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Nandkumar Krishnarao Navgire v. Jananath Laxman Kushalkar And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The complainant had prompted the State to prosecute the appellant and another person on allegations of cheating and criminal breach of trust. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pune acquitted the appellant and, simultaneously, issued a notice to the complainant under Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to show cause why compensation should not be awarded to the acquitted accused. Before the complainant could respond, a different Magistrate assumed charge. The successor-Magistrate concluded that he lacked jurisdiction to continue the Section 250 proceedings, holding that the power was personal to the Magistrate who initiated it. The High Court of Bombay, in revision, upheld that view. The present appeal by special leave challenged the High Court’s refusal to interfere.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a successor-Magistrate can continue and conclude proceedings for compensation under Section 250 CrPC that were initiated by his predecessor.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajaram Majhi v. Panchanan Ghosh, AIR 1929 Cal 762 | Interpretation that only the Magistrate who initiates Section 250 proceedings may conclude them. | Cited as part of the “unanimous understanding” of High Courts supporting the same-Magistrate requirement. |
| Emperor v. Mohd. Alan | Same principle regarding personal jurisdiction of the initiating Magistrate under Section 250. | Referenced to demonstrate consistent judicial opinion across jurisdictions. |
| Ram Nath v. Bashir-Ud-Din, AIR 1953 Punj 213 | Reiterates that proceedings under Section 250 are to be initiated and concluded by the same Magistrate. | Highlighted by the Court as further evidence of the settled view. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began with a textual examination of Section 250 CrPC, noting that the phrase “the Magistrate” in sub-section (2) could, on a literal reading, permit a successor-Magistrate to carry forward the proceedings. However, the Court found this literal construction incompatible with the purpose and narrow scope of Section 250:
- The section limits the compensation enquiry to the fine-imposing powers of the Magistrate (e.g., a First-Class Magistrate’s ceiling of Rs 2000), indicating the legislature viewed it as an ancillary “addenda” to the main trial.
- Given the modest pecuniary jurisdiction and the ancillary nature of the enquiry, continuity in fact-finding and assessment is best served when the same Magistrate both initiates and concludes the compensation proceedings.
- All cited High Court authorities had uniformly held that the jurisdiction is personal to the initiating Magistrate. Disturbing this settled position would create uncertainty and procedural complications.
Balancing literal interpretation against legislative intent and consistent precedent, the Court adopted the view that only the Magistrate who issued the initial notice under Section 250 may pass the final order.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
By affirming that Section 250 CrPC proceedings must be initiated and concluded by the same Magistrate, the Supreme Court validated the unanimous understanding of several High Courts. The immediate effect is that the successor-Magistrate’s disengagement was correct, the notice to the complainant remains discharged, and no compensation proceedings can continue before a different Magistrate. The judgment reinforces procedural consistency but does not create a new precedent beyond clarifying and endorsing existing interpretations.
Order
1. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay declining to upset an order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pune, whereby notice issued against the complainant-respondent under Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was discharged.
2. It is seen that the State at the instance of the complainant had prosecuted the appellant and another on charges of cheating, criminal breach of trust, etc. The appellant was acquitted of the charges by the Presiding Officer of the Court who issued simultaneously a notice to the complainant-respondent as to why he should not be ordered to pay compensation under Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code. By the time the respondent could give his response, the Presiding Officer got changed. The succeeding one took the view that he had no jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter under Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He opined that jurisdiction conferred on a Magistrate under Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was personal to the incumbent and that a successor could not continue with the proceedings. That order has been upheld by the High Court in revision.
3. Section 250 insofar as relevant is extracted below:
“250. (1) If, in any case instituted upon complaint or upon information given to a police officer or to a Magistrate, one or more persons is or are accused before a Magistrate of any offence triable by a Magistrate, and the Magistrate by whom the case is heard discharges or acquits all or any of the accused, and is of opinion that there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation against them or any of them, the Magistrate may, by his order of discharge or acquittal, if the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made is present, call upon him forthwith to show cause why he should not pay compensation to such accused or to each or any of such accused when there are more than one; or, if such person is not present, direct the issue of a summons to him to appear and show cause as aforesaid.
(2) The Magistrate shall record and consider any cause which such complainant or informant may show, if he is satisfied that there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation, may, for reasons to be recorded, make an order that compensation to such amount, not exceeding the amount of fine he is empowered to impose, as he may determine, be paid by such complainant or informant to the accused or to each or any of them.
(3)-(5)***
(6) A complainant or informant who has been ordered under sub-section (2) by a Magistrate of the Second Class to pay compensation exceeding one hundred rupees, may appeal from the order, as if such complainant or informant had been convicted on a trial held by such Magistrate.”
4. Literal meaning of the expression “the Magistrate” occurring in the opening of sub-section (2) of Section 250, on first flush admits the interpretation that a succeeding Magistrate can continue with the proceedings initiated by his predecessor under sub-section (1) of Section 250 CrPC. An attractive argument can also be advanced to suggest that had the intention of the legislature been that the same Magistrate, as initiating, should conclude proceedings under Section 250, then the expression aforementioned in quotes could have been “such Magistrate”. The last words in sub-section (6) “such Magistrate” can also be employed to support the afore-view, but the argument would not stand long because such Magistrate could also be read as the same Magistrate initiating and concluding (But here the Magistrate, 2nd Class).
5. The literal interpretation, as put forth, though attractive, violates, in our view, the purpose behind Section 250 which has a narrow scope. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the Magistrate, as is evident, is equivalent to his jurisdiction to impose fine on an accused. The Magistrate of the First Class can impose fine to the extent of Rs 2000 only and a Magistrate of lesser denomination can impose lesser fines as enjoined under the law. Now, here was a case of a Chief Judicial Magistrate who had acquitted the appellant. His jurisdiction to impose fine was only up to Rs 2000. Thus, the scope of enquiry under Section 250 CrPC is only an effort to award to the accused a bare sum of Rs 2000, if at all, after hearing the complainant. The enquiry in the nature being so small and narrow, the legislature perhaps thought that it should be in the nature of an addenda to the main enquiry or trial. Therefore, the view has emerged in all the High Courts in the country that the same Magistrate alone can initiate action and pass the final orders. To mention a few precedents in that regard, attention be invited to Rajaram Majhi v. Panchanan Ghosh AIR 1929 Cal 762, Emperor v. Mohd. Alan and Ram Nath v. Bashir-Ud-Din AIR 1953 Punj 213 and many others which exist, as have been noticed in the last mentioned Punjab case. It would thus be worthwhile to preserve the interpretation of the provision which would not disturb the unanimous understanding of the High Courts on the subject. We hold accordingly.
6. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is hereby dismissed.
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