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Hukam Raj Khinvsara v. Union Of India And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a government employee, was suspended and charge-sheeted on 29-4-1974. His dismissal was subsequently set aside by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) in OA No. 261 of 1991 on 13-3-1992, with a direction that he be reinstated with all consequential benefits. When the administration failed to grant those benefits, the appellant filed a contempt petition on 11-12-1992, which CAT dismissed on 29-7-1993. He then instituted OA No. 466 of 1994 before the CAT, Jodhpur Bench, seeking implementation of the 1992 order. By order dated 16-4-1996, the CAT dismissed the OA on the ground of limitation. The present appeal to the Supreme Court was brought by special leave against that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the application filed by the appellant on 13-12-1994 for execution/implementation of the CAT’s final order dated 13-3-1992 was barred by limitation under Sections 21 and 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The CAT ought to have condoned the delay in filing the application for execution of its earlier order.
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not provide specific arguments advanced by the respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court focused on the statutory scheme governing execution of CAT orders:
- Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act makes a Tribunal’s final order executable in the same manner as a final departmental order.
- Section 21(1)(a) requires that any application connected with a final order mentioned in Section 20(2)(a) be filed within one year of that order.
- The CAT’s reinstatement order became final on 13-3-1992 and was never stayed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the execution application should have been filed on or before 12-3-1993.
- The appellant filed the application only on 13-12-1994—well beyond the statutory one-year period. Consequently, the CAT correctly held the OA to be time-barred.
- Although counsel for the appellant argued that the CAT could have condoned the delay, no application for such condonation had been made before the CAT. Hence, there was no error for the Supreme Court to correct.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct Effect: The appellant’s application for implementation of the 1992 CAT order remains dismissed as time-barred, and no consequential benefits are presently enforceable through that route.
Broader Implication: The decision reinforces the mandatory one-year limitation period for executing CAT orders under the Administrative Tribunals Act when no application for condonation is made, but it sets no new legal precedent beyond applying the statutory text to the facts.
Order
1. Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
3. This appeal, by special leave, arises from the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur, made on 16-4-1996 in OA No. 466 of 1994.
4. The appellant was initially suspended and charge-sheet was laid against him on 29-4-1974. His order of dismissal was ultimately set aside and thereafter he was reinstated into the service by the Tribunal's order dated 13-3-1992 in OA No. 261 of 1991. It would appear that while setting aside the order of dismissal the Tribunal had passed the order that the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits which he could have earned had he been in service. Since in spite of his representations, he was not given consequential benefits, he filed contempt application on 11-12-1992, which was dismissed by the Tribunal on 29-7-1993. Thereafter, the appellant filed the present OA for a direction to implement the order dated 13-3-1992. The Tribunal dismissed the same by the impugned order dated 16-4-1996 on the ground that the application of the appellant was barred by limitation. Thus this appeal by special leave.
5. The only question is whether the application seeking implementation of the earlier order of the Tribunal was barred by limitation. Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”) envisages thus:
“27. Execution of orders of a Tribunal.—Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the order of a Tribunal finally disposing of an application or an appeal shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court (including a High Court) and such order shall be executed in the same manner in which any final order of the nature referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 (whether or not such final order had actually been made) in respect of the grievance to which the application relates would have been executed.”
6. Relevant part to sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act postulates that:
“20. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,—
(a) if a final order has been made by Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance;”
7. Section 21 prescribes limitation in that behalf. Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 21 postulates that:
“21. (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,—
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;”
8. Thus it could be seen that the final order passed by the Tribunal is executable under Section 27 of the Act within one year from the date of its becoming final. Admittedly, the final order was passed on 13-3-1992. Consequently, the appellant was required to file the execution application within one year from the said date unless the order of the Tribunal was suspended by this Court in a special leave petition/appeal which is not the case herein. Admittedly, the application came to be filed by the appellant on 13-12-1994 which is well beyond one year. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the application was barred by limitation.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Tribunal would have condoned the delay in filing the application. It is not his case that he made an application for condonation of delay and the Tribunal had rejected the application without examining the grounds for the delay occasioned by him. Under these circumstances, we need not go into the further question of refusal to condone the delay by the Tribunal.
10. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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