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State Of Haryana And Others v. Balwan .
Factual and Procedural Background
Several life convicts in Haryana filed writ petitions before the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking premature release. The High Court held that the policy or instructions prevailing on the date of their conviction—rather than later, more restrictive policies—should govern their entitlement. Consequently, it directed the State Government to reconsider their cases accordingly. The State of Haryana appealed, and the Supreme Court heard the appeals together because all raised the same question regarding the correct temporal benchmark for applying remission policies after the insertion of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, for life convicts falling within the scope of Section 433-A CrPC, the applicable government policy on premature release is the one in force on the date of conviction or the one in force when the executive considers the prisoner's case.
- Whether life convicts acquire an enforceable right to release after earning statutory or policy-based remissions, notwithstanding Section 433-A and the necessity of an order under Articles 72 or 161 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107 | (1) Power of remission under Sections 432–433 CrPC is now limited by Section 433-A. (2) Earning remissions does not create an automatic right to release for life convicts; release requires an executive order under Articles 72 or 161. |
Formed the core legal foundation: the Supreme Court applied its ratio to hold that Haryana must consider cases consistently with Section 433-A and, where greater benefit is sought, only through Article 161. |
| Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 600; 1961 3 SCR 440 | Life imprisonment means imprisonment for the remainder of the prisoner’s natural life unless formally remitted; remission alone does not vest a right to release. | Re-affirmed to reiterate that remissions merely create eligibility and not an enforceable entitlement, reinforcing the need for an executive order for premature release. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reasoned as follows:
- Section 433-A CrPC, inserted on 18-12-1978, statutorily restricts the State’s power to remit or commute life sentences prior to a minimum of 14 years of actual imprisonment. Therefore, any policy predating this provision cannot override the statute.
- Maru Ram clarified that while States may frame remission schemes, those schemes only guide the executive’s discretion; they do not confer an accrued right of release on life convicts.
- Consequently, life convicts whose convictions occurred after the commencement of Section 433-A can obtain early release only via an order under Article 161 of the Constitution, even if they have earned remissions beyond 20 years.
- The Haryana Government revised its policy around 1982–1984 to ensure compliance with Section 433-A, stipulating that cases of life convicts covered by the section be placed before the Governor under Article 161 with full background materials.
- The High Court erred in directing the Government to apply the remission policy existing at the date of conviction; the correct approach is to apply the legal position and policy prevailing when the case is placed before the Governor, while ensuring that the prisoner does not forfeit any remission benefits for the purpose of consideration.
- To reconcile fairness with legality, the Court directed the State to treat the date on which the prisoner’s case ought to be placed before the Governor as the reference point for assessing remission-related eligibility.
Holding and Implications
Appeals ALLOWED; High Court judgments SET ASIDE.
The Supreme Court directed the State of Haryana to reconsider, within 15 days of receiving the Court’s order, the applications of the respondent life convicts falling under Section 433-A in accordance with the clarified legal position and the revised Government instructions. The decision affects only the pending remission applications; it sets no new precedent beyond reaffirming the principles in Maru Ram and Godse.
G.T Nanavati, J.— These appeals arise out of the judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in writ petitions filed by “life convicts” for their premature release. The High Court held that for deciding their entitlement for premature release what was relevant to consider was the government policy/instructions in force at the time of their conviction by the trial court and that the State Government was not right in applying the subsequent policy decisions and instructions that were in force at the time when their cases were taken up for consideration. Taking this view the High Court allowed the writ petitions and directed the State Government to reconsider their applications. The view taken by the High Court is challenged in these appeals. As the point raised in these appeals is the same they were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment.
2. It is not necessary to refer to the facts of these cases or the government instructions issued prior to 18-12-1978 when Section 433-A came to be inserted into the Code of Criminal Procedure. As laid down by this Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 the power of the State Government under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC cannot now extend beyond what is provided by Section 433-A. The premature release of those convicted before that date had to be considered on the basis of the relevant government instructions and the dates of their convictions. As regards those persons who have been convicted after Section 433-A came into force and thus fall within the purview of that section their cases will have to be considered consistently with Section 433-A and if life convicts are to be given a larger benefit, it can only be done now under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution.
3. The State of Haryana was earlier considering premature release of life convicts in accordance with the rules framed and instructions issued by it in that behalf. To be consistent with the correct legal position emerging after the enactment of Section 433-A and the decision of this Court in Maru Ram case (1981) 1 SCC 107 the State of Haryana modified its policy decision and instructions and declared that though the cases of life convicts for their premature release will still be governed by the instructions issued by it, in respect of those convicts who fall within the purview of Section 433-A their cases will be considered on an individual basis and such cases will be put up to the Governor through the Minister of Jails and Chief Minister, with the full background of the prisoners and recommendations of the State-level committee, along with the copy of the judgment etc., for order under Article 161 of the Constitution of India. Neither the record of these cases nor the judgments of the High Court make it clear when the said change in the instructions was made but it appears that it was made either sometime in 1982 or latest on 27-6-1984. Obviously, the cases of the respondent convicts, who are all life convicts and fall within the purview of Section 433-A, were required to be considered in accordance with the modified instructions as they could have been released prematurely only if an order in that behalf was passed by the State Government in exercise of its power under Article 161 of the Constitution.
4. As held by this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 600, (1961) 3 SCR 440 and in Maru Ram (1981) 1 SCC 107 by earning remissions a life convict does not acquire a right to release, but release would follow only upon an order made under the Criminal Procedure Code by the appropriate Government or on a clemency order in exercise of power under Article 72 or Article 161 of the Constitution. This Court observed in Maru Ram (1981) 1 SCC 107 as under:
“Even if the remissions earned have totalled up to 20 years, still the State Government may or may not release the prisoner and until such a release order remitting the remaining part of the life sentence is passed, the prisoner cannot claim his liberty. The reason is that life sentence is nothing less than lifelong imprisonment. Moreover, the penalty then and now is the same — life term. And remission vests no right to release when the sentence is life imprisonment. … Nor is any vested right to remission cancelled by compulsory 14-year jail life once we realise the truism that a life sentence is a sentence for a whole life….”
Thus, this Court in clear terms has laid down that by earning remissions a life convict does not acquire a right to be released prematurely. But if the Government has framed any rule or made a scheme for early release of such convicts then those rules or schemes will have to be treated as guidelines for exercising its power under Article 161 of the Constitution.
5. If this is the correct legal position then no life convict can validly contend that his case for premature release should be considered according to the government policy/instructions that were in force on the date on which he came to be convicted as he acquired a right to get remissions as declared and to be released accordingly. If according to the government policy/instructions in force at the relevant time the life convict has already undergone the sentence for a period mentioned in the policy decision/instructions, then the only right which he can be said to have acquired is the right to have his case put up by the prison authorities in time before the authorities concerned for considering exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution. Ordinarily, when an authority is called upon to exercise its powers that will have to be done consistently with the legal position and the government decision/instructions prevalent at that time. However, in order to see that a life convict does not lose any benefit available under the remission scheme which has to be regarded as the guideline, it would be just and proper to direct the State Government to treat the date on which his case is/was required to be put up before the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution as the relevant date with reference to which their cases are to be considered. The direction given by the High Court is not consistent with the decision of this Court in Maru Ram (1981) 1 SCC 107 and the view which we are now taking and, therefore, it has to be set aside.
6. Accordingly, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and direct the State Government to reconsider the applications of the respondent life convicts, who fall under the purview of Section 433-A CrPC, in accordance with the correct legal position pointed out above. The State Government is directed to do so within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order of this Court.
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