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Mudigonda Chandra Mouli Sastry v. Bhimanepalli Bikshalu And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The landlord instituted eviction proceedings against the tenant on four grounds: (a) personal requirement of the premises, (b) default in payment of rent, (c) acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenant, and (d) the dilapidated condition of the premises requiring reconstruction. The Rent Controller granted the eviction petition, and the appellate authority upheld that decision. In a civil revision, however, the High Court set aside the concurrent findings, relying on Section 10(4)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (“the Act”), which shields employees in notified essential services from eviction. The landlord appealed that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a tenant transferred to another town continues to enjoy protection from eviction under Section 10(4)(i) of the Act as an employee engaged in an essential service.
- Whether the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, could reassess evidence and overturn concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Landlord)
- The tenant’s transfer from Tenali to Marcherla removed the statutory protection afforded by Section 10(4)(i) of the Act.
- The High Court exceeded its limited revisional jurisdiction by re-evaluating evidence and reversing concurrent factual findings regarding the landlord’s bona fide need.
The opinion does not detail the respondent tenant’s arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Interpretation of Section 10(4)(i): The Court examined the statutory text and purpose of Section 10(4)(i). The provision seeks to prevent disruption of essential services by protecting employees from eviction near their place of work. Once an employee is transferred to another city, the underlying hardship ceases; allowing continued protection would create anomalous results, potentially granting immunity at both the old and new locations. Consequently, the tenant, having been transferred 110 miles away, no longer qualified for the statutory shield.
Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction: Both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority had found the landlord’s need bona fide. The Supreme Court emphasized that, absent legal infirmity, a revisional court cannot reappraise evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact. The High Court’s reassessment was therefore outside the permissible limits of Section 22 of the Act (revisional power).
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside.
Eviction of the tenant is restored, but the tenant is granted six months (until 31-01-2000) to vacate, conditional upon depositing arrears within two months and paying rent punctually. The ruling primarily affects the parties; it clarifies that statutory protection for essential-service employees lapses upon transfer, but it does not announce a broader legal doctrine beyond the interpretation of Section 10(4)(i).
V.N Khare, J.— This is a landlord's appeal. The landlord filed a petition for eviction of the respondent tenant from the premises in dispute on the grounds, namely,
(a) he required the said premises for his own needs;
(b) the tenant has committed default in payment of rent;
(c) the tenant has acquired an alternative accommodation; and
(d) the premises was in a dilapidated condition which required reconstruction.
The Rent Controller, after being satisfied that the grounds for eviction were well substantiated, allowed the petition filed by the landlord. Aggrieved, the tenant preferred an appeal. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant. The High Court, however, in the civil revision petition filed by the tenant held that by virtue of sub-section (4)(i) of Section 10 of the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) no order of eviction can be passed against the tenant, as the tenant is in employment in a department which has been declared as an essential service. The High Court further, after reassessing the evidence reversed the finding of facts as regard other grounds for eviction of the tenant arrived at by the two courts below. Consequently, the revision petition filed by the tenant was allowed and the petition filed by the landlord for eviction of the tenant was rejected.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the order of the High Court on two grounds. Firstly, that the tenant having been transferred from Tenali to Marcherla — another town, the protection under sub-section 4(i) of Section 10, was not available to the tenant and, secondly, it was not open to the High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction to reassess the evidence and arrive at a different finding contrary to the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two courts below.
3. After we heard the matter, we find that both the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant are well substantiated. So far as the first submission is concerned, it is worthwhile to reproduce Section 10(4)(i) of the Act, which is as under:
“10. (4) No order for eviction shall be passed under sub-section (3)—
(i) against any tenant who is engaged in any employment or class of employment notified by the Government as an essential service for the purposes of this sub-section unless the landlord is himself engaged in any employment or class of employment which has been so notified; or
A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that no order of eviction can be passed under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act against any tenant, who is engaged in any employment or class of employment notified by the Government as an essential service for the purposes of this sub-section. In the present case, the tenant was working as Senior Assistant (Accounts) in ITI, Tenali. The Government issued a notification under sub-section (4)(i) of Section 10 declaring service in ITI as an essential service. Therefore, any person in employment in ITI enjoyed immunity from eviction from any order that may be passed under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act. But, in the present case, the tenant was transferred from Tenali to Marcherla — a place which is about 110 miles from Tenali. Under such circumstances, the question that arises for consideration is if a tenant employed in a department catering essential services is transferred to another city or town, will he still enjoy the protection from eviction from any order that may be passed under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act? The aforesaid provisions show that the object behind clause (i) of sub-section (4) of Section 10 is that an employee who is employed for rendering an essential service is not to be ejected from the premises of which he is a tenant lest he be put to a hardship and inconvenience which may, ultimately, interfere in his work in catering essential services to the society. Keeping in mind the object we are of the view that once a tenant, who was engaged in catering essential services, has been transferred to another city or town, the protection to such a tenant against an order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act ceases to be available to him as he is no longer required to cater essential services. If we give a literal interpretation to clause (i) of sub-section (4) of Section 10 then it would lead to an anomalous position. For example, if a tenant working in a department which is rendering essential services is transferred to another city or town where he is posted in a department which is also engaged in providing essential services and he takes a premises on rent for his residence, does it mean that such a tenant enjoys protection against eviction at both places, namely, in the original place of posting and the subsequent place of posting? But that is not the object behind the provision of Section 10(4)(i) of the Act. It was pointed out before the High Court by the appellant that in view of transfer of the tenant from Tenali, the protection from ejectment under Section 10(4)(i) is not available to him but the High Court rejected the said submission on the ground that the transfer of the tenant from Tenali would not come in the way of protection available to the tenant. This view of the High Court is repugnant to the object behind the provisions of the Act. Therefore, we find that the view taken by the High Court in applying sub-section (4)(i) of Section 10 of the Act in the present case, was totally misplaced.
4. Coming to the second submission what we find is that the Rent Controller and the first appellate authority after assessing the evidence recorded concurrent finding of facts that the need of the landlord was bona fide. It was not pointed out that the said finding suffered from any legal infirmity. Under such circumstances, it was also not open to the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to have indulged in reassessment of evidence and thereby interfered with the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two courts below, especially when it was found by the High Court that the tenant's wife had already acquired a vacant accommodation in the town of Tenali and the tenant himself was transferred from Tenali to Marcherla. Since the petition deserves to succeed on these two grounds, we are not inclined to go into the other grounds on which the landlord sought eviction of the respondent tenant.
5. For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the judgment and order passed by the High Court under appeal is not sustainable in law and, therefore, liable to be set aside. We order accordingly. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
6. After the order was dictated, learned counsel appearing for the tenant prayed that the respondent tenant may be granted some time to vacate the premises. To this, counsel for the appellant has no objection. We, therefore, direct that the respondent tenant shall not be dispossessed from the premises in question for a period of six months i.e up to 31-1-2000 provided the respondent tenant deposits the arrears of rent/damages, if any, before the Rent Controller within two months and continues to pay month-to-month rent/damages to the landlord. The respondent tenant on the expiry of the aforesaid period shall hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to the landlord.
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