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Ramesh v. Sheshrao And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 21, 1997
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Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1, Sheshrao, was the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Thanegaon, Tahsil Karanja, District Wardha. A no-confidence motion against him was passed by a majority of panchas in a meeting held on 8-3-1995. He raised a dispute under the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 before the Additional Collector, who rejected it on 21-4-1995. On appeal, the Divisional Commissioner allowed the appeal on 22-1-1996 on the ground of want of a valid notice, thereby treating the no-confidence motion as invalid.

Subsequently, another no-confidence motion was moved by 8 out of 11 panchas on 3-2-1996 and was passed by an overwhelming majority on 9-2-1996. Respondent 1 again raised a dispute before the Additional Collector, which was rejected. On appeal, the Divisional Commissioner allowed the appeal by order dated 14-8-1996. The appellant, one of the panchas, challenged the Commissioner's order by filing a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed by order dated 14-10-1996. This appeal by special leave followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Section 35(3-A) of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958, a second no-confidence motion moved within one year of an earlier motion is barred when the first motion was carried by the requisite majority but later treated as invalid for want of a valid notice.
  2. Whether a prior motion that was carried but subsequently invalidated on procedural grounds falls within the statutory phrases “not moved” or “not carried,” thereby triggering the one-year bar in Section 35(3-A).
  3. Whether the Divisional Commissioner and the High Court correctly applied Section 35(3-A) to bar the second motion of no confidence.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on the language of Section 35(3-A) of the Act, which provides that if a motion is “not moved” or is “not carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members,” no fresh motion shall be moved against the Sarpanch within one year from the date of such special meeting.

It identified the “significant words” as “if the motion is not moved or is not carried,” and examined whether the first motion of 8-3-1995—passed by the requisite majority but later held invalid for want of notice—could be treated as a motion “not moved” or “not carried.” The court concluded it could not. The first motion was in fact carried by the requisite majority; its ineffectiveness arose subsequently due to a procedural defect (lack of valid notice) identified by the Commissioner. Such a scenario is not encompassed by Section 35(3-A).

The court further explained that Section 35(3-A) is aimed at situations where a motion, though validly convened, is either not moved or fails to secure the requisite two-thirds majority in the meeting. The evident object of the provision is to prevent repeated or frivolous no-confidence motions within a year where the earlier motion was not even moved or was defeated due to lack of the required majority. In the present case, the earlier motion was neither un-moved nor defeated in the meeting; it was carried. Therefore, the statutory bar in Section 35(3-A) did not apply.

On this basis, the court held that there was no ground for the Commissioner to allow the appeal by invoking Section 35(3-A), and the High Court’s affirmance of that view was incorrect.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DATED 14-8-1996 AND HIGH COURT'S ORDER DATED 14-10-1996 SET ASIDE.

Implications: The immediate effect is that the reasoning that Section 35(3-A) barred the second no-confidence motion is rejected. Section 35(3-A) does not apply where an earlier motion was carried by the requisite majority but later became ineffective due to a notice defect. The decision affects the parties by nullifying the Commissioner’s and High Court’s orders; no broader implications are discussed in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. Leave granted.

2. Sheshrao, Respondent 1, was the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Thanegaon, Tahsil Karanja, District Wardha. A motion of no confidence was moved against him which was passed by majority of the panchas in a meeting held on 8-3-1995. Respondent 1 challenged the same by raising a dispute under the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 before the Additional Collector of the District who rejected the same on 21-4-1995. Respondent 1 then preferred an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner which was allowed by order dated 22-1-1996 on the ground of want of a valid notice. The effect of the order was that the motion of no confidence was treated to be invalid. Thereafter, another motion of no confidence was moved by 8 out of 11 panchas on 3-2-1996. The motion was passed by an overwhelming majority of the panchas on 9-2-1996. Respondent 1 then raised a dispute before the Additional Collector who rejected the same. An appeal to the Divisional Commissioner by Respondent 1 has been allowed by the order dated 14-8-1996. The appellant who is one of the panchas filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the Commissioner's order. That writ petition has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 14-10-1996. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

3. The point which arises for decision is to be answered with reference to sub-section (3-A) of Section 35 of the Act, which reads as under:

“35(3-A).— If the motion is not moved or is not carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members (other than associate members) who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the panchayat, no such fresh motion shall be moved against the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch within a period of one year from the date of such special meeting.”

4. The Commissioner has taken the view that the no-confidence motion having been passed on 8-3-1995, the moving of the second motion on 3-2-1996 was even a period of one year of the date of the first motion on account of which it was barred by sub-section (3-A) of Section 35 of the Act. The question is whether the view taken by the Commissioner which has been upheld by the High Court is correct.

5. The significant words in the above provisions are “if the motion is not moved or is not carried”, then “no such fresh motion shall be moved … within a period of one year” from the date of rejection of the motion. The question is whether the first motion which ended in the manner indicated above can be treated as a motion not moved or not carried by the requisite majority. In our opinion, the first motion does not fall in this category. The first motion which was passed on 8-3-1995, was carried by the requisite majority but it became ineffective because the Commissioner on appeal by the Sarpanch held the motion of no confidence to be invalid for want of the requisite notice of holding the special meeting on 8-3-1995. The bar contained in sub-section (3-A) of Section 35 of the Act does not cover such a situation.

6. The provision clearly is in respect of a motion which though valid, is not carried by the requisite majority of members because of its not being moved or being passed by the requisite majority. No such defect was found in the first motion in the present case which was carried by the requisite majority and not rejected in the meeting. The object of the provision clearly is to prevent frivolous no-confidence motions repeatedly within one year, if the earlier one has not been even moved or has been defeated because want of the requisite majority for passing the same. In the present case, the first motion was not of the kind which attracted sub-section (3-A) of Section 35. Accordingly, there was no ground for the Commissioner to allow the appeal since sub-section (3-A) of Section 35 was not available in the present case.

7. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order dated 14-8-1996 passed by the Commissioner and the order dated 14-10-1996 passed by the High Court are set aside.