- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Surendra Nath Mohanty And Another v. State Of Orissa .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants were originally tried and convicted by the trial court under Sections 307, 326, 325, 324 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and were sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment (RI) and a fine of ₹200. In Criminal Revision No. 436 of 1994, the High Court of Orissa re-evaluated the evidence, set aside the conviction under Section 307 IPC, and substituted a conviction under Sections 326, 325, 324 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC. Taking note of the injuries and an affidavit of compromise, the High Court reduced the custodial sentence to six months’ RI and increased the fine to ₹1,000 for the Section 326 offence, imposing no separate sentences on the remaining counts.
The appellants then sought (i) correction/alteration of the judgment and (ii) permission to compound the offence on the basis of an amicable settlement with the victim. Both requests were rejected by the High Court on 5-9-1997 and 10-11-1997. Aggrieved, the appellants obtained special leave and filed the present appeals before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an offence punishable under Section 326 IPC can be compounded after the parties have reached a compromise, in view of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
- If compounding is impermissible, whether the compromise and lapse of time should nonetheless influence the quantum of sentence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The dispute has been amicably settled; therefore the offence should be permitted to be compounded.
- Relied on Supreme Court decisions in Ram Pujan v. State of U.P. (1973) 2 SCC 456 and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp SCC 681, which allowed compounding or took compromise into account.
Respondent's Arguments
- Section 326 IPC is not listed as compoundable in Section 320 CrPC; therefore the High Court correctly refused to allow compounding.
- Relied on Ram Lal v. State of J&K (1999) 2 SCC 213, which held that Mahesh Chand was rendered per incuriam and reiterated the bar under Section 320(9) CrPC.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Pujan v. State of U.P. (1973) 2 SCC 456 | Compromise can be considered while determining sentence even for non-compoundable offences. | Court acknowledged but distinguished it; used only for guidance on sentence reduction, not for compounding. |
| Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp SCC 681 | Permitted compounding of a non-compoundable offence. | Held to be per incuriam because Section 320(9) CrPC was not considered. |
| Ram Lal v. State of J&K (1999) 2 SCC 213 | Reaffirmed that offences not specified in Section 320 CrPC cannot be compounded; declared Mahesh Chand per incuriam. | Relied upon as binding authority to reject appellants’ request for compounding. |
| Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. JT (1987) 2 SC 361 | Earlier instance where a non-compoundable offence was allowed to be compounded. | Court noted that it was expressly stated not to be treated as precedent and therefore did not follow it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Statutory Framework: The Court began with Section 320 CrPC, which provides an exhaustive list of compoundable offences. Sub-section (9) expressly states that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section
. Section 326 IPC is not included in either Table 1 or Table 2, rendering it non-compoundable.
2. Precedent Re-evaluation: The Court examined the earlier authorities relied upon by the appellants. It observed that Ram Pujan merely allowed compromise to influence sentencing and did not sanction compounding. Decisions in Mahesh Chand and Y. Suresh Babu were declared per incuriam because they ignored Section 320(9) CrPC. The binding judgment in Ram Lal reaffirmed the statutory bar.
3. Application of Law to Facts: Given the statutory prohibition, the Court upheld the High Court’s refusal to permit compounding. Nonetheless, it recognised mitigating factors: (i) the parties had settled their dispute; (ii) ten years had elapsed since the incident; and (iii) the appellants had already served three months of imprisonment.
4. Sentencing Discretion: Invoking its power to mould the sentence in the interests of justice, the Court reduced the custodial sentence to the period already undergone and enhanced the fine to ₹5,000 each under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC, with a default sentence of three months’ simple imprisonment. It also directed that ₹9,000 from the fine, when realised, be paid to the injured as compensation and imposed no separate sentences on the remaining counts.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeals allowed in part. Permission to compound the offence under Section 326 IPC was refused, but the sentence was modified—custodial sentence reduced to time already served and a fine of ₹5,000 each imposed, with default imprisonment of three months; ₹9,000 of the fine to be paid as compensation to the injured.
Implications: The judgment reinforces the mandatory scheme of Section 320 CrPC by clarifying that non-compoundable offences, such as one under Section 326 IPC, cannot be compounded by consent of parties or judicial discretion. At the same time, it affirms that compromise may inform sentencing discretion. The decision overrules earlier contrary dicta and provides guidance for future cases involving requests to compound serious offences.
M.B Shah, J.— Leave granted.
2. These appeals are filed against the judgment and order dated 5-9-1997 and 10-11-1997 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Criminal Revision No. 436 of 1994 and Miscellaneous Case No. 521 of 1997 whereby the revision petition against the conviction order and the application for correction, alteration and for compounding the offence filed by the appellants were rejected.
3. The appellants were convicted and sentenced under Sections 307, 326, 325, 324 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to 5 years' RI and a fine of Rs 200 in default of payment of which to undergo RI for one month. That order was challenged before the High Court by filing Criminal Revision No. 436 of 1994. After considering the entire evidence on record, the Court held that from the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the injured and also from the manner in which the car struck against the injured, it was difficult to come to a conclusion that the intention of the accused was to kill the injured and, therefore, it would be hazardous to uphold their conviction under Section 307 IPC. After considering the injuries caused to the witness, the High Court altered the conviction of the appellants under Sections 326, 325, 324 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the affidavit of the witness produced on record, the Court imposed sentence of six months' RI and a fine of Rs 1000 in default of payment of which to undergo RI for a further three months for the offence under Section 326 IPC and no separate sentence was imposed on the other counts of offences. Against that order, these appeals are filed by special leave.
4. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that as the dispute was amicably settled and the matter was compromised, the High Court ought to have granted permission to compound the offences and ought not to have convicted the appellants and imposed the sentence. For this purpose, reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in Ram Pujan v. State of U.P (1973) 2 SCC 456 and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp SCC 681, JT (1988) 1 SC 618. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the offence under Section 326 is not compoundable and the High Court has rightly rejected the application for compounding the same. He, for this purpose, relied upon the judgment of this Court in Ram Lal v. State of J&K (1999) 2 SCC 213, JT (1999) 1 SC 147 wherein after referring to Section 320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court observed that the decision in Mahesh Chand 1990 Supp SCC 681, JT (1988) 1 SC 618 was rendered per incuriam.
5. In our view, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent requires to be accepted. For compounding of the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, a complete scheme is provided under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Sub-section (1) of Section 320 provides that the offences mentioned in the table provided thereunder can be compounded by the persons mentioned in column 3 of the said table. Further, sub-section (2) provides that the offences mentioned in the table could be compounded by the victim with the permission of the court. As against this, sub-section (9) specifically provides that “no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section”. In view of the aforesaid legislative mandate, only the offences which are covered by Table 1 or Table 2 as stated above can be compounded and the rest of the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code could not be compounded.
6. Further, the decision in Ram Pujan case (1973) 2 SCC 456 does not advance the contention raised by the appellants. In the said case, the Court held that the major offences for which the accused have been convicted were no doubt non-compoundable, but the fact of compromise can be taken into account in determining the quantum of sentence. In Ram Lal (1999) 2 SCC 213, JT (1999) 1 SC 147 the Court referred to the decision of this Court in Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P JT (1987) 2 SC 361 and to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp SCC 681, JT (1988) 1 SC 618 and held as under:
“3. We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the offence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the trial court shall permit them to compound the offence.”
7. In the case of Y. Suresh Babu JT (1987) 2 SC 361 the Court has specifically observed that the said case “shall not be treated as a precedent”. The aforesaid two decisions are based on facts and in any set of circumstances, they can be treated as per incuriam as pointed attention of the Court to sub-section (9) of Section 320 was not drawn. Hence, the High Court rightly refused to grant permission to compound the offence punishable under Section 326.
8. We reiterate that the course adopted in Ram Pujan v. State of U.P (1973) 2 SCC 456 and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp SCC 681, JT (1988) 1 SC 618 was not in accordance with law. However, considering the fact that the parties have settled their dispute outside the court and the fact that 10 years have elapsed from the date of the incident and the further fact that the appellants have already undergone 3 months' imprisonment as per the sentence imposed on them, we think that the ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone besides imposing a fine of Rs 5000 on each of the accused under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. We reduce the sentence as indicated above and direct that in default of payment of fine, the appellants concerned shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three months. We also refrain from imposing any separate sentence on the other counts of offences. Out of the fine amount, if realised, a sum of Rs 9000 also be paid to the injured as compensation.
9. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
Alert