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Municipal Corporation Of Brihanmumbai And Another v. State Bank Of India .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent initially filed an appeal before the Additional Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, Mumbai, under Section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The Additional Chief Judge decided that appeal on 8 February 1996. Dissatisfied, the respondent invoked Section 218-D(1) of the Act and filed a second appeal in the Bombay High Court. A learned Single Judge partly allowed that second appeal on 31 January 1997.
The appellants, in turn, preferred a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench, accepting an objection based on Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), dismissed the LPA on 13 January 1998 as not maintainable. The present matter is an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court challenging that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after a learned Single Judge of the High Court decides a second appeal under Section 218-D(1) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, a further Letters Patent Appeal is barred by Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court undertook a textual analysis of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and Section 100-A CPC:
- Nature of proceedings under Section 217. The Court emphasized that Section 217(1) confers appellate—rather than original—jurisdiction on the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court. Therefore, the decision dated 8 February 1996 was an appellate order.
- Second appeal under Section 218-D. An appeal to the High Court under Section 218-D(1) lies only against an appellate order of the Chief Judge and is itself a second appeal. The Single Judge’s decision of 31 January 1997 thus constituted a judgment in second appeal.
- Statutory bar created by Section 100-A CPC. Section 100-A expressly prohibits “any further appeal” from a judgment of a Single Judge rendered in an appeal from an appellate decree or order. The provision applies notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent or any other law.
- Application to the present case. Because the LPA sought to challenge a Single Judge’s decision in a second appeal, it fell squarely within the prohibition of Section 100-A CPC. Consequently, the Division Bench correctly dismissed the LPA for want of jurisdiction.
- Policy objective. The Court noted that Section 100-A was enacted to reduce delay and hasten finality in litigation, underscoring the Legislature’s intent to terminate the appellate chain at that stage.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench’s order, holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable.
Implications. The decision confirms that, after the 1976 insertion of Section 100-A CPC, no further intra-court appeal lies against a Single Judge’s decision rendered in a second appeal under Section 218-D of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The ruling brings finality to the litigation between the present parties; no broader precedent was set beyond reiterating the statutory bar.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave calls in question an order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay dated 13-1-1998 dismissing the letters patent appeal on the ground that the same was not maintainable. A brief reference to the facts, at this stage, would be apposite.
3. The respondent herein had preferred an appeal before the Additional Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court under Section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The learned Additional Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court decided the appeal vide order dated 8-2-1996. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Additional Chief Judge, Small Cause Court dated 8-2-1996, the respondent filed a second appeal in the High Court under Section 218-D(1) of the Act. The learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court on 31-1-1997 allowed that appeal partly. The appellant questioned the order of the learned Single Judge dated 31-1-1997 through a letters patent appeal. An objection was raised before the Division Bench of the High Court regarding the maintainability of the letters patent appeal on the ground that against an order of dismissal of the second appeal by the High Court, no further appeal could lie either under letters patent or any other law. Reliance was also placed on Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The objection found favour with the learned Division Bench and without going into the merits of the order of the learned Single Judge, the letters patent appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.
4. We have heard Mr Bhimrao N. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr Rafique Dada, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent.
5. The Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 is a complete code and contains provision for filing appeal etc. against order made under the Act. Section 217(1) of the Act provides:
“217. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, appeals against any rateable value or tax fixed or charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. A bare reading of Section 217(1) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 shows that the jurisdiction exercised by the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court is appellate jurisdiction.
7. Section 218 provides for the period when the cause of complaint can be said to have accrued for filing of an appeal under Section 217 of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the proceedings under Section 217(1) are “original proceedings” in the first forum. The proceedings are appellate proceedings in a second forum and not original proceedings in a first forum.
8. Against the appellate order of the learned Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, an appeal is provided to the High Court under Section 218-D. Section 218-D provides:
“218-D. (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court—
(a) from any decision of the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court in an appeal under Section 217 by which a rateable value in excess of two thousand rupees is fixed, and
(b) from any other decision of the said Chief Judge in an appeal under the said section, upon a question of law or usage having the force of law or the construction of a document.
(2) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with respect to appeals from original decrees shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to appeals under sub-section (1) and orders passed therein by the High Court may on application to the said Chief Judge be executed by him as if they were decrees made by himself:
Provided that no such appeal shall be heard by the High Court unless it is filed within one month from the date of the decision of the Chief Judge.”
9. Thus, according to Section 218-D, an appeal shall also lie to the High Court from any decision of the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court in an appeal under Section 217, “upon a question of law or usage having the force of law or the construction of a document”. That the respondent had taken recourse to Section 218-D(1) in filing an appeal against the appellate order of the learned Additional Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court is not in dispute. The appellant has not questioned the maintainability of the appeal filed by the respondent under Section 218-D of the Act before the learned Single Judge of the High Court before us. Thus, it is obvious that the appeal filed by the respondent under Section 218-D of the Act was a second appeal against the appellate order made by the Additional Chief Judge, Small Cause Court. Under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, no further appeal has been provided against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court deciding the second appeal under Section 218-D of the Act against an appellate order of the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court passed under Section 217(1) of the Act. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was introduced by the Amendment Act, 1976, specifically bars any further appeal in such cases. That section reads:
“100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any letters patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such Single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal.”
10. This section has been introduced to minimise the delay in the finality of a decision. Prior to the enactment of the above provision, under the letters patent, an appeal against the decision of a Single Judge in a second appeal was, in certain cases, held competent, though under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there was some inhibition against interference with the findings of fact. The right of taking recourse to such an appeal has now been taken away by Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (supra). Since, an appeal under Section 217(1) of the Act is a first appeal in a second forum/court and an appeal under Section 218-D of the Act is the second appeal in the third forum/court, no further appeal would be competent before the fourth forum/court in view of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (supra).
11. In the instant case, since an appeal from the appellate order was heard and decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court, no further appeal was maintainable from the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge passed in that appeal. The view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court under the circumstances suffers from no error. This appeal has no merits and it is dismissed as such. No costs.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants, at this stage, submitted that the appellants could challenge the order of the learned Single Judge against which the letters patent has been held to be not maintainable directly under Article 136 of the Constitution. It shall be open to the appellants to take recourse to such other proceedings as may be available to them in law to challenge that order but we express no opinion on that question or on the merits of the order of the learned Single Judge, since in this appeal, that order has not been put in issue.
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