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Director General Of Police And Others v. R. Janibasha .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent was charge-sheeted for misconduct. After an enquiry, the charges were found established and the disciplinary authority dismissed the respondent from service. On appeal, the appellate authority modified the punishment to compulsory retirement. The respondent then approached the Tribunal, which (i) held the charge-memo was issued by an authority other than the appointing authority, and (ii) reappreciated the evidence as though exercising appellate powers, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish the charges. On these grounds, the Tribunal set aside the compulsory retirement order. The State appealed against the Tribunal’s order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether disciplinary proceedings are vitiated on the ground that the charge-memo was issued by an authority other than the appointing/disciplinary authority.
- Whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence and substituting its own findings for those of the disciplinary authority.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Tribunal’s view that proceedings were illegal because the charge-memo was not issued by the disciplinary authority was contrary to Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan (1996) 2 SCC 145.
- The Tribunal wrongly acted as an appellate forum by reappreciating evidence; its role was limited to judicial review (checking technical irregularities/illegalities), as supported by State of T.N v. S. Subramaniam (1996) 7 SCC 509.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Tribunal was justified in interfering and reappreciating the evidence because it found discrepancies that went to the root of the order.
- The respondent’s counsel fairly accepted that the charge-memo issue was covered by Thavasiappan.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan (1996) 2 SCC 145, (1996) 32 ATC 663 | The Tribunal’s view that proceedings are illegal because the charge-memo was not issued by the disciplinary/appointing authority was not accepted. | The Court treated the issue as covered by this precedent (as conceded by respondent’s counsel) and rejected the Tribunal’s basis for interference on this ground. |
| State of T.N v. S. Subramaniam (1996) 7 SCC 509, (1996) 33 ATC 317 | The Tribunal is not a court of appeal; in judicial review it cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own conclusions for those of the disciplinary authority; technical rules of evidence do not apply in disciplinary proceedings. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence and replacing the disciplinary authority’s findings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court found that the Tribunal acted beyond its permissible judicial review role by reassessing the evidence as if it were an appellate authority. The disciplinary authority’s charge was that the respondent demanded and accepted a bribe; the Tribunal focused on discrepancies relating to date, time, and amount. The Court noted that these discrepancies had been considered by the disciplinary authority, which gave acceptable reasons for ignoring them. In such circumstances, the Tribunal could not substitute its own findings for those of the disciplinary authority.
The Court further held that the Tribunal’s objection regarding the authority competent to issue the charge-memo was unsustainable in light of Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan, and the respondent’s counsel fairly accepted that the point was covered by that decision.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED. The Tribunal’s order was set aside and the disciplinary authority’s order was restored. There was no order as to costs.
The direct effect was that the respondent remained subject to the disciplinary authority’s order as restored by the Court. The decision applied existing Supreme Court authority on the limits of Tribunal jurisdiction and did not indicate that any new precedent was set.
1. The respondent was charge-sheeted for certain misconduct and on enquiry it was found that the charges have been established. On that basis, the disciplinary authority passed an order dismissing the respondent from service. On appeal, the appellate authority modified the punishment to that of “compulsory retirement”. Still aggrieved the respondent preferred an application before the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that the charge-memo was issued not by the appointing authority but by a different authority and after reappreciating the evidence as if it was an appellate forum, the Tribunal independently came to the conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to hold that the charges were established. On that ground the Tribunal set aside the order compulsorily retiring the respondent. The State, aggrieved by that order has come up in this appeal.
2. Mr Mariarputham, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the view of the Tribunal that the charge-memo was not issued by the disciplinary authority, the further proceedings were illegal, was not accepted by this Court in the judgment reported in Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan (1996) 2 SCC 145, (1996) 32 ATC 663. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal has followed its earlier order in OA No. 4235 of 1991 dated 9-12-1992 which was reversed by this Court in the abovesaid judgment. On the second point, namely, reappreciation of evidence, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was not to reappreciate the evidence, but to find out whether there are any technical irregularities and illegalities in the decision of the disciplinary authority. On the other hand, in this case, the Tribunal has gone into the evidence as if it was an appellate authority and then has come to its conclusion upsetting the findings of the disciplinary authority. In support of that he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in State of T.N v. S. Subramaniam (1996) 7 SCC 509, (1996) 33 ATC 317.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent however submitted that the Tribunal has rightly interfered with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority as it has found the discrepancy as set out in the order which goes to the root of the order and, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in this case in reappreciating the evidence. We find from the order of the disciplinary authority the charge was that the respondent had demanded and accepted the bribe, but the only discrepancy pointed out in the evidence was regarding the date, time and amount. This has been noticed by the disciplinary authority and it has given acceptable reasons for ignoring those discrepancies. If that be the position, we do not think that the Tribunal can substitute its own finding in place of the finding given by the disciplinary authority. This Court in S. Subramaniam case (1996) 7 SCC 509, (1996) 33 ATC 317 has observed as follows: (SCC Headnote)
“The Tribunal is not a court of appeal. The power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was taken away by the power under Article 323-A and invested in the Tribunal by the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It is settled law that the Tribunal has only power of judicial review of the administrative action of the appellant on complaints relating to service conditions of employees. It is the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record findings whether the charge has been proved or not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence have no application to the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion.”
4. In the light of the above decision of this Court, we are of the view that the learned counsel for the appellant is right that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence and substituting its finding in place of the findings rendered by the disciplinary authority. On the question of the authority who can issue the charge-memo, learned counsel for the respondent has fairly accepted that the case is covered by the Thavasiappan case (1996) 2 SCC 145, (1996) 32 ATC 663. In the circumstances, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore the order of the disciplinary authority. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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