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Kalu Ram v. State Of Rajasthan .

Supreme Court Of India
Jul 28, 1999
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Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Kalu Ram maintained two concurrent marriages. His first wife, Baby, lived in one house, while he resided with his second wife, Vimla, a widow with a daughter (Pooja – PW 6), in another. On the evening of 23 March 1993, after consuming alcohol, the appellant demanded Vimla’s ornaments, apparently to raise money for liquor. When she refused, he poured kerosene on her, handed her a matchbox, and, when she did not strike a match, ignited one himself, setting her on fire. He then attempted to extinguish the flames with water. Vimla was taken to hospital, where the police and a Munsif Magistrate (PW 7) recorded her statements, both treated as dying declarations. She subsequently died of burn injuries.

Relying on these dying declarations, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced him to life imprisonment, a decision later affirmed by the High Court. The present judgment arises from the appellant’s appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the two dying declarations were reliable in light of contrary testimony from witnesses who arrived at the scene.
  2. Whether, on the facts proved, the appellant’s conduct amounted to murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The dying declarations conflicted with the testimony of all witnesses who rushed to the scene, each of whom said that Vimla stated she had ignited herself.
  • Because of this inconsistency, the dying declarations should not have been relied upon to sustain the conviction.

The opinion does not provide specific arguments advanced on behalf of the prosecution/respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that every witness claiming Vimla admitted self-immolation was confronted with his or her earlier statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thereby discrediting their in-court testimony. Finding “no good reason to discard” the dying declarations, the Court accepted them as reliable evidence that the appellant set Vimla ablaze.

The Court then evaluated the nature of the offence. Key considerations were:

  • The appellant was “in a highly inebriated stage” when he poured kerosene on Vimla.
  • After lighting the match, he “suddenly and frantically” attempted to save her by pouring water.
  • These circumstances suggested he did not intend to cause death, although he clearly performed an act likely to cause it.

Viewing these factors “in the totality of the circumstances,” the Court concluded that the requisite intention for murder under Section 302 IPC was not established. His conduct instead satisfied Section 304 Part II IPC, which covers culpable homicide not amounting to murder when the offender acts with knowledge that death is likely but without the specific intention to cause it.

Holding and Implications

Conviction altered to Section 304 Part II IPC; sentence imposed at seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. Both parties acknowledged that the appellant was already in custody. The jail authorities were directed to credit any period already undergone toward the seven-year sentence and to release him if that period was sufficient; otherwise, he must serve the remainder.

The decision reduces the legal culpability and sentence of the appellant but sets no broader precedent beyond the immediate case.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. Appellant Kalu Ram had taken the risk of keeping two wives at the same time and later realised that it was costly for him and one of the wives (Vimla) had died of burn injuries. The appellant was charge-sheeted for the murder of Vimla and the trial court as well as the High Court found him guilty of the said offence and convicted and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. Hence this appeal by special leave.

2. The first wife of the appellant is Baby who was put up in his own house situated at a different place. Subsequently he came across deceased Vimla who herself was a widow having a daughter by name Pooja (PW 6) from her first marriage. Then the appellant married Vimla and they were living together in a house different from the house where the first wife Baby was residing.

3. It all happened without any premeditation when the appellant set ablaze Vimla on the evening of 23-3-1993. According to the prosecution version, he asked Vimla to spare her ornaments presumably for raising some more money for buying liquor. He was then also drunk. But Vimla refused to part with her ornaments and that infuriated the appellant. He doused her with kerosene and wanted her to die and supplied a box of matchsticks to her. As she failed to ignite the matchstick the appellant collected the matchbox and lit one matchstick and set her ablaze. When the flames were up he brought water in a frantic effort to save her from death. She was later removed to the hospital. A statement was recorded from her by the police which became the basis for the FIR. Subsequently the Munsif Magistrate (PW 7) recorded her dying declaration. Later she succumbed to her burn injuries.

4. Both the trial court and the High Court relied on the two dying declarations proved in this case and came to the conclusion that it was the appellant who set her ablaze and caused her death. He was therefore convicted under Section 302 IPC.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the contents in the dying declaration are contrary to the testimony of all the witnesses who rushed to the scene on hearing the wailing of the dying lady. It is true that all those witnesses have said that the deceased told her that she herself committed the act of lighting the matchstick but all those witnesses were confronted with their earlier version recorded by the investigating officer under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The version of those witnesses in court stands discredited by such earlier statements and the two courts below have rightly declined to place any reliance on the testimony of those witnesses. Out of those witnesses PW 5 Indu was not declared hostile formally. But that does not matter because she too was confronted with her first version recorded by the police and thereby her testimony in court was contradicted by the prosecution.

6. We find no good reason to discard the two dying declarations given by the deceased regarding the actual occurrence. The courts below have rightly acted on such dying declarations.

7. But then, what is the nature of the offence proved against him? It is an admitted case that the appellant was in a highly inebriated stage when he approached the deceased when the demand for sparing her ornaments was made by him. When she refused to oblige he poured kerosene on her and wanted her to light the matchstick. When she failed to do so he collected the matchbox and ignited one matchstick but when the flames were up he suddenly and frantically poured water to save her from the tongues of flames. This conduct cannot be seen divorced from the totality of the circumstances. Very probably he would not have anticipated that the act done by him would have escalated to such a proportion that she might die. If he had ever intended her to die he would not have alerted his senses to bring water in an effort to rescue her. We are inclined to think that all that the accused thought of was to inflict burns to her and to frighten her but unfortunately the situation slipped out of his control and it went to the fatal extent. He would not have intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained on account of his act. Therefore we are persuaded to bring down the offence from first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

8. We therefore alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC. Both sides conceded that the appellant is continuing in jail. We impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years on him. It is for the jail authorities to count whether the period he had already undergone would be sufficient to complete the period of sentence imposed by us and if so, the jail authorities shall release him from jail. Otherwise he will continue in jail until completion of the period of seven years of imprisonment. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.