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Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi And Others v. State Of Bihar And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 26, 1997
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This order concerns a special leave petition arising from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court dated 1-7-1996 in LPA No. 1213 of 1995, which confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 2311 of 1995. The Court first condoned the delay.

The petitioners were engaged at the Cooperative Training Institute, Deoghar, by its Principal. Petitioner 1 was appointed as an Assistant on 1-8-1988; Petitioner 2 as a Driver on 10-11-1989; and Petitioners 3 to 5 as Peons on different dates, namely 31-5-1987 and 22-4-1992. They were admittedly daily-wage employees. Their services were terminated by the Principal, leading them to file a writ petition in the High Court. The Single Judge’s decision was upheld by the Division Bench. The petitioners then approached this Court by special leave. Ultimately, the special leave petition was dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners’ termination amounted to “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  2. Whether the termination was arbitrary, given the petitioners’ status as daily-wage employees with no right to the posts.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners’ Arguments

  • The termination of their services violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  • Learned counsel contended that, in the High Court, the petitioners had not put forth a “retrenchment” claim but had challenged the termination as arbitrary.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on whether the petitioners’ termination constituted “retrenchment” under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It noted that not every department of the Government can be treated as an “industry,” and where appointments are governed by statutory rules, the concept of “industry” is excluded to that extent.

The petitioners were not appointed in accordance with the applicable rules; rather, they were engaged based on the need for work. They were temporary, daily-wage employees. In these circumstances, their disengagement from service could not be construed as “retrenchment” under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court emphasized that the concept of “retrenchment” cannot be expanded to include such daily-wage engagements that were not made in conformity with statutory rules.

Addressing the contention that the termination was arbitrary, the Court held that, since the petitioners were only daily-wage employees and had no right to the posts, their disengagement could not be characterized as arbitrary.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Delay condoned. The special leave petition was DISMISSED.

Implications: The termination of the petitioners’ daily-wage engagements stands, and no relief was granted. The order turns on the petitioners’ status as daily-wage employees not appointed under statutory rules and does not set out broader doctrinal changes beyond its application to these facts. No new precedent was set beyond the direct effect on the parties.

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Order

1. Delay condoned.

2. This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court, made on 1-7-1996 in LPA No. 1213 of 1995 confirming the order of the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 2311 of 1995.

3. The admitted position is that Petitioner 1 came to be appointed as Assistant, Petitioner 2 as Driver and Petitioners 3 to 5 as Peons on different dates, viz., on 1-8-1988, 10-11-1989, 31-5-1987 and 22-4-1992. They were appointed in the Cooperative Training Institute, Deoghar by its Principal. They are admittedly daily-wage employees. Their services came to be terminated by the Principal. Calling that termination in question, they filed a writ petition in the High Court. The main grievance of the petitioners before us is that termination of their services is in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question for consideration, therefore, is: Whether the petitioners can be said to have been “retrenched” within the meaning of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act? Every department of the Government cannot be treated to be “industry”. When the appointments are regulated by the statutory rules, the concept of “industry” to that extent stands excluded. Admittedly, they were not appointed to the posts in accordance with the rules but were engaged on the basis of need of the work. They are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. The concept of “retrenchment” therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. The learned counsel for the petitioners seeks to contend that in the High Court, the petitioners did not contend that it is a case of retrenchment but termination of their services is arbitrary. Since they are only daily-wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary.

4. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.