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Union Territory, Chandigarh And Others v. Mohinder Singh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, Mohinder Singh, was serving as a Sub-Inspector of Police with the Administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. On 5 July 1991, the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) dismissed him from service while invoking the second proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, thereby dispensing with a formal departmental enquiry. The dismissal relied on an intelligence report alleging that the respondent had illegally detained, tortured, and extorted money from one Ranjit Singh and had generated fear that would prevent witnesses from testifying against him.
The respondent’s departmental appeal was rejected by the Inspector General of Police on 30 September 1991. He then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Chandigarh Bench, which—relying on its earlier decision in Baljit Singh v. Chandigarh Administration—set aside the dismissal and ordered reinstatement with full benefits. The Administration appealed to the Supreme Court of India, resulting in the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the satisfaction recorded by the Senior Superintendent of Police that it was “not reasonably practicable” to hold a departmental enquiry, as required by proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, was legally sustainable.
- The permissible scope of judicial or Tribunal review over such satisfaction, in light of Article 311(3).
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s Arguments
- He contended, through counsel Shri M. L. Verma, that a superior police officer against whom similar allegations were made was not proceeded against under proviso (b) to Article 311(2), suggesting discriminatory or arbitrary application of the constitutional provision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Baljit Singh v. Chandigarh Administration, CAT Chandigarh, OA No. 232.Ch/94 (order dated 2-6-1995) | Held that the circumstances relied upon by the Administration did not justify dispensing with an enquiry under Article 311(2)(b). | The Tribunal relied on this earlier CAT order to quash the respondent’s dismissal; the Supreme Court found that reliance to be misplaced and reversed the Tribunal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court, per B. P. Jeevan Reddy J., began by reproducing the constitutional text of Article 311(2) and (3). Clause (3) makes the disciplinary authority’s decision on practicability of an enquiry “final,” though the Court acknowledged that judicial review is not entirely excluded.
Examining the facts, the Court highlighted key portions of the Intelligence Report:
- The respondent allegedly arrested and tortured Ranjit Singh while intoxicated and demanded ₹60,000, eventually accepting ₹20,000 for his release.
- The report described the respondent as “a terror in the area,” noting that witnesses, including the complainant, were visibly intimidated in the presence of senior officers.
- Two other victims fled Chandigarh immediately after release, expressing unwillingness to testify out of fear.
Given these circumstances—particularly the respondent’s intimidation of witnesses in the presence of the Superintendent of Police and the volatile security environment in Punjab in 1991—the Court concluded that the SSP’s satisfaction that a regular enquiry was not reasonably practicable was justified.
The Court rejected the respondent’s parity argument regarding a superior officer, finding the allegations against that officer materially different and lacking any intimidation component. Accordingly, the CAT had erred in overturning the dismissal.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; JUDGMENT OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL SET ASIDE.
Immediate Effect: The respondent’s dismissal from service stands restored, and the reinstatement order with attendant benefits is vacated. No costs were awarded.
Broader Implications: While reaffirming that judicial review over Article 311(2)(b) decisions is permissible, the Court emphasised deference to the disciplinary authority where contemporaneous material shows genuine witness intimidation making an enquiry impracticable. The decision does not create new precedent but reinforces established constitutional principles governing summary dismissals in exceptional circumstances.
B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.— Leave granted. Heard the counsel for the parties.
2. The respondent, a Sub-Inspector of Police in the service of the Administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh, had been dismissed from service by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Union Territory, Chandigarh. The Senior Superintendent of Police dispensed with the enquiry invoking proviso (b) to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and made the order of dismissal on 5-7-1991. An appeal preferred by the respondent was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police on 30-9-1991 whereupon the respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh. The Tribunal found, following its earlier order dated 2-6-1995 in OA No. 232.Ch/94 (Baljit Singh v. Chandigarh Admn.), that the ground upon which the Senior Superintendent has dispensed with the enquiry is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the Tribunal quashed the order of dismissal and the appellate order and directed the administration to reinstate the respondent with all attendant benefits.
3. The order of dismissal reads as follows:
“Order
Whereas SI Mohinder Singh No. CHG/1 was holding the post of Sub-Inspector in the Police Department, Union Territory, Chandigarh.
It was brought to my notice that he indulged in gross misuse of official power and attempted to extort money from an innocent victim after illegally detaining and torturing him in the Police Station, which amounts to grave misconduct on the part of a Police Officer.
Shri Baldev Singh, Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, UT, Chandigarh, has also conducted an enquiry against him for his aforesaid nefarious activities and misdeeds and has submitted a report which proves the misconduct of SI Mohinder Singh No. CHG/1.
From the facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that he has indulged in gross misuse of official power.
And further, I, Sumedh Singh Saini, Senior Superintendent of Police, Union Territory, Chandigarh, after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, am satisfied under sub-clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against SI Mohinder Singh No. CHG/1 for the reasons that the witnesses cannot come forward freely to depose against him in a regular departmental enquiry.
Now, therefore, I, Sumedh Singh Saini, Senior Superintendent of Police, Union Territory, Chandigarh, appointing authority of SI Mohinder Singh No. CHG/1, hereby dismiss him from government service with immediate effect.
sd/-
Senior Superintendent of Police
UT, Chandigarh
SI Mohinder Singh, No. CHG/1,
PS North, Chandigarh.”
4. The order of dismissal refers to and is based upon the report of Shri Baldev Singh, Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, Union Territory, Chandigarh. It is, therefore, necessary to notice the main features of the said Report. The Report says that the respondent arrested one Ranjit Singh from his house at about 11.45 p.m on the night intervening 3-7-1991/4-7-1991 along with two friends of Ranjit Singh who happened to be in his house at that time, brought Ranjit Singh to the police station and tortured him mercilessly on the plea that he was harbouring terrorists. It is reported that the respondent was in a drunken condition at that time and that he was repeatedly asking Ranjit Singh about the whereabouts of a particular terrorist. The respondent also told Ranjit Singh that he was torturing him at the instance of his superior officers. He demanded a sum of Rupees sixty thousand from Ranjit Singh as a condition for releasing him. Ultimately, a sum of Rupees twenty thousand was paid to the respondent whereafter Ranjit Singh was released. The Report submits that the ground on which Ranjit Singh was arrested and tortured was wholly baseless and that it was done with a view to extort money from him. The last paragraph of the Report is relevant for the present purposes and reads thus:
“I may mention that this SI is a terror in the area and in a regular departmental enquiry no policeman or private man is likely to depose against him. In my presence he intimidated the complainant, Shri Ranjit Singh who appeared to be visibly terrified of this Sub-Inspector. Also, the 2 guests of Shri Ranjit Singh, who were also victims of the harassment caused by SI Mohinder Singh, left Chandigarh immediately on being released as they were terrified of the Sub-Inspector. Before going they told Shri Ranjit Singh that they would not testify against SI Mohinder Singh because they were scared of him. As such I am of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by initiating any departmental proceeding against him and would recommend that stern disciplinary action be taken against him.
sd/-
Superintendent of Police
Intelligence, UT, Chandigarh
Dt. 5-7-1991”
5. We are unable to understand the reasoning of the Tribunal when it says that the reason given by the Senior Superintendent of Police is not sufficient reason for dispensing with the enquiry under proviso (b) to Article 311(2). The order of dismissal recites that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against SI Mohinder Singh CHG/1 for the reason that the witnesses cannot come forward freely to depose against him in a regular departmental enquiry”. Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 311, insofar as they are relevant, read thus:
“311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.—
(1) ***
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply—
(a) ***
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) ***
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.”
6. Clause (3) of Article 311, it may be noticed, declares that where a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry as contemplated by clause (2), the decision of the authority empowered to dismiss such person shall be final on that question. The Tribunal has not referred to clause (3) at all in its order. We are not suggesting that because of clause (3), the court or the Tribunal should completely shut its eyes. Nor are we suggesting that in every case the court should blindly accept the recital in terms of the said proviso contained in the order of dismissal. Be that as it may, without going into the question of extent and scope of judicial review in such a matter, we may look to the facts of this case. The Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, has reported that the respondent “is a terror in the area” and, more important, in his very presence, the respondent “intimidated the complainant Shri Ranjit Singh who appeared to be visibly terrified of this Sub-Inspector”. It is also reported that the other persons who were arrested with Ranjit Singh, and who were present there, immediately left his office terrified by the threats held out by the respondent. In such a situation — and keeping in view that all this was happening in the year 1991 in the State of Punjab — the Senior Superintendent of Police cannot be said to be not justified in holding that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry against the respondent.
7. Shri M.L Verma, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that a similar allegation was made against the Inspector of Police (superior of the respondent) but that in his case, proviso (b) to Article 311(2) was not invoked. We have seen the Report against the Inspector. We find that the allegation against him is entirely different. Above all, there is no allegation that the Inspector held out any threat to Ranjit Singh in the presence of the Superintendent of Police or any other superior officer. The said plea has no substance whatsoever.
8. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the Tribunal is set aside. No costs.
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