant is protracting the litigation and, being in possession of the premises, seeks to delay the suit’s disposal.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in refusing leave to produce secondary evidence. The statute permits secondary evidence where the original document is in possession of the opposite party (Section 65(a) of the Evidence Act). Determining the authenticity of the copy should occur only after the party has been allowed to adduce such evidence; rejecting the request in limine for “doubtful veracity” was therefore unjustified. Although the respondent alleged deliberate delay, that allegation was not the basis of the trial court’s refusal and could not sustain the order. To balance equities, the Court allowed secondary evidence but imposed costs and a strict timetable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed; both the trial court’s order dated 3-2-1998 and the High Court’s order dated 16-9-1998 are set aside. The appellant is granted leave to adduce secondary evidence of the rent note on a date fixed by the trial court, failing which no further adjournment shall be granted. The appellant must pay Rs 5,000 in costs to the respondent.
Implications: The decision reinstates the statutory right to introduce secondary evidence when the original document is in the adverse party’s possession, reinforcing procedural fairness. The ruling directly affects only the parties and does not purport to establish a new legal precedent on other issues in the underlying suit.
R.C Lahoti, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant has filed a suit for permanent preventive injunction restraining the defendant-respondent from interfering with the possession of the appellant. The appellant alleges himself to be a tenant in the suit shop inducted by the defendant-respondent as per a rent note dated 23-9-1994. The tenancy is seriously disputed by the respondent. At the trial, after having taken about 14 adjournments for adducing evidence, the appellant moved an application seeking production of the rent note from the custody of the respondent, which application was rejected by the trial court. On the next date of hearing the appellant moved an application seeking leave of the Court for production of secondary evidence of the rent note dated 23-9-1994, which application has also been rejected by the trial court. This order was challenged by the appellant by filing a civil revision before the High Court which has been dismissed.
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the trial court was not justified in rejecting the prayer seeking leave of the Court for production of secondary evidence. The prayer has been rejected mainly on the ground that the copy of the rent note sought to be produced by the appellant was of doubtful veracity. The trial court was not justified in forming that opinion without affording the appellant an opportunity of adducing secondary evidence. The appellant has alleged the original rent note to be in possession of the respondent. The case was covered by clause (a) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant was protracting the trial and being in possession of the premises was interested in delaying the hearing of the suit. That may or may not be true but the fact remains that that is not the reason on which the rejection by the trial court is founded. In our opinion, the ends of justice would be satisfied if the appellant is allowed an opportunity of adducing secondary evidence but subject to terms.
5. The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the trial court dated 3-2-1998 and the order of the High Court dated 16-9-1998 passed in revision are both set aside. The appellant is granted leave of adducing secondary evidence of the existence, condition and contents of the rent note dated 23-9-1994. The trial court shall appoint a date on which the appellant shall have the liberty of adducing such secondary evidence as he may choose to do but if he fails to adduce such evidence on the appointed date, he shall not be entitled to an adjournment for the purpose. The appellant shall also be liable to pay costs quantified at Rs 5000 (Rupees five thousand only) to the respondent, having regard to all the circumstances.
6. We make it clear that we have neither formed nor expressed any opinion touching the merits of the controversy in issue before the trial court.
7. The appeal stands disposed of in the abovesaid terms.
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