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Ganesh Nagorao Raut Dudhagaonkar v. Rajani Shankarrao Satav And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 9, 1998
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal was filed under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 challenging the judgment dated 12-3-1996 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Aurangabad Bench). The controversy is confined to Issue 2 of the election petition: whether the Returning Officer erred in treating 71 ballot-papers as “exhausted” instead of transferring their 3rd to 6th preference votes to the appellant.

In the election held on 15-6-1994 for a constituency comprising 424 councillors, the quota was fixed at 213 votes (424 / 2 + 1). No candidate achieved this quota in the first round. Two candidates (Respondents 3 and 4) secured no first-preference votes and were eliminated immediately; Respondents 2, 5, 6 and 7 were excluded in later counts. Respondent 1 was ultimately declared elected, and the appellant lost.

The appellant’s election petition contended that, had the allegedly “exhausted” 71 ballot-papers been transferred on the basis of their subsequent preferences, he would have met the quota. The Single Judge dismissed the petition, accepting the Returning Officer’s classification of those ballot-papers as exhausted. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Returning Officer erred in declaring 71 ballot-papers as exhausted and in failing to transfer the 3rd to 6th preference votes recorded thereon to the appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The 71 ballot-papers contained further preferences that, if counted, would have accrued to the appellant after the elimination of earlier-ranked candidates.
  • The Returning Officer should have treated these ballots as “unexhausted” and transferred their value in accordance with Rule 75(3) of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961.
  • Consequently, the appellant would have secured the requisite quota and been declared elected.

Respondent 1 / Returning Officer's Position

  • The ballot-papers were correctly classified as “exhausted” because their remaining preferences were for candidates already eliminated, or no further preference was indicated for any continuing candidate.
  • Rule 75(3), read with the definitions of “exhausted” and “unexhausted” ballot-papers in Rules 71(1) and 71(8), bars the transfer of such ballots.
  • The counting process therefore complied with the statutory scheme and could not be disturbed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dattatraya Eknath Lanke v. Returning Officer, Amravati, AIR 1986 Bom 354; 1985 Mah LJ 875 A ballot-paper on which the next preference is recorded for an already eliminated candidate becomes an “exhausted” and non-transferable paper under Rule 75(3). The Supreme Court adopted this interpretation to uphold the Returning Officer’s decision that the 71 disputed ballot-papers were exhausted and could not be transferred to the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined Chapter VII of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, particularly Rule 75(3) which prescribes the method for exclusion and transfer when no candidate meets the quota. It noted that:

  • Rule 75(3)(b) mandates that only “unexhausted” ballot-papers—those containing a next available preference for a continuing candidate—may be transferred.
  • Rules 71(1) and 71(8) define “exhausted” ballot-papers as those where either (i) no subsequent preference is expressed, or (ii) the next preference is for an eliminated candidate.
  • The Returning Officer had already transferred 30 unexhausted ballots arising from earlier eliminations: 21 to the appellant and 9 to Respondent 1.
  • The remaining 71 ballots fell squarely within the definition of exhausted papers because their next preferences were for candidates no longer in the contest, or no further preferences were marked.
  • Following the precedent in Dattatraya Eknath Lanke, such ballots are non-transferable despite the potential “wastage” of lower-order preferences.

Accordingly, the High Court’s dismissal of the election petition reflected a correct application of Rule 75(3). The Supreme Court found no misinterpretation or procedural error and declined to disturb the finding.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

Respondent 1’s election remains undisturbed. The Court affirmed the statutory interpretation that ballot-papers become exhausted—and therefore non-transferable—when their next available preference is for an eliminated candidate. While the decision reinforces the existing framework under Rule 75(3), it sets no new precedent beyond affirming the High Court’s conformity with settled law. There is no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 calls in question the judgment and order made by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) dated 12-3-1996. Since the controversy in this appeal only centres around Issue 2 which reads thus:

“Whether the petitioner proves that the Returning Officer was in error in declaring 71 ballot-papers referred to in para 12 of the petition as exhausted and he should have taken in consideration the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th preferences indicated in those ballot-papers, allegedly cast in favour of the petitioner?”

we need to refer only to such of the facts as are necessary for consideration of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order on that issue.

2. The Returning Officer declared the final list of contesting candidates on 26-5-1994 after scrutinising the nomination papers on the last date fixed for withdrawal of candidature. The election was held on 15-6-1994. The counting of votes commenced on 17-6-1994 in the morning and the result was declared on the same day. Respondent 1 was declared elected. There were in all 424 Councillors of the Municipal Council and Zilla Parishad who comprised the constituency for the election. As per the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, the quota for election is fixed by dividing the total number of votes by two and adding one to it. The total number of votes being 424, the quota in the present case worked out to 212+1=213. None of the contesting candidates secured the requisite quota of 213 votes and, therefore, none could be declared elected at the conclusion of the counting in the first round. Two candidates, i.e, Respondents 3 and 4 herein, did not secure even a single preference vote and, therefore, they were excluded in the first round itself. Out of the remaining candidates, Respondents 2, 5, 6 and 7 came to be excluded during the counting in the subsequent rounds. While Respondent 1 was declared elected, the appellant was the unsuccessful candidate.

3. In the election petition challenging the election of the returned candidate, the plea raised on behalf of the appellant was that preferences recorded on the ballot-papers in favour of the excluded candidates were also required to be counted in favour of the appellant and that had the same been so counted, the appellant would have been declared elected. The learned Single Judge of the High Court did not agree and dismissed the election petition.

4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

5. The Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 provides for the manner of counting and in Rule 74, it lays down that the ballot-papers should be arranged in parcels according to the first preference, recorded for each of the contesting candidates and that credit be given to the candidate concerned of the value of the ballot-papers in his parcels. Rule 75(3) details the procedure when at the end of the counting, no candidate can be declared elected having obtained the requisite quota. That sub-rule reads thus:

“75. (3) If, at the end of any count, no candidate can be declared elected, the returning officer shall—

(a) exclude from the poll the candidate who up to that stage has been credited with the lowest value;

(b) examine all the ballot-papers in his parcels and sub-parcels, arrange the unexhausted papers in sub-parcels according to the next available preferences recorded thereon for the continuing candidates, count the number of papers in each such sub-parcel and credit it to the candidate for whom such preference is recorded, transfer the sub-parcel to that candidate, and make a separate sub-parcel of all the exhausted papers; and

(c) see whether any of the continuing candidates has, after such transfer and credit, secured the quota.”

6. The learned Single Judge of the High Court found that the returning officer had transferred 30 votes to the appellant and Respondent 1 on the basis of the next available preferences recorded on the unexhausted ballot-papers. Rest of the ballot-papers were found exhausted, meaning thereby that there was no preference cast in favour of any of the continuing candidates. The break-up of the transferred votes was that the appellant secured 21 votes while Respondent 1 secured 9 votes, out of the transferred votes on the unexhausted ballot-papers. The learned Single Judge dealing with this aspect of the case observed:

“Firstly, whenever a second preference was given in favour of the petitioner, those votes (21 in number) have already been transferred to the petitioner. 9 votes were transferred to Respondent 3. Other ballot-papers become exhausted ballot-papers since further preference was not in favour of any continuing candidate or there was no further preference cast at all. It is not the case of the petitioner that second and further preference in these ballot-papers was given to any continuing candidate, which obviously cannot be since at that time only the election petitioner and the returned candidate were continuing candidates.”

7. The observations made by the learned Single Judge of the High Court are completely in accord with the scheme of the Rules contained in Chapter 7 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 and particularly of Rule 75(3) read with Rules 71(1) and 71(8) of the Conduct of Elections Rules which define “exhausted” and “unexhausted” ballot-papers. It is only such a ballot-paper which can be transferred, which has not been exhausted. Where a ballot-paper has already been exhausted since either further preference was not in favour of any continuing candidate or there was no further preference cast at all, any preference recorded on such ballot-papers could not be transferred to any candidate. The 71 votes which the appellant claims to get counted in his favour fell in that category and were rightly declared as “exhausted” and were not counted in favour of any of the continuing candidates because preference recorded on those ballot-papers was in favour of the eliminated candidates.

8. In Dattatraya Eknath Lanke v. Returning Officer, Amravati AIR 1986 Bom 354, 1985 Mah LJ 875 dealing precisely with the scope of Rule 75(3) of the Conduct of Elections Rules, it was held by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court:

“Thus, a ballot-paper on which further preference is recorded in favour of an eliminated candidate is also an exhausted paper and therefore becomes a non-transferable paper. Undoubtedly this involves wastage of additional preferences only due to unpredictable chance of someone being eliminated at a particular count, but that cannot be helped.”

9. The above observations which were relied upon by the learned Single Judge in the present case stand scrutiny and are based on a correct interpretation of Rule 75(3) of the Conduct of Elections Rules. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, therefore, neither fell in any error nor misinterpreted Rule 75(3) of the Conduct of Elections Rules to find that counting had been properly done and 71 votes rightly excluded from being counted in favour of the appellant. Despite a vigorous attempt made by Mr A.M Khanwilkar, learned counsel for the appellant, we are not persuaded to take a contrary view.

10. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs insofar as this appeal is concerned.