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S. Thangappan v. P. Padmavathy .

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 24, 1999
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant has been a tenant of the suit premises—used as an automobile workshop—since 1962. Rent was initially paid to the predecessor of the present respondent and, from 1980 onward, to the respondent herself. In 1983 the respondent instituted eviction proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 on three grounds: (i) wilful default in rent from October 1982 to May 1983; (ii) bona fide requirement of the building for demolition and reconstruction; and (iii) alleged sub-letting. The Rent Controller allowed eviction on the first two grounds (rejecting the sub-letting allegation).

The Appellate Authority affirmed the order, holding that (a) the relationship of landlord and tenant existed, (b) denial of the respondent’s title was not bona fide, and (c) rent default was wilful. Civil Revision Petitions filed by the tenant were dismissed by the High Court of Madras on 24-11-1997. Separate execution proceedings initiated by the respondent were also upheld. The present consolidated appeals challenge those concurrent findings before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenant’s denial of the respondent’s title—based on an asserted paramount title of Arulmigu Athikesava Perumal Peyalwar Devasthanam—was bona fide.
  2. If the denial was not bona fide, whether non-payment of rent constituted “wilful default” under the Act.
  3. Whether the respondent’s claim that the premises were required for demolition and reconstruction was sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The tenant genuinely believed that the temple (Devasthanam) was the true owner, and therefore paid rent to it; such conduct should be regarded as bona fide.
  • Courts below failed to record a specific finding that his denial of title lacked bona fides.
  • Respondent’s own affidavit in the Devasthanam’s subsequent suit describes her as “lessee” of the temple, contradicting her assertion of absolute ownership in the eviction petition.
  • Reliance placed on Mangat Ram v. Sardar Meharban Singh and D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish to argue that Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not estop a tenant once a paramount title holder asserts rights.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • All three forums below have concurrently held the tenant guilty of wilful default and found bona fide necessity for demolition; such concurrent findings should not be disturbed.
  • No evidence shows that the respondent’s title has been divested since inception; therefore the tenant remains bound by the estoppel in Section 116 of the Evidence Act.
  • Any apparent inconsistency in affidavits is irrelevant because, under Section 2(6) of the Act, even a lessee to a superior landlord can be “landlord” to the tenant.
  • The executing court cannot go behind the decree; challenges based on the Devasthanam’s later suit are impermissible in execution proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mangat Ram v. Sardar Meharban Singh (1987) 4 SCC 319 Section 116 estoppel is confined to denying title “at the commencement of the tenancy”; a tenant may dispute title that has subsequently ended. Held inapplicable because the tenant’s denial related to alleged ownership existing from the beginning, not a subsequent change; therefore estoppel still operates.
D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC 424 A tenant under threat of eviction by a paramount title holder may challenge the lessor’s title. Rejected for similar reasons; no evidence that the respondent’s title ended or that the tenant faced an actual threat of eviction from the temple.
LIC of India v. India Automobiles & Co. (1990) 4 SCC 286 Rent Control authorities cannot conclusively adjudicate questions of title. Court agreed in principle but clarified that only a prima facie examination of title is necessary to gauge the bona fides of the tenant’s denial; no final adjudication of ownership was undertaken.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Scope of “Landlord” under Section 2(6). The Act defines “landlord” broadly to cover anyone entitled to receive rent, including a tenant in relation to a sub-tenant. The appellant had paid rent to the respondent from 1980; prima facie, the respondent qualified as his landlord.

2. Estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. A tenant is barred from disputing the landlord’s title as it existed “at the beginning of the tenancy.” Because the appellant’s challenge was that the temple was owner ab initio, the denial squarely fell within the statutory estoppel. The court distinguished the precedents relied on by the appellant: in those cases the landlord’s title was alleged to have ended after the tenancy commenced.

3. Bona fides of the Tenant’s Conduct. The Rent Controller recorded that neither the temple demanded rent nor asserted ownership before the tenant unilaterally wrote requesting recognition. The High Court and Supreme Court found this conduct “mala fide and motivated,” confirming the rent default was wilful.

4. Requirement for Demolition and Reconstruction. All lower forums concurrently accepted the respondent’s need to demolish and rebuild the premises. No error of law or fact was shown to disturb that finding.

5. Execution Proceedings. The executing court correctly limited itself to the decree; the subsequent temple suit could not render the decree inexecutable.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED.

Direct consequences: the eviction decree stands affirmed. The Court granted the tenant six months to vacate, conditioned on filing an undertaking within four weeks. Broadly, the judgment reinforces the evidentiary estoppel under Section 116 and emphasises that, in rent-control litigation, denial of title must be scrutinised for bona fides but cannot defeat the landlord-tenant relationship where the title dispute relates to the tenancy’s inception. No new precedent was set, but the decision consolidates existing principles.

Show all summary ...

1. These appeals are directed against the order of the High Court of Madras dated 24-11-1997 in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 3476 of 1985 and 830 of 1997 dismissing these revisions. These appeals arise under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960), hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. The short facts are that the appellant is a tenant of the disputed premises, who was running an automobile workshop. The respondent filed the eviction petition against him, on the grounds that he is a defaulter, had not paid the rents from October 1982 to May 1983, the said premises is required for demolition and reconstruction and that he has sub-let a portion of the disputed premises.

2. The appellant's stand is that earlier he was under an impression that the respondent is the owner of the premises but later he came to know that Arulmigu Athikesava Perumal Peyalwar Devasthanam is the owner of the premises. So he wrote a letter to the said Devasthanam to recognise the appellant as a tenant. Since then and for this reason the appellant did not pay any rent to the respondent bona fide believing the Devasthanam to be the owner. The Rent Controller rejected this defence and held that the appellant committed default in the payment of rent, the premises in question is legitimately required by the respondent for demolition and reconstruction. However, the Rent Controller rejected the case of sub-letting, which for the present appeal is not in issue as it has become final. The appellant then filed an appeal. The appellate authority confirmed the order passed by the Rent Controller and held, there exists relation of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the appellant and the denial of title by the appellant is not bona fide and the default of payment of rent is wilful. Finally, the appellant filed civil revision before the High Court. The main contention raised before the High Court was also the same as raised before us that the courts below have failed to appreciate on the facts and circumstances of this case that denial of title by the appellant is bona fide and hence non-payment of rent cannot be held to be wilful. The appellant also relied on facts which came into existence, during the pendency of the said revision that in fact the said Devasthanam filed a suit on 30-10-1987 against the appellant and others, claiming paramount title over the land including the disputed one and also for eviction before the City Civil Court, Madras. Reliance is sought to be placed on the reply affidavit of the appellant in the said suit, where it is said he has admitted to be the tenant of the Devasthanam. On the other hand the aforesaid revision of the appellant was dismissed for default by the High Court on 27-4-1989. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application for restoration. Meanwhile, the respondent filed execution petition before the Rent Controller. The appellant in this execution also referred to the suit of the Devasthanam, and submitted that rent was rightly paid to the temple and not to this respondent, thus this execution has become inexecutable. The respondent denied this claim on merit and further objected to this being considered in the execution proceedings. It was urged that the executing court cannot go beyond the decree. Thus the executing court on 24-9-1987 rejected the appellant's contention. The appellant thereafter preferred Civil Revision Petition No. 830 of 1997, as aforesaid, before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

3. The application of the appellant for restoration of the revision was allowed. Finally, the High Court dismissed both the said revisions. In the restored revision the High Court held, even if the entire property belongs to the temple, but since at the initial stage through the arrangement with the respondent, the appellant was inducted into the tenancy, the appellant cannot deny his right and title. Consequently, it held that non-payment of rent to the respondent was wilful. It also confirmed that the building is required by the respondent for demolition and reconstruction. In the revision against the order passed by the executing court, the High Court held that merely because the paramount title-holder filed a suit, the arrangement between the appellant and the respondent cannot come to an end, hence the claim of the appellant was rejected. The appellant aggrieved by these dismissal orders of the High Court in the two revisions, which upheld the concurrent findings recorded by both the authorities below has filed the present appeals.

4. The main contention by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr M.N Krishnamani is that the courts below have neither applied their minds to the facts of this case nor recorded any finding that the denial of title by the appellant was not bona fide. The submission is that he denied the title of the respondent in favour of the temple on the basis of information received from the temple which is also borne out by the subsequent event, leading to filing of the suit by the Devasthanam, thus his paying rent to the temple constitutes to be a bona fide one. Further he submits that the said affidavit of the respondent in the Devasthanam suit where he admits to be the lessee, not the owner, is contrary to what he has stated in the present petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act where he asserted himself to be the owner. For all these reasons the conduct of the appellant should be construed to be bona fide.

5. The said averment made by the respondent in para 3 of the petition under Section 14(1)(b) read with Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(2)(a) of the Act, is quoted hereunder:

“The petitioner states that she is the absolute owner of the premises house and ground bearing Municipal Door No. 108, Pilliar Koil Street, Alwarpet, Madras-600 018. The respondent herein is a tenant under her in respect of the said property.”

6. While in para 2 of the affidavit filed by the respondent for impleadment in the Devasthanam suit he states:

“I respectfully submit that I am the lessee in the land of the first respondent herein. I have put up superstructure and a portion was let out to the second respondent herein.”

It is on this it is submitted he admits to be the lessee of the Devasthanam then he cannot be the owner or the landlord of the appellant. The two statements are contradictory. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits, there is a concurrent finding by all the courts that the appellant's default in payment of rent is wilful and the building is required for demolition and reconstruction, hence this Court should not interfere. It is also submitted that there is no contradiction in the two statements and even if there is, it would be of no avail to the appellant. The denial of title cannot be held to be bona fide as the appellant was aware he was inducted into tenancy by the predecessor of the respondent, there was nothing to show since thereafter the respondent lost his title thus even filing of the subsequent suit by the Devasthanam would not change the position as relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the appellant continues under the Act. So, on these facts the denial of title of the respondent by the appellant followed by refusal to pay rent to the respondent constitutes wilful default.

7. Mr M.N Krishnamani, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant referred to Mangat Ram v. Sardar Meharban Singh (1987) 4 SCC 319 wherein it is observed as hereunder:

“11. In the premises, the High Court as well as the learned Additional District Judge were clearly in error in decreeing the suit brought by Respondent 1 under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act by relying on the rule of estoppel embodied in Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The estoppel contemplated by Section 116 is restricted to the denial of title at the commencement of the tenancy and by implication it follows that a tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the lessor had since come to an end.”

8. Similarly, he referred to D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC 424:

“3. The appeal must be allowed on the short ground that there being a threat of eviction by a person claiming title paramount i.e head lessor Krishnamurthy, the appellant was not estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from challenging the title and his right to maintain the eviction proceedings of the respondent P. Jagadish as the lessor. Section 116 of the Evidence Act provides that no tenant of immovable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. Possession and permission being established, estoppel would bind the tenant during the continuance of the tenancy and until he surrenders his possession. The words ‘during the continuance of the tenancy’ have been interpreted to mean during the continuance of the possession that was received under the tenancy in question, and the courts have repeatedly laid down that estoppel operates even after the termination of the tenancy so that a tenant who had been let into possession, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly surrendered possession, cannot dispute the title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. The rule of estoppel is thus restricted not only in extent but also in time i.e restricted to the title of the landlord and during the continuance of the tenancy; and by necessary implication, it follows that a tenant is not estopped, when he is under threat of eviction by the title paramount, from contending that the landlord had no title before the tenancy commenced or that the title of the landlord has since come to an end.”

9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the orders passed by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority we find they concurrently held that the denial of title by the appellant was not bona fide and the default was wilful. They also held that the building is required for demolition and reconstruction. Challenging these findings the learned counsel for the appellant argued with vehemence that the authority below should not have addressed itself to the question of title, as it had no jurisdiction to decide the question of title, hence approach of the appellate authority was against the jurisdiction vested in it under the law. Learned counsel referred to the case in LIC of India v. India Automobiles & Co. (1990) 4 SCC 286 to contend that the question of title cannot be gone into in these proceedings. There is no dispute on this proposition neither is it disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent nor has this question of title been decided in these proceedings. It is only when a tenant denies title of the landlord, the court has to scrutinise the evidence and come to the conclusion prima facie, whether the denial of title is bona fide or not. It is in this context of course the court has to go into the evidence to test the veracity of this denial of title. Thus, any finding in this regard could not be a finding on the question of title. There is neither any claim of title set up by the respondent nor is there any such issue between the parties in these proceedings and hence recording of any finding in this regard is only to be understood for a limited purpose of testing the bona fide of the tenant to deny the title of the landlord.

10. What has to be considered in a case of denial of title by a tenant is whether there still exists any relationship of landlord and tenant inter se as in the present case between Respondent 1 and the appellant. In other words by such denial of title does the liability to pay this rent to such landlord cease? Is mere denial of title sufficient not to tender rent to such landlord or at what stage such liability ceases? These are all considerations in the context of testing the defence of a tenant in not tendering the rent to such landlord. So the question is to whom is rent payable? In this regard the definition of “landlord” under Section 2(6) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is relevant, which is quoted hereunder:

“2. (6) ‘landlord’ includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant;

Explanation.—A tenant who sub-lets shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the sub-tenant.”

(emphasis supplied)

11. The definition of landlord is very wide to include any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent. The explanation includes even a tenant to be a landlord under this Act. In the present case it is not in dispute that the appellant was inducted into tenancy by the predecessor of the respondent. After such induction he had been paying rent first to the predecessor of Respondent 1 from 1962 and then to Respondent 1 since 1980. The appellant in his cross-examination has admitted this by stating that he came as a tenant under one Shivlingam who is the elder brother of Respondent 1 and from 1980 onwards he had been paying rent to Respondent 1. It is in this background we have to test the submission for the appellant with respect to the default and denial of title. It is clear as is also the finding recorded that the appellant himself approached the Devasthanam subsequently to execute the tenancy of the disputed premises in question to him. In order to appreciate the conduct of the appellant in denial of title of Respondent 1 we herewith record the finding of the trial court in this regard:

“The petitioner strongly and curiously would contend that since he came to know all of a sudden that Arulmigu Athikesava Perumal Peyalwar Devasthanam is the true owner of the petition premises, he stopped the payment of rent to the petitioner. In fact, the said Devasthanam never demanded the rent from the respondent at any point of time, of their own accord. Further, the said Devasthanam never intimated to the respondent that they are the owners of the petition premises. The abovesaid Devasthanam had not informed the petitioner that the said Devasthanam is the true owner of the petition premises. For the first in the history, the 1st respondent writes a letter Ex. R-1 dated 28-3-1983 stating that he may be recognised as a tenant under the said Devasthanam in respect of the petition premises, as he considered that the said Devasthanam is the true owner of the petition premises. Thus the respondent himself gives right and title to the said Devasthanam.

The said Arulmigu Athikesava Perumal Peyalwar Devasthanam sent a reply to the 1st respondent on 4-5-1983, which is marked as Ex. R-3 in this petition. Even in Ex. R-3, the said Devasthanam had not examined any right and title over the petition premises and the said Devasthanam had not even admitted their ownership over the petition premises. Therefore, I hold that the contention of the respondent that the petitioner has no right or title over the petition premises, is not true even for a moment.”

12. The aforesaid finding speaks for itself the conduct of the tenant in denial of Respondent 1's title. In spite of no claim of the rent made from the appellant he on his own volition requested the Devasthanam to accept him as his tenant. Further, the Devasthanam had not even informed the appellant that they are the owners. In this background can denial of title by the tenant be held to be bona fide? The courts below rightly held it to be not bona fide.

13. With reference to the subsequent event the other submission for the appellant is with reference to the Devasthanam suit, viz., the affidavit by the respondent in which it is urged he admits to be the lessee of the Devasthanam and thus his averment in the present proceedings being the owner of the premises is wrong. This also would be of no avail. Firstly, we are not called up to examine the said suit. Respondent 1 was not even impleaded hence was not a party there. This apart, the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is of tenant and landlord under the Act while the relationship between the respondent and the Devasthanam may be of lessee and lessor in a different set of facts. This would make no difference. The definition of “landlord” is under Section 2(6) and under its explanation even tenant is treated to be a landlord. Neither of the aforesaid two decisions, viz., Mangat Ram (1987) 4 SCC 319 and D. Satyanarayana (1987) 4 SCC 424 render any help to the appellant nor could they be distinguished as not to apply to the facts of the present case. On the contrary the two decisions squarely apply to the present case. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with the principle of estoppel against a tenant where he denies the title of his landlord. Section 116 reads as under:

“116. Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession.—No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.”

14. This section puts an embargo on a tenant of an immovable property, during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the beginning of his tenancy. The significant words under it are “at the beginning of the tenancy”. This is indicative of the sphere of the operation of this section. So a tenant once inducted as a tenant by a landlord, later he cannot deny his landlord's title. Thus, this principle of estoppel debars a tenant from denying the title of his landlord from the beginning of his tenancy. However defective the title of such landlord could (sic may) be, such tenant cannot deny his title. But subsequent to his induction as tenant if the landlord loses his title under any law or agreement and there is a threat to such tenant of his eviction by subsequently acquired paramount title-holder then any denial of title by such tenant to the landlord who inducted him into the tenancy will not be covered by this principle of estoppel under this section. In Mangat Ram (1987) 4 SCC 319 this Court held:

“The estoppel contemplated by Section 116 is restricted to the denial of title at the commencement of the tenancy and by implication it follows that a tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the lessor had since come to an end.”

(emphasis supplied)

15. Similarly in D. Satyanarayana (1987) 4 SCC 424 also this Court holds in para 4:

“4. The rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is that, a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however defective it may be, …. Similarly, the estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is restricted to the denial of the title at the commencement of the tenancy.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. Now reverting to the facts of the present case, we find, admittedly the appellant was inducted into the tenancy by the predecessor of Respondent 1 in 1962 and he continued to pay rent to Respondent 1 since 1980. There is no case or any evidence that since thereafter Respondent 1 lost his title to the disputed premises. On the contrary denial of title in the present case is based on some information that the Devasthanam is the owner of the property since the inception. No case, the Devasthanam became the owner of this property after 1962. In other words, the denial of title by the appellant against his landlord is from the very inception. This is forbidden under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. So both on law and facts we do not find the submissions for the appellant sustainable. All the courts below rightly concluded that denial of title by the appellant was not bona fide and hence non-payment of rent to (sic by) him amounts to wilful default.

17. Lastly, submission is that there is no finding by the courts below that denial of title by the appellant was not bona fide. The submission has no merit. We find the trial court very clearly recorded:

“Since it was found that the allegation of the respondent in disputing the title of the petitioner is mala fide and motivated, I hold that the default committed by the respondent in the payment of rent is wilful.”

18. Thus, none of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant has any merit. All the courts below also concurrently held that the disputed premises is required for demolition and reconstruction. No illegality worth consideration has been pointed out to set aside such findings.

19. In view of the aforesaid findings, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed. Costs on the parties.

20. At this time a request was made by learned counsel for the appellant to grant some time to the appellant to vacate the premises, since they are in occupation of this premises since 1962. We heard learned counsel for the parties. In the background of this case, we grant six months' time to the appellant to vacate the premises in question from this date, on condition that he submits the usual undertaking to the effect that he will hand over peaceful possession of the disputed premises to the respondent immediately at the expiry of this six months, without creating any third-party right. He shall file this undertaking within four weeks from today before the trial court.