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Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns a shop premises in Solapur, Maharashtra. In 1975 the appellant-landlord sought eviction of the respondent-tenant on multiple grounds under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (“the Act”). The trial court rejected all grounds. On 30-08-1982 the appellate court upheld only one ground—Section 13(1)(g), i.e., that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his own occupation to start a business in electrical goods—and granted a decree for eviction with four months’ time to vacate.
The tenant filed a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court, obtaining a stay of eviction. After about 15 years, a Single Judge of the High Court set aside the eviction decree, holding that the landlord had not proved the bona fides of his requirement because he lacked “know-how” or experience in the proposed business. The landlord then approached the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 13(1)(g) of the Act, a landlord must prove prior experience or “know-how” in the proposed business to establish a bona fide and reasonable requirement for the premises.
- Whether the High Court, exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, exceeded its permissible limits by overturning concurrent findings of fact made by the lower appellate court.
- Whether the matter should be remitted to the High Court to consider the unresolved issue regarding availability of alternative premises for either party.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant-Landlord’s Arguments
- The High Court erred in assuming that prior experience in the intended business is a prerequisite for proving bona fide requirement.
- The High Court transgressed the limits of Article 227 jurisdiction by re-appreciating evidence and upsetting a factual finding rendered by the appellate court.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent-tenant’s legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined Section 13(1)(g) of the Act, emphasizing that the expression “reasonably and bona fide required” demands genuine need judged by a reasonable standard, but does not mandate demonstration of dire necessity. A landlord bears the burden of proving his requirement, yet there is no statutory presumption against the landlord’s bona fides.
The Court noted that the lower appellate court had found the landlord’s diploma in Electrical Engineering sufficient to support the genuineness of his plan to start an electrical-goods business and expressly held that prior practical experience is not always necessary. The High Court’s contrary view—treating lack of “know-how” as fatal—was described as “fallacious and unpragmatic,” potentially stifling entrepreneurship. The Court observed that many ventures are begun by novices and that experience can be acquired during the course of business.
Further, the Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a jurisdictional error by interfering with concurrent findings of fact merely because the Single Judge held a different personal opinion on business initiation. Such re-appreciation of evidence exceeded the limits of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.
However, the Court recognized that the High Court had left undecided an additional contention—whether either party possessed alternative premises. As that issue remained unresolved, the matter required remittal.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; writ petition remitted to the Bombay High Court for fresh disposal limited to the unresolved issue concerning alternative accommodation.
Immediate Effect: The eviction decree granted by the appellate court is revived for the time being, but final relief depends on the High Court’s determination of the remaining issue. Broader Implication: The decision clarifies that lack of prior experience does not, by itself, negate a landlord’s bona fide requirement under Section 13(1)(g), and underscores the limited scope of Article 227 review over factual findings.
K.T Thomas, J.— Leave granted.
2. This litigation, even by now a quarter of a century old, shows fortune's fluctuations as between a landlord and his tenant. The latest gainer is the tenant when the High Court of Bombay saved him from the peril of eviction. It is now the turn of the landlord and hence he challenged the judgment by filing this appeal by special leave.
3. In the year 1975, the appellant-landlord spread his net so wide with multi-spoked grounds, as to catch the tenant by an order of eviction on the expectation that at least one of the grounds would click and the tenant could be evicted from a shop room situated at Solapur (Maharashtra). But the trial court found none of the grounds in his favour and consequently non-suited him. However, the appellate court, after testing all the grounds employed by the landlord, found all of them but one unsubstantiated. The one on which the appellate court favoured the landlord was the ground envisaged in Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”). Resultantly the appellate court granted a decree for eviction with a rider that the tenant need vacate the premises only within four months. The appellate court passed the judgment on 30-8-1982.
4. The tenant very soon filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution in challenge of the decree for eviction and got it stayed. It took 15 long years for the High Court to dispose of the writ petition as per the impugned judgment. A Single Judge of the High Court interfered with the finding on facts and held that the landlord has failed to prove the bona fides of his claim for requirement of the building to start a business therein. Learned Single Judge observed that the landlord has not proved that he has the know-how to do such a business.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court adopted an erroneous view that a man can think of starting a new business only if he has experience in that business field. Alternatively learned counsel contended that the High Court has overstepped its jurisdictional contours under Article 227 of the Constitution in upsetting a finding on fact entered by the fact-finding court.
6. The relevant provision under which a landlord can seek a decree for eviction of his tenant for his own occupation of the building is Section 13(1)(g) of the Act. It reads thus:
“13. When landlord may recover possession.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of Sections 15 and 15-A, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied—
(a)-(f)***
(g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust;”
7. Sections 15 and 15-A are not applicable in this case and hence we are not bothered about their implications. The grounds mentioned in clause (g) are couched in a language to provide emphasis to the genuineness of the requirement of the landlord by using the words “reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord”. In fact both the terms (reasonably and bona fide) are complementary to each other in the context, for any unreasonable requirement is not bona fide. Vice versa it can also be spelt that if the requirement has to be bona fide it must necessarily be reasonable also. But when the legislature employed the two terms together the message to be gathered is that the requirement must be really genuine from any reasonable standard. All the same, the genuineness of the requirement is not to be tested on a par with the dire need of a landlord because the latter is a much greater need.
8. When a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation there is no doubt he has to prove it. But there is no warrant for presuming that his need is not bona fide. The statute enjoins that the court should be satisfied of his requirement. So the court would look into the broad aspects and if the court feels any doubt about the bona fides of the requirement it is for the landlord to clear such doubts. Even in a case where the tenant does not contest or dispute the claim of the landlord the court has to look into the claim independently albeit the landlord's burden gets lessened by such non-dispute. In appropriate cases it is open to the court to presume that the landlord's requirement is bona fide and put the contesting tenant to the burden to show how the requirement is not bona fide.
9. In this case the appellate court found that the landlord's requirement to occupy the building is to start a business in electrical goods. The fact that the landlord is a holder of a diploma in Electrical Engineering was counted as a factor lending assurance that he would be genuinely contemplating such a business idea. Regarding the contention of the respondent-tenant that the landlord has not acquired practical experience in the business of electrical goods the appellate court has observed that it is not necessary in every case that the landlord should establish previous experience for starting a new business.
10. But the High Court took a different view. This is what the learned Single Judge of the High Court has said in the impugned judgment:
“In order to establish that he is in a position to start the said business, it was necessary for the landlord to place material on record to show that he has the know-how necessary for starting business of sale of electrical goods. For considering whether the landlord has necessary know-how to start the business of selling electrical goods only, the fact that he holds a diploma in Electrical Engineering, in my opinion, would not be sufficient. It was necessary for the landlord to place material on record which would show that either he has experience of the business that he proposes to start or that even though he has no experience of the business he has knowledge of the business sufficient to start the business of his own.”
11. Learned Single Judge opted to interfere with the fact-finding only on the premise that in his opinion “if the landlord is really in a position to commence the business one of the ingredients that has to be established by the landlord is that he possesses the know-how necessary for doing the business”.
12. If a person wants to start a new business of his own it may be to his own advantage if he acquires experience in that line. But to say that any venture of a person in the business field without acquiring past experience reflects lack of his bona fides is a fallacious and unpragmatic approach. Many a business has flourished in this country by leaps and bounds which was started by a novice in the field; and many other business ventures have gone haywire despite vast experience to the credit of the propounders. The opinion of the learned Single Judge that acquisition of sufficient know-how is a precondition for even proposing to start any business, if gains approval as a proposition of law, is likely to shatter the initiative of young talents and deter new entrepreneurs from entering any field of business or commercial activity. Experience can be earned even while the business is in progress. It is too pedantic a norm to be formulated that “no experience no venture”.
13. That apart, the appellant is not a total novice in the field of dealings in electrical equipment. The fact that the discipline in his academic specialisation was Electrical Engineering is quite indicative of some knowledge he has in the subject, though a business in such commodities may have different phases. Learned Single Judge seems to have written him off as a person totally unfamiliar with any transaction in electrical goods. Such an angle is not a charitable view towards the landlord. At any rate there may be differing views for different people on how to start a business. The High Court has committed jurisdictional error in upsetting a fact-finding merely on the individual view held by the learned Judge about a business venture. We have no doubt that reversal of the appellate court order on the above ground is unsupportable in law and hence is liable to be interfered with. We do so.
14. But there is one point which the respondent-tenant urged in the High Court and which learned Single Judge avoided discussing on the premise that dislodgement of the appellant in the suit on one ground is enough. This is what the High Court said about it:
“In the present petition, the landlord has filed a civil application to point out that the tenant has some other premises where he can shift his business. There is a rejoinder filed by the tenant, disputing that statement of the landlord and it is pointed out that it is the landlord himself who has other premises available to him for starting his business. That fact is also disputed by the landlord by filing a rejoinder. However, since I have held that the landlord failed to establish one of the necessary ingredients for establishing that he needs the suit premises bona fide for his own business, it is not necessary for me to consider the civil application filed by the landlord.”
15. Now that point needs consideration by the High Court as we have upset the finding in the impugned judgment regarding the first point. Hence the writ petition has to go back to the High Court for disposal afresh. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and remit the writ petition to the High Court for disposal after deciding the remaining point referred to above.
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