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Rajendra Mahton v. State Of Bihar Through Legal Remembrancer, Govt. Of Bihar, Patna .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 21 April 1981 at about 7:00 p.m., the appellant visited a small shop run by the deceased, Arjun Sao, and demanded a packet of cigarettes from PW 4 (the deceased’s daughter). When informed that no cigarettes were available, the appellant hurled abuses. The deceased protested, whereupon the appellant drew a pistol and shot him; the deceased died on the spot. Eyewitnesses present included PW 3 (a neighbour), PW 4, PW 5 (the deceased’s son), PW 6 (the deceased’s wife) and PW 7 (sister-in-law of PW 6).
PW 8, the investigating officer, arrived in the village around 2:00 a.m. while probing an unrelated complaint of dacoity lodged by the appellant’s grandfather. PW 7 informed him of the killing, and her statement formed the basis of the First Information Report (FIR). The appellant could not be immediately traced.
The prosecution examined eight witnesses; the defence, two. The Sessions Court, Nalanda, acquitted the appellant, granting him the benefit of doubt. On the State’s appeal, the Patna High Court reversed the acquittal, convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The present judgment relates to the appellant’s further appeal challenging the High Court’s decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Patna High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal and convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC.
- Whether the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of five eyewitnesses, was reliable and sufficient to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- Whether the trial court erred in using omissions in the FIR to discredit eyewitnesses and in accepting the defence theory of a stray gunshot during an alleged dacoity.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The Sessions Court’s view acquitting the appellant was reasonable and should not have been disturbed; reliance was placed on Dinanath Singh v. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 674.
- DW 1, a self-described village doctor, testified that the deceased stated dacoits had shot him, supporting the defence version of an attempted dacoity.
- The deceased allegedly survived for some time and died en route to hospital, casting doubt on the prosecution timeline.
- No complaint was made by the deceased’s family until PW 8 arrived at 2:00 a.m., raising suspicion of after-thought and false implication.
- Material discrepancies (e.g., presence of a lantern) undermined the credibility of prosecution witnesses.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The trial court wrongly disbelieved eyewitnesses solely because certain details (such as the burning lantern) were not mentioned in PW 7’s FIR.
- Under Betal Singh v. State of M.P. (1996) 8 SCC 205, statements under Section 161 CrPC cannot be used to impeach witnesses, and an appellate court may reverse an acquittal that is palpably wrong.
- The appellant was well known to the witnesses and stood close to them; identification was unmistakable even at twilight.
- The alleged dacoity was never proved: the complaint by the appellant’s grandfather appeared contrived; no FIR from that case was proved; DW 1 and DW 2 were unreliable.
- The High Court correctly appreciated the evidence and rectified the trial court’s palpable errors.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dinanath Singh v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 674 | An appellate court should not overturn an acquittal if the trial court’s view is reasonably possible. | Cited by the appellant to argue that the High Court ought not to have reversed the acquittal. The Supreme Court distinguished the case, finding the trial court’s view “palpably wrong” and therefore not protected by the Dinanath principle. |
| Betal Singh v. State of M.P., (1996) 8 SCC 205 | (i) Statements under Section 161 CrPC cannot be used to discredit witnesses; (ii) Appellate court can reverse an acquittal that is manifestly erroneous. | Relied upon by the respondent and endorsed by the Court to hold that the Sessions Judge erred in using FIR omissions to reject eyewitness testimony and that the High Court properly exercised its appellate powers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court conducted an independent appraisal of the evidence and concluded as follows:
- Defence of Dacoity Unsubstantiated: No credible material supported the alleged dacoity. The complaint by the appellant’s grandfather (CR No. 298 of 1981) was not proved; DW 1 and DW 2 were found unreliable.
- Identification and Lighting Conditions: The shooting occurred at about 7:00 p.m. in April when residual daylight or customary artificial lighting (a lantern) would permit clear recognition. The appellant was a neighbour known to the eyewitnesses, negating any identification doubt.
- Misuse of FIR Omissions: The trial court erred in discrediting eyewitnesses for not mentioning the lantern in PW 7’s fard beyan. The FIR cannot be used against witnesses who did not author it.
- Palpable Error by Trial Court: The Sessions Judge’s wholesale rejection of five eyewitnesses on trivial discrepancies was deemed “palpably wrong,” justifying appellate interference.
- High Court’s Evaluation Affirmed: The High Court had “discussed in detail the evidence of every witness and appreciated the same in the proper perspective,” correctly restoring the conviction.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The conviction under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Patna High Court stand affirmed.
Implications: The decision upholds the High Court’s authority to reverse an acquittal where the trial court’s reasoning is manifestly unsound. It reinforces that omissions in an FIR cannot, by themselves, nullify otherwise credible eyewitness testimony. No new legal doctrine is created, but the judgment underscores existing principles governing appellate review in criminal cases.
M. Srinivasan, J.— The appellant was prosecuted under Section 302 IPC. The case of the prosecution was briefly as follows: On 21-4-1981 at about 7.00 p.m the appellant went to the shop belonging to the deceased Arjun Sao near his residence and demanded a packet of cigarettes from PW 4, the daughter of the deceased. At that time PW 6, the wife of the deceased, PW 7, the wife of the brother of PW 6, PW 5, the son of the deceased and PW 3, a resident of a nearby house were also present. When the appellant demanded a packet of cigarettes, PW 4 and PW 6 informed him that there was no cigarette in the shop. The appellant used abusive language and made certain derisive remarks. The deceased protested against the same. Immediately the appellant took out a pistol and shot the deceased who fell down and died at the spot. PW 8, the Investigating Officer came to the village at about 2.00 a.m in connection with investigation of another case on a complaint lodged by the grandfather of the appellant that there was dacoity in the village by certain persons. At that time he was informed about the killing of the deceased by PW 7 whose statement was recorded by him. The appellant was not traceable for some time. Later a case was registered against him.
2. The appellant denied the occurrence and claimed that he was falsely implicated. According to the appellant there was an attempt by certain persons to commit dacoity in the house of his grandfather and when there was a hue and cry, the dacoits fired shots and ran away from there. According to the appellant one such gunshot hit the deceased and was the cause of his death.
3. The prosecution examined eight witnesses while the appellant examined two witnesses in support of his case. The Court of Session at Nalanda opined that the charge against the appellant was not proved beyond all reasonable doubts and he was therefore entitled to benefit of doubt. Consequently he was acquitted. On appeal by the State, the High Court at Patna reversed the judgment of the Sessions Court and held that the appellant was guilty of committing an offence under Section 302 IPC. The appellant was therefore convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. It is the judgment of the High Court which is under challenge in this appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court inasmuch as the view taken by the Sessions Judge was quite reasonable on the evidence on record. Our attention is drawn to the judgment of this Court in Dinanath Singh v. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 674, AIR 1980 SC 1199 wherein this Court held that where the view taken by the trial court in acquitting the accused is reasonably possible, even if the High Court have taken a different view, that is no ground for reversing the order of acquittal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the depositions of the witnesses and in particular that of DW 1. The said witness claims to be engaged in doctor's profession. According to him, he was called by PW 5, who was accompanied by PW 3 and PW 7 to come and examine the deceased who had received a bullet injury. According to the witness when he saw the deceased, the latter was alive and told him that dacoits had fired at him. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that the deceased was alive for quite some time after he was injured by the gunshot and he died on the way to the hospital. It is contended by learned counsel that DW 1 is an independent witness and his version should be accepted. It is also submitted that the members of the family of the deceased had not made any complaint to the police till 2.00 a.m when PW 8 came to the village for investigating another case on the basis of the report given by the grandfather of the appellant with reference to the dacoity in the village. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on the reasoning of the Sessions Judge and submitted that there are material discrepancies and inconsistencies in the statement of the witnesses which made them totally unreliable.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the judgment of the trial court is based on a palpable illegality inasmuch as the trial Judge has chosen to disbelieve the witnesses entirely on the basis of the contents of the FIR which was recorded on the statement of PW 7 only. He has placed reliance on the judgment of Betal Singh v. State of M.P (1996) 8 SCC 205 The Court has held in that case that evidence of a witness cannot be impeached with reference to the statements of other witnesses recorded under Section 161. It has also been held in that case that the High Court's power in deposing of appeals from conviction or acquittal are essentially the same and the appellate court is free to come to any conclusion as to the credibility of the evidence except when it depends upon the demeanour of the witnesses. It has also been pointed out that if the view taken by the trial court is palpably wrong the order of acquittal can be reversed.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out that the Sessions Judge has chosen to disbelieve all the prosecution witnesses on the only ground that the facts stated by such witnesses were not set out in the Fard beyan (Ext. 4) of the informant (PW 7). The trial court has also made much of the small and immaterial discrepancies relating to the existence of lantern in the shop at the time of occurrence and proceeded to hold that the appellant could not have been identified by the witnesses in the absence of sufficient light. It is submitted that according to the evidence of the witnesses the appellant was standing very near them when he fired the pistol and that the appellant was known to them for quite a long time as he was resident of a nearby house. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that there is no error whatever in the judgment of the High Court in accepting the evidence of the five eyewitnesses, one of them being an independent witness. It is also pointed out by him that DW 1 is a quack in the village and even a perusal of his evidence shows that he is not speaking the truth. It is further pointed out that there is absolutely no material to support the version put forward by the defence regarding the alleged dacoity in the village on the date of occurrence. According to learned counsel the complaint lodged by the grandfather of the appellant regarding the alleged dacoity was deliberately made in order to create evidence.
8. On a perusal of the entire record we are inclined to accept the view taken by the High Court. It is quite evident that the version put forward by the defence regarding the alleged dacoity is not proved in any manner by any acceptable evidence. Significantly, the complaint lodged by the grandfather of the appellant was registered as CR Case No. 298 of 1981 under Sections 399 and 402 IPC but the complaint relating to the occurrence in this case is registered as CR No. 297 of 1981 though it was lodged later according to PW 8. There is no explanation for the same. The FIR in the CR Case No. 298 of 1981 has not been proved before the court. A perusal of the depositions of DW 1 and DW 2 shows that neither of them is speaking the truth. There is also no other acceptable evidence regarding the alleged dacoity. Both the courts are therefore justified in rejecting the defence version of alleged dacoity.
9. The time of occurrence was about 7.00 p.m In the second half of April, there would be sufficient light and it will not be so dark as to prevent people from recognizing others who are already well known to them. It is also common knowledge that generally in this country, people will switch on the lights or light lamps in the absence of electric lights. The evidence adduced by the prosecution that there was a lantern in the shop of the deceased was quite natural. The absence of reference to the same in the fard beyan of PW 7 does not have any significance. She might not have mentioned it as it is a part of the daily routine and not an unusual feature. The trial court was in error in making much of the omission of reference to burning of lamp in the shop in the FIR and disbelieving the witnesses who spoke about it. The trial court was certainly not entitled to use the FIR against witnesses who were not responsible for it.
10. The trial court had also overlooked the fact that the appellant was not a stranger to the witnesses. He was living in practically the next house and the PWs knew him for long. They would have had no difficulty in recognizing him at twilight. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondent, the trial court had chosen to disbelieve every eyewitness on the ground that there was no reference to a burning lamp in the FIR and the Investigating Officer did not find a lamp or lantern in the shop. There is no doubt that the trial court was palpably wrong.
11. The High Court has discussed in detail the evidence of every witness and appreciated the same in the proper perspective. The High Court is fully justified in reversing the conclusion of the trial court and setting aside the order of acquittal.
12. We find no merit in the appeal. It is dismissed.
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