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Collector Of Central Excise, Jaipur v. J.K Synthetics .

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 14, 1999
Important Paras
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Customs Authorities appealed against a judgment of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. The respondents manufacture polyester chips, polyester staple fibre, and tow using mono-ethylene glycol (MEG). They imported MEG and claimed exemption from paying additional duty of customs on it, relying on an excise notification dated 4-5-1987 issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.

The notification exempted MEG from the whole of the excise duty leviable thereon, provided MEG was used in the manufacture of specified polyester products and the procedure in Chapter X of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 was followed. The respondents' claim was rejected by the Assistant Collector and then by the Collector on appeal. In further appeal, the Tribunal upheld the respondents' claim.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents satisfied the notification condition requiring compliance with the Chapter X procedure under the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
  2. Whether an excise exemption notification (exempting MEG from excise duty) applies for determining liability to additional duty of customs under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Arguments of the Parties

Customs Authorities' Arguments

  • The respondents could not claim the benefit of the excise notification (the Tribunal’s judgment noted this submission but did not discuss it).
  • In any event, the respondents did not satisfy the notification condition because they failed to follow the procedure laid down in Chapter X of the Central Excise Rules.
  • Relying on Union of India v. Modi Rubber Ltd. (1986) 4 SCC 66, it was argued that the expression “duty of excise” in notifications under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 applied only to duty under that enactment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Students of Dattatraya Adhyapak Vidyalya v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 4 SCC 440 The position regarding the relationship between excise duty liability and additional duty of customs under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Cited as authority that, where no excise duty is leviable on a like article in India, additional duty under Section 3 cannot be levied on import, consistent with the “plain words” of Section 3.
Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1999) 5 SCC 15 The position regarding additional duty of customs under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 being linked to excise duty “for the time being leviable” on a like article. Relied on as specifically relating to Section 3 and supporting the conclusion that if excise duty is exempt (hence not leviable), no additional duty arises.
Union of India v. Modi Rubber Ltd. (1986) 4 SCC 66 That the expression “duty of excise” in notifications under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 applied only in respect of duty under that enactment. Distinguished on the basis that it did not consider the terms of Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, whereas the other cited judgments specifically relate to Section 3.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed compliance with the notification’s condition requiring adherence to the Chapter X procedure. The Tribunal had held, on facts, that there was “substantial compliance” with the Chapter X procedure by the respondents. Given this factual finding, the Court held that the respondents satisfied the condition of the notification.

The Court then turned to whether the excise exemption affected the levy of additional duty of customs. It relied on the wording of Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, which provides that imported articles are liable to an additional duty equal to the excise duty “for the time being leviable” on a like article if produced or manufactured in India. Since the excise notification exempted MEG from the whole of excise duty leviable thereon, the Court reasoned that there was no excise duty leviable on MEG; therefore, applying the “plain words” of Section 3, there could be no additional duty of customs on MEG.

The Court noted that this position had been adverted to in Students of Dattatraya Adhyapak Vidyalya v. State of Maharashtra and Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India. It considered the Customs Authorities’ reliance on Union of India v. Modi Rubber Ltd., but held that the Modi Rubber decision did not consider Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act and therefore did not displace the reasoning grounded in Section 3 and supported by the two other judgments.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED: The appeal filed by the Customs Authorities was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The direct consequence is that the respondents’ imported MEG was not liable to additional duty of customs, because (i) the Tribunal’s factual finding of substantial compliance with Chapter X meant the notification conditions were satisfied, and (ii) with MEG exempt from excise duty, no additional duty could be levied under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The opinion does not state any broader implications beyond the application of Section 3 to the parties’ circumstances.

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Order

1. The Customs Authorities are in appeal from a judgment rendered by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal.

2. The respondents manufacture polyester chips, polyester staple fibre and tow from mono-ethylene glycol (MEG). They imported the same and claimed that they were not liable to pay an additional duty of customs thereon because MEG was exempt from the payment of excise duty by virtue of a notification dated 4-5-1987 issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The said notification provided that

“MEG was exempt from the payment of the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon which is specified in the said Schedule provided that such mono-ethylene glycol is used in the manufacture of polyester chips or polyester staple fibre and tow, including tops or polyester filament yarn and the procedure set out in Chapter X of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 is followed”.

The claim was rejected by the Assistant Collector and, in appeal, by the Collector. The Tribunal, in further appeal, upheld the respondents' claim.

3. It appears from the judgment of the Tribunal that the departmental representative appearing on behalf of the Customs Authorities submitted before it that the respondents could not claim the benefit of the said notification, but there is no discussion on this aspect. It was also urged on behalf of the Customs Authorities that, in any event, the respondents had not satisfied the condition of the said notification because they had failed to follow the procedure laid down in Chapter X of the Central Excise Rules. On this aspect there is a discussion in the order of the Tribunal and it has been held, based on facts, that there had been substantial compliance with the said procedure by the respondents.

4. The Tribunal having found on facts that there was substantial compliance with the procedure under Chapter X of the Central Excise Rules, it must be held that the respondents satisfied the condition of the said notification.

5. The question then is in regard to the availability of the said excise notification for the purposes of the additional duty of customs. Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 provides for the levy of the additional duty of customs. It says that an article which is imported into India would, in addition to duties of customs levied under the Customs Act, be liable to a duty (hereafter in this section referred to as the additional duty) equal to the excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India. The said excise notification exempts MEG from the whole of the excise duty leviable thereon. There being, therefore, no excise duty leviable on MEG, there is no additional duty that MEG can be made liable to, having regard to the plain words of Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act.

6. This position has been adverted to by this Court in Students of Dattatraya Adhyapak Vidyalya v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 4 SCC 440 and Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1999) 5 SCC 15.

7. Reference was made by learned counsel for the Customs Authorities to the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Modi Rubber Ltd. (1986) 4 SCC 66 and the conclusion therein that the expression “duty of excise” in notifications under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 applied only in respect of duty under that enactment. That judgment does not consider the terms of Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The two judgments aforementioned specifically relate thereto.

8. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.