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Manzoor Ahmed Magray v. Ghulam Hassan Aram And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns 17 kanals and 2 marlas of orchard land at Shankerpora, Tehsil Chadoora, District Srinagar. On 14-7-1971 Defendant 1 (Mohammad Yousuf Magray) agreed to sell the land to the plaintiff for Rs 72,500, accepting Rs 2,000 as advance. The agreement recited that Defendant 1 could act for his brother (Defendant 2) and minor son (Defendant 3), who were recorded co-owners.
Alleging that Defendant 1 reneged because of rising land prices, the plaintiff first sought an injunction and later, on 24-5-1974, filed Suit No. 22 of 1974 in the Jammu & Kashmir High Court for specific performance. At that time Defendant 2 was a major and Defendant 3 a minor; a guardian ad litem was appointed for the latter.
The Single Judge decreed specific performance only for Defendant 1’s 1/3 share and dismissed the suit against Defendants 2 and 3. Both the plaintiff and Defendant 1 appealed. A Division Bench dismissed Defendant 1’s appeal and, partly allowing the plaintiff’s appeal, granted specific performance for Defendant 3’s 1/3 share, but maintained dismissal regarding Defendant 2.
Defendant 1 (SLPs Nos. 18241-42 of 1998) and Defendant 3 (SLPs Nos. 16649-50 of 1998) approached the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the presence of a Rs 10,000 “penalty” clause in the sale agreement barred a decree for specific performance under Section 23 of the J&K Specific Relief Act.
- Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations, and whether delay in filing the suit justified refusing equitable relief.
- Whether the contract was indivisible, thereby precluding specific performance of only part (1/3 or 2/3) of the land.
- Whether statutes governing agrarian reform and prohibition on alienation of orchards barred transfer of the suit land.
- Whether Defendant 1 could validly agree to sell the share standing in the name of his minor son (Defendant 3).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments (Defendants 1 & 3)
- The penalty clause provided an exclusive remedy of Rs 10,000, making specific performance impermissible.
- The plaintiff lacked readiness and willingness; the contract required completion within 1½ months, and the suit was delayed.
- The contract was indivisible; Sections 14 and 15 of the J&K Specific Relief Act barred partial enforcement.
- The J&K Agrarian Reforms Acts and the J&K Prohibition on Conversion of Land and Alienation of Orchards Act, 1975 prohibited alienation of the suit land.
- A father cannot transfer the minor son’s share.
Plaintiff/Respondent’s Position
- He was always ready and willing, had issued notice on 23-11-1972, and had funds to pay the consideration.
- Defendant 1’s own admissions showed that execution failed only because Defendants 2 and 3 refused.
- The penalty clause was merely to secure performance, not an alternative to it.
- Statutory prohibitions did not apply to orchard land or, at most, required permission at the stage of conveyance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M.L. Devender Singh v. Syed Khaja (1973) 2 SCC 515 | A penalty clause does not bar specific performance unless payment is an agreed alternative to performance. | Used to reject the argument that the Rs 10,000 clause excluded specific performance. |
| Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal (1979) 4 SCC 393 | Stipulated damages aimed at securing performance do not preclude a decree for specific performance. | Further supported enforceability notwithstanding the penalty clause. |
| Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh (1990) 3 SCC 517 | Specific performance can be granted against a co-owner for his identifiable share even if another co-owner refuses. | Relied on to uphold decrees for 1/3 and 2/3 shares despite contract allegedly being “indivisible.” |
| Bai Dosabai v. Mathurdas Govinddas (1980) 3 SCC 545 | Statutory prohibition on alienation does not bar a decree; the decree can be moulded to require statutory permission. | Cited to dismiss the contention that the Orchards Act barred specific performance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Penalty Clause: The Court characterised the Rs 10,000 clause as a penalty “for securing the performance of the contract,” not an optional substitute for conveyance. Therefore, Section 20 of the J&K Specific Relief Act expressly allowed specific performance despite a named sum for breach.
Readiness and Delay: Defendant 1 never entered the witness box, and his pleadings admitted willingness to convey his own share but blamed co-owners. Evidence showed the plaintiff had funds, served notice, and filed within limitation. Hence, the equitable requirement of readiness and willingness was met.
Divisibility of Contract: Section 15 of the J&K Act empowers courts to order performance of so much of the contract as a party can perform. Precedent confirmed that a co-owner’s identifiable share may be specifically enforced. Accordingly, decrees confined to shares of Defendants 1 and 3 were valid.
Statutory Prohibitions on Alienation: The Agrarian Reforms Acts exclude orchards from the definition of “land.” Section 3 of the Orchards Act merely requires prior permission for transfer and does not bar a decree; permission can be sought after judgment.
Minor’s Share: Evidence, including the agreement recital, showed Defendant 1 bought the land with his own funds and placed part in his son’s name. With no contrary evidence from the now-major son, the High Court rightly treated the father as beneficial owner capable of conveying that share.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED. Both sets of appeals were rejected. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decree granting specific performance for the 1/3 share of Defendant 1 and the 1/3 share standing in Defendant 3’s name. It ordered the Receiver to deliver possession of land already conveyed and directed parties to obtain any statutory permission necessary for execution of the remaining sale deed; the High Court Registrar may act if defendants do not cooperate.
Implications are confined to the parties: the plaintiff secures conveyance and possession of two-thirds of the orchard. The decision reiterates established principles on penalty clauses, partial specific performance, and statutory permissions, but does not announce new precedent.
M.B Shah, J.— Leave granted.
2. These appeals are filed by Original Defendant 1, Mohammad Yousuf Magray, Defendant 3 (Manzoor Ahmed Magray, son of Mohammad Yousuf Magray) against the judgment and decree dated 14-8-1998 in CIAs Nos. 6 and 8 of 1982 passed by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. The dispute pertains to orchard land measuring 17 kanals and 2 marlas, comprised in Khasra No. 191/45, Khewat No. 43, situated at Shankerpora, Tehsil Chadoora, District Srinagar along with trees. It is the case of the plaintiff that Mohammad Yousuf Magray had entered into an agreement dated 14-7-1971 for sale of suit land in favour of the plaintiff; the price of the land was fixed at Rs 4250 per kanal and an advance of Rs 2000 was paid by the plaintiff to Defendant 1; the sale transaction was to be completed within one and a half months. The agreement further stated that Defendant 1 had an authority from his younger brother, Defendant 2 to sell the land and was also entitled to transfer the same on behalf of his minor son, Defendant 3. It was stated that the land was purchased by him. His younger brother and son (both minor) were benamidar co-owners. Out of the agreed sale consideration of Rs 72,500, a sum of Rs 60,000 was to be paid by the plaintiff to Defendant 1 at the time of execution of the sale deed and delivery of possession. Balance amount was to be paid by the plaintiff at the time of registration of the sale deed. It was contended by the plaintiff that as there was escalation in the prices of land, Defendant 1 dishonestly refused to perform his part of the contract and, therefore, notice was issued for performance of the contract. As the plaintiff apprehended that the defendants were likely to alienate the suit land, the plaintiff filed the suit for injunction in the Court of the IInd Additional Munsif, Srinagar. Thereafter, as the defendant refused to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff had filed the present Suit No. 22 of 1974 on 24-5-1974 for specific performance of the contract before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir.
3. On the day when the suit was filed, Defendant 2 (brother of Defendant 1) was a major. However, Defendant 3 was a minor and, therefore, the Court appointed Shri K.K Dhar as guardian who appeared on his behalf during the course of trial. In the written statement filed by Defendant 1, he has admitted the execution of the agreement dated 14-7-1971. However, he denied that Defendants 2 and 3 were his benamidars. It was contended that the entire land did not belong to him but Defendants 2 and 3 were co-owners. He submitted that he had offered to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff qua his share but it could not materialise because the plaintiff was unable to persuade the other defendants to similarly execute the sale deed of their respective shares. Lastly, it was contended that the plaintiff had no ready money and he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Additionally, it was contended that as the agreement was not executed by all the co-owners, it could not be specifically enforced. In his written statement, Defendant 2 stated that the land was purchased jointly and that all the three defendants were full-fledged owners of 1/3rd share each. Regarding the agreement for sale, he feigned ignorance. On behalf of Defendant 3, written submission was filed contending that Defendant 1 had no authority to permanently transfer his share in the land.
4. It has to be stated that at the time of trial, the defendants never stepped into the witness box. The learned Single Judge after considering the evidence on record partly decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract so far as it related to 1/3rd share of Mohammad Yousuf Magray (Defendant 1) and dismissed the suit against Defendants 2 and 3. Against the said judgment, original plaintiff Ghulam Hassan Aram preferred CIA No. 6 of 1982; Defendant 1 preferred CIA No. 8 of 1982 which came up for hearing before the Division Bench. The Court dismissed the appeal (CIA No. 8 of 1982) filed by Defendant 1 with costs and partly allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and decreed the suit so far as it related to 1/3rd share of Manzoor Ahmad Magray, son of Defendant 1.
5. Against that judgment and decree, Defendant 1 has filed SLPs Nos. 18241-42 of 1998 and Defendant 3 has filed SLPs Nos. 16649-50 of 1998. At the time of hearing of this appeal, learned counsel, Mr Thakur appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the High Court is illegal and erroneous because:
(a) The agreement itself provides a default clause to the effect that in case of non-fulfilment of the agreement, the defaulting party shall pay to the other, an amount of Rs 10,000 as damages and shall be bound to pay the same. Therefore, in view of Section 23 of the Jammu & Kashmir Specific Relief Act, decree for the specific performance is not required to be granted.
(b) The plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and there is the specific condition in the agreement that the sale deed is to be executed within a period of one and a half months after obtaining the copies of the site plan and extracts of the revenue entries from the patwari concerned.
(c) Delay in filing the suit which also indicates that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in such cases, it is the discretion of the court not to grant relief of specific performance.
(d) The contract is indivisible and, therefore, there was no question of granting specific performance of the contract of 1/3rd share or 2/3rds share. For this purpose, he relied upon Sections 14 and 15 of the J&K Specific Relief Act, 1977 Smvt.
(e) Suit land cannot be alienated or transferred in view of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 and the Jammu and Kashmir Prohibition on Conversion of Land and Alienation of Orchards Act, 1975.
Re: Contention (a) —The default clause providing for damage of Rs 10,000, decree specifically cannot be granted
6. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention referred to the last part of the agreement which provides that if any party violates the terms and conditions of the agreement, he will be liable to pay Rs 10,000 as penalty to the other party. He, therefore, submitted that at the most, the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages to the tune of Rs 10,000 and there is no question of passing a decree for specific performance.
7. From a reading of the aforesaid clause in the agreement, it can be stated that it is strictly a penalty clause for securing the performance of the contract. It only provides that if any party violates the terms and conditions of the agreement, he would be liable to pay a penalty of Rs 10,000. This would not mean that the contract is not to be performed. It would only mean that if there is a breach of some terms and conditions of the contract, the defaulting party has to pay the penalty specified therein. The said clause, also, does not provide that in case a sale deed is not executed, damages to the tune of Rs 10,000 are to be awarded. While dealing with a similar contention and a clause in the contract providing that in case of failure of compliance with the terms of agreement, the vendor will be liable to refund security deposit and to pay damages equal to the security, this Court in M.L Devender Singh v. Syed Khaja (1973) 2 SCC 515 held that there was no mention anywhere in the contract that the party to it will have the option to either fulfil the contract to buy or sell or to pay the liquidated damages or penalty of Rs 20,000 stipulated for a breach as an alternative to performance of the contract to buy or sell. The Court considered the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, particularly Section 23 (which is similar to Section 20 of the Act of 1877) and held that Section 23 of the Act of 1963 contains a comprehensive statement of the principles on which, even before the Act of 1963, the presence of a term in a contract specifying a sum of money to be paid for a breach of the contract is to be construed. The Court observed:
“Where payment is an alternative to carrying out the other terms of the contract, it would exclude, by the terms of the contract itself, specific performance of the contract to convey a property.”
8. Thereafter the Court quoted with approval the following principles stated in Sir Edward Fry's Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts (6th Edn., at p. 65):
“From what has been said it will be gathered that contracts of the kind now under discussion are divisible into three classes—
(i) where the sum mentioned is strictly a penalty — a sum named by way of securing the performance of the contract, as the penalty is a bond;
(ii) where the sum named is to be paid as liquidated damages for a breach of the contract;
(iii) where the sum named is an amount the payment of which may be substituted for the performance of the act at the election of the person by whom the money is to be paid or the act done.
Where the stipulated payment comes under either of the two first-mentioned heads, the court will enforce the contract, if in other respects it can and ought to be enforced, just in the same way as a contract not to do a particular act, with a penalty added to secure its performance or a sum named as liquidated damages, may be specifically enforced by means of an injunction against breaking it. On the other hand, where the contract comes under the third head, it is satisfied by the payment of the money, and there is no ground for the court to compel the specific performance of the other alternative of the contract.”
9. The Court also held that the fact that the parties themselves have provided a sum to be paid by the party breaking the contract does not, by itself, remove the strong presumption contemplated by the use of the words “unless and until the contrary is proved” in Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963. The sufficiency or insufficiency of any evidence to remove such a presumption is a matter of evidence. Similar clause was interpreted by this Court in the case of Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal (1979) 4 SCC 393 and it was observed that a perusal of the terms of the contract indicated that stipulation for damages was made only for the purpose of securing performance of the contract and not for the purpose of giving an option of paying money in lieu of specific performance. The Court observed:
“Even if a sum has been named in the contract for sale as the amount to be paid in case of a breach the appellant is entitled in law to the enforcement of the agreement.”
10. Further, for the purpose of the present matter, Section 20 and the illustration therein of the Specific Relief Act, 1977 (1920 AD) of Jammu & Kashmir which is applicable to the parties makes it explicitly clear thus:
“20. A contract, otherwise proper to be specifically enforced, may be thus enforced, though a sum be named in it as the amount to be paid in case of its breach, and the party in default is willing to pay the same.
Illustration
A contracts to grant B an underlease of property held by A under C, and that he will apply to C for a licence necessary to the validity of the underlease, and that, if the licence is not procured, A will pay B Rs 10,000. A refuses to apply for the licence and offers to pay B the Rs 10,000. B is nevertheless entitled to have the contract specifically enforced if C consents to give the licence.”
11. Hence, there is no substance in the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellant.
Re: Contentions (b) and (c) — Plaintiff not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that there was delay in filing the suit
12. For this contention, it is to be stated that it depends upon the evidence which is led by the parties before the court. In the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and to abide by its terms. In the written statement filed by Defendant 1, it has been stated that he was always ready and willing to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff to the extent of his share in the suit land but the plaintiff was avoiding because he was pursuing the other defendants who were not ready to execute the sale deed for their shares. Defendant 1 has also stated that the plaintiff had no ready money with him and, therefore, also he avoided execution of the document. It is to be stated that after filing his written statement, Defendant 1 has not stepped into the witness box. Still, however, from the written statement of Defendant 1, it is clear that the sale deed could not be executed only because Defendants 2 and 3 were not prepared to execute the sale deed. Hence, it cannot be stated that there was any delay on the part of the plaintiff which would disentitle him to get the equitable relief. Further, the plaintiff has deposed that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Notice dated 23-11-1972 was also served on Mohd. Yousuf for execution of the sale deed. He has also denied the suggestion that he was not ready to purchase the suit land within the stipulated time. He also deposed that he was in a position to pay the sale consideration of Rs 70,000, which was not challenged in the cross-examination. There is nothing on record to suggest that the defendants have shown readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract or that they have called upon the plaintiff to get the sale deed executed in his favour or to do the needful. Therefore, it cannot be said that the High Court erred in giving finding in favour of the plaintiff that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The suit is filed within the period of limitation and there is no delay on the part of the plaintiff which would disentitle him to have equitable relief. Hence, there is no substance in the aforesaid contention.
Re: Contention (d) — The contract is indivisible and hence there was no question of granting specific performance of 1/3rd or 2/3rds share
13. The aforesaid contention is also against the provision of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act as applicable in Jammu & Kashmir which is as under:
“15. Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which must be left unperformed forms a considerable portion of the whole, or does not admit of compensation in money, he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance. But the court may, at the suit of the other party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform: provided that the plaintiff relinquishes all claim to further performance, and all right to compensation either for the deficiency, or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendant.”
14. The illustration given under the said section further makes the position abundantly clear. Illustration (a) is thus:
“(a) A contracts to sell to B a piece of land consisting of 100 bighas. It turns out that 50 bighas of the land belong to A, and the other 50 bighas to a stranger, who refuses to part with them. A cannot obtain a decree against B for the specific performance of the contract; but if B is willing to pay the price agreed upon, and to take the 50 bighas which belong to A, waiving all right to compensation either for the deficiency or for loss sustained by him through A's neglect or default, B is entitled to a decree directing A to convey those 50 bighas to him on payment of the purchase money.”
15. Further, in the present case, Defendant 1 Mohd. Yousuf Magray entered into an agreement to sell the land purchased by him in 1968-69 in three names, namely, himself, his brother (Ghulam Rasool at the relevant time — a minor) and his minor son (Manzoor Ahmad Magray). Clause 2 of the agreement stipulated that Mohd. Yousuf would be bound to include and join his brother Ghulam Rasool for the execution and completion of the sale deed in respect of the said land. The learned Single Judge by judgment and decree dated 16-11-1981 granted relief for specific performance of the contract only for 1/3rd share of Mohd. Yousuf (Defendant 1). Against that judgment the plaintiff as well as Defendant 1 filed appeals. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by Mohd. Yousuf. It allowed the appeal of the plaintiff qua the share of the minor son of Defendant 1 by holding that land was purchased by Mohd. Yousuf in the name of his son and in fact, it was owned by him. The Division Bench, however, dismissed the claim for specific performance in respect of 1/3rd share of Ghulam Rasool. Against that part of the decree, the plaintiff has not preferred any appeal.
16. As stated above, Section 15 of the J&K Act makes it abundantly clear that where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, the court may at the suit of the other party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform. Hence, there is no bar for passing the decree for specific relief with regard to 1/3rd or 2/3rds share owned by the contracting party for which he can execute the sale deed. For the share of Ghulam Rasool (brother of Defendant 1) admittedly, no decree is passed by the High Court. Dealing with the similar contention where agreement was for sale of property belonging to a brother and sister each having a half share, the Court in Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh (1990) 3 SCC 517 held that when the absentee vendor, for some reason or the other refused to accept the agreement, there is no reason why the agreement should not be enforced against the vendor who had signed and his property is identifiable by specific share. The Court further held that such case is not covered by Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which relates to specific performance of a part of a contract. Such type of case would be the case of specific performance of the whole of the contract so far as the contracting party is concerned. Further, whenever a share in the property is sold the vendee has the right to apply for the partition of the property and get the share demarcated. Hence there would not be any difficulty in granting specific performance of the contract to the extent to which it is binding between the parties.
Re: Contention (e) — Suit land cannot be alienated or transferred
17. It is to be stated that the appellant has neither raised the said contention in the written statement nor during the trial. However, in the appeal, the appellant sought to raise the contention that the specific performance qua the suit land cannot be granted as the transfer or alienation of the suit property is prohibited under the provisions of the J&K Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972, the J&K Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976 and the J&K Prohibition on Conservation of Lands and Alienation of Orchards Act, 1975. The Court declined to entertain the plea on the ground that it was raised almost 24 years after the filing of the suit by the plaintiff and the same, if permitted to be raised, would prejudice the rights of the plaintiff. Even considering that the said plea is a pure question of law, in our view, it is without any substance. The definition under Section 2(4) of the J&K Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 specifically excludes “land” which was an orchard on the first day of September 1971. Sub-section (5) of Section 2 defines “orchard” to mean a compact area of land having fruit trees grown thereon or devoted to cultivation of fruit trees in such number that the main use to which the land is put is growing of fruits or fruit trees. In the present case, agreement to sell was executed on 14-7-1971 in respect of an orchard land. Therefore, the said Act was not applicable to the land in dispute. Similar provisions are there in the Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976 which gives the definition of the word “land” under Section 2(9) and definition of the word “orchard” under Section 2(10). From the said definition, it is apparent that orchard is excluded from the operation of the Agrarian Reforms Act.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, further referred to Section 3 of the J&K Prohibition on Conversion of Land and Alienation of Orchards Act, 1975 which is as under:
“3. Prohibition on conversion of land and alienation of orchards.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force—
(a) no person shall alienate an orchard except with the previous permission of the Revenue Minister or such officer as may be authorised by him in this behalf:
Provided that alienation of orchards to the extent of four kanals only in favour of one or more persons for residential purposes shall not need any permission.
19. Considering the aforesaid section, it is apparent that prohibition on transfer of orchards is not absolute and the question of obtaining previous permission as contemplated under Section 3(1)(a) would arise at the time of execution of the sale deed on the basis of decree for specific performance. Section 3 does not bar the maintainability of the suit and permission can be obtained by filing proper application after the decree is passed. Therefore, it cannot be stated that decree for specific performance is not required to be passed. Further, under Section 3 of the J&K Prohibition on Conservation of Land and Alienation of Orchards Act, 1975, prohibition on transfer is limited. Firstly, the proviso makes it clear that alienation of orchards to the extent of four kanals only in favour of one or more persons for residential purposes will not require any permission. Secondly, for more than four kanals of land, previous permission of the Revenue Minister or such officer as may be authorised by him in this behalf is required to be obtained. Dealing with similar contention, this Court in Bai Dosabai v. Mathurdas Govinddas (1980) 3 SCC 545, (1980) 3 SCR 762 observed that even if the Act prohibits alienation of land, if the decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff, it is required to be moulded suitably.
20. Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Defendant 1, the father had no right to transfer the share of his minor son in the suit land. In our view, the High Court has arrived at the conclusion that the land was purchased by the father from his own funds and that the father was in fact the owner of the said property. The defendants have not led any evidence. Further, after obtaining majority also Defendant 3 has not stepped into the witness box or raised any contention to controvert the evidence of the plaintiff that Defendant 1 was owner of the suit land as he had purchased the suit land from his money. In the agreement to sell, it has been specifically mentioned that Defendant 1 first party has purchased one share of the said land in the name of his minor son. Hence for want of any other evidence on record the said findings cannot be said to be in any way illegal or erroneous, which would call for our interference in these appeals.
21. In the result, there is no substance in these appeals. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that on 11-5-1982 Defendant 1 had executed the sale deed in respect of 1/3rd share of the total area of 17 kanals and 2 marlas of orchard in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of the decree passed by the trial court. However, the possession of the said land was handed over to the Receiver as ordered by the High Court. It is also pointed out that by order dated 21-5-1982 the High Court had directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the possession of the suit land. The defendants were restrained from alienating the suit land till further orders of the Court. In this view of the matter, the Receiver is directed to hand over possession of the land for which the sale deed is executed in favour of the plaintiff. Further, if any permission for execution of the sale deed is required, as contemplated under Section 3 of the J&K Prohibition on Conservation of Land and Alienation of Orchards Act, 1975, in executing the sale deed on the basis of decree passed by the High Court then the parties would file proper application for obtaining the said permission. If the defendants fail to cooperate, the Registrar of the High Court would take appropriate steps. After permission is granted then the sale deed with regard to the remaining 1/3rd share in the suit land shall be executed in favour of the plaintiff.
22. In the result, the appeals stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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