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Suresh N. Bhusare And Others v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The three appellants were prosecuted in Sessions Case No. 117 of 1983 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik, for offences under Sections 376 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that on 28 July 1983, at about 11 a.m., the appellants raped Smt. Gangu Bai (PW 3) inside the shop of Appellant 1. Evidence was led through the victim, her brother-in-law Shankar (PW 4), the examining doctor, and the recovery of broken necklace beads allegedly belonging to the victim.
The trial court disbelieved the prosecution, citing inconsistencies in PW 3’s testimony, absence of injuries, delay in lodging the FIR, and doubts about the recovery of beads, and therefore acquitted all three appellants. On appeal, the High Court found PW 3’s evidence wholly reliable, set aside the acquittal, and convicted the appellants under both sections. The appellants then filed the present criminal appeal challenging the High Court’s judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal and convicting the appellants solely on the testimony of PW 3.
- Whether the inconsistencies and corroborative deficiencies in the prosecution evidence rendered the conviction unsafe.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The High Court erred in placing implicit reliance on PW 3’s testimony despite serious inconsistencies between her FIR, police statement, and in-court deposition.
- PW 3’s account was contradicted by PW 4, and her claim of seven-month pregnancy and subsequent abortion was not supported by medical evidence.
- Absence of injuries, unexplained delay in filing the FIR, and the improbable recovery of necklace beads four days after the incident further undermined the prosecution case.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted an independent reassessment of the evidence and highlighted multiple infirmities overlooked by the High Court:
- Contradictory Statements: PW 3 omitted mention of PW 4 in her police statement and later altered her narrative in court, casting doubt on her credibility.
- Improvement on Material Fact: Her claim of being seven months pregnant and suffering an abortion within three days was absent from the FIR and lacked medical corroboration, indicating a deliberate embellishment to negate consent.
- Physical Improbabilities: No injuries were found on PW 3 although she alleged being dragged and scratched; additionally, carrying a bundle of food well inside the shop suggested voluntary entry rather than forcible confinement.
- Conduct of PW 4: The brother-in-law’s behaviour—pulling her out, kicking her, buying tobacco from the accused, and remaining silent until the next morning—was inconsistent with immediate knowledge of rape, reducing corroborative value.
- Recovery of Necklace Beads: The Court found it unnatural that broken beads would remain in the shop for four days, weakening this circumstantial evidence.
Weighing these factors, the Court concluded that PW 3’s evidence did not inspire the “implicit reliance” placed on it by the High Court. The trial court’s view that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt was deemed plausible, and the appellate interference with an acquittal was therefore unwarranted.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SET ASIDE.
The appellants are to be released from custody unless required in another case. The decision reinstates the trial court’s acquittal and underscores the principle that an appellate court must exercise caution before overturning an acquittal, especially when the prosecution evidence contains serious inconsistencies. No new legal precedent was articulated beyond reinforcing established standards for appellate review in criminal matters.
1. The three appellants were tried in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik, in Sessions Case No. 117 of 1983, for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 342 IPC. The trial court acquitted them but their acquittal was reversed by the High Court. Therefore, they have filed this appeal.
2. It was alleged against the appellants that on 28-7-1983, at about 11 o'clock, they committed the rape of Gangu Bai when she had gone to the shop of Appellant 1 for purchasing a matchbox. In order to prove its case, the prosecution had examined PW 3-Gangu Bai and PW 4-Shankar, brother-in-law of Gangu Bai. The prosecution had also led evidence of the doctor who had examined Gangu Bai. The circumstance that from the house of Appellant 1, some beads of a broken necklace of Gangu Bai were found, was also relied upon. The trial court, however, found that the evidence of PW 3-Gangu Bai could not be relied upon safely as it suffered from serious infirmities. Her evidence was found to be inconsistent with the FIR lodged by her on material aspects. The trial court also took note of the fact that no injury was found on her person even though her version was that she was dragged and had in fact received some scratches. The trial court also took into consideration the delay in filing the FIR. The circumstance that some beads of a broken necklace of PW 3-Gangu Bai were found in the house of Appellant 1 was not believed as it was considered unnatural that even after four days, the appellant would have allowed the beads to remain there. For these reasons, the trial court acquitted the appellants.
3. The High Court found the evidence of PW 3 reliable and observed that it was such that implicit reliance could be placed upon it. Therefore, accepting the evidence of PW 3-Gangu Bai alone, the High Court reversed the acquittal of the appellants and convicted the appellants under Sections 376 and 342 IPC.
4. Mr Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that the High Court has committed a grave error in placing implicit reliance on the evidence of PW 3-Gangu Bai as her evidence was not trustworthy and consistent with the evidence of PW 4, her brother-in-law.
5. It is proved that in her police statement, PW 3 had stated that Vishnu was following while she was going to the shop of Appellant 1 and had not referred to Shankar, PW 4 at all. She changed her version in the Court and stated that Vishnu had not followed her. She also stated that Shankar, her brother-in-law, met her on the way. He was sitting on his bullock-cart and had asked her as to where she was going. She had replied by saying that she was taking food for her husband who had gone to the field. She further stated that after about ten minutes, he had come to the shop of Appellant 1 to purchase tobacco and finding the door closed had kicked the door and shouted in the name of Appellant 1 to open the door. He then forcibly took her out and kicked her and told her to go home. She had not disclosed anything to him at that time.
6. In her evidence, she has stated that when the incident took place she was pregnant. It was about seven months' old and because of the rape she had aborted on the third day. But when she was examined by Dr Sulay after a few days, no positive sign of recent abortion was noticed. It is proved that she had not stated like that in her FIR. It would go to show that she was making a deliberate improvement on a material point when she stated that at the time of rape she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy with a view to rule out consent.
7. Her further version was that when she had gone to purchase a matchbox from the shop of Appellant 1, she was carrying a bundle of food articles on her head and she kept it on the “ota” (platform) of the shop. If she had really gone only for that purpose, there was no necessity for her to do so. Moreover, PW 5-Shankar had not found it outside the shop but outside the door of the middle room, i.e, well within the shop. If that was so, then it would mean that she had gone inside the shop willingly and was not lifted from the outer portion of the shop and then dragged and taken into the middle room. She had deposed that because of dragging and resistance, she had received scratches on her back, neck and thighs. But not a single injury was found on her person when she had lodged her complaint.
8. The High Court had rightly not relied upon the evidence of Shankar, brother-in-law of Gangu Bai. His conduct was not consistent with his claim that Gangu Bai had told him that the three appellants had raped her. He behaved thereafter as if nothing had happened. He even purchased tobacco from Appellant 1 thereafter. He did not inform anyone till next day morning about what had happened. On the contrary, his conduct in pulling her out from the middle room, giving a kick to her and telling her to go home, not taking any other action and waiting at the shop of Appellant 1 and purchasing tobacco leads to an inference that no complaint was made by Gangu Bai at that time that she was raped. Gangu Bai herself has not stated that she had told PW 4 like that when she came out of that room.
9. With all these infirmities in her evidence, no implicit reliance could have been placed upon her evidence. The High Court having failed to consider all these important aspects erroneously came to the conclusion that her evidence was reliable. The High Court was wrong in reversing the order of acquittal passed by the trial court and convicting the appellant for both the offences.
10. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court. They are therefore ordered to be released from jail, if their presence in jail is not required in connection with some other case.
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