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Serai Kella Glass Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector Of Central Excise, Patna .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants manufacture sheet glass, an excisable commodity assessed on an ad valorem basis under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In July 1979 they submitted Price List No. 38/1979. The Assistant Collector issued successive show-cause notices (7-7-1979, 16-8-1979 and 5-9-1979) questioning deductions, directing provisional assessment under Rule 9-B and proposing differential duty and penalty under Rule 173-Q. On 21-3-1980 the Assistant Collector disallowed most deductions.
The appellants challenged these actions in a writ petition before the Patna High Court. On 15-9-1982 the High Court quashed the notices and the 21-3-1980 order, but remanded the matter to the Assistant Collector to re-determine assessable value excluding post-manufacturing expenses.
No appeal was filed against the High Court’s judgment. Pursuant to the remand, the Assistant Collector issued a fresh notice on 7-3-1983 and, following Union of India v. Bombay Tyres International Ltd., passed two demand orders: 6-9-1984 (₹4,61,09,242.28 for 20-6-1983 – 30-7-1983) and 17-10-1984 (₹27,81,826.87 for 1-8-1983 – 31-12-1983).
The appellants contested these demands on the ground that they were not preceded by a mandatory show-cause notice under Section 11-A. Their appeal failed before the Collector (Appeals) and again before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT), leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether differential duty can be demanded after finalisation of assessment without issuing a show-cause notice under Section 11-A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
- Whether the demands raised by the Assistant Collector pursuant to the Patna High Court’s remand order amount to mere completion of assessment under Rule 173-I, thus ousting the requirement of Section 11-A notice.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- A demand for duty (except where clearances are provisional under Rule 9-B) must be initiated by a show-cause notice under Section 11-A; failure to do so renders the demand void ab initio.
- Relied on Union of India v. Madhumilan Syntex (P) Ltd. to contend that issuance of notice is a condition precedent to any demand.
Revenue's Arguments
- Invoked Samrat International (P) Ltd. v. CCE to submit that under a self-assessment regime the assessments are provisional until finalised; therefore the post-remand exercise was only a final assessment, not a fresh demand requiring a Section 11-A notice.
- Emphasised that the Assistant Collector’s correspondence (e.g., letter dated 5-12-1983) requesting books and bills constituted sufficient notice for determining duty liability.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Bombay Tyres International Ltd. (1983) 4 SCC 210 | Determination of assessable value; exclusion/inclusion of post-manufacturing expenses. | The Assistant Collector relied on this decision to disallow deductions when recomputing value after remand. |
| Union of India v. Madhumilan Syntex (P) Ltd. (1988) 3 SCC 348 | Mandatory requirement of notice under Section 11-A where a finalised classification list exists. | Cited by appellants; Court distinguished it on facts, noting multiple earlier notices and the remand context. |
| Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. CCE (1987) 2 SCC 93 | Show-cause notice under Section 11-A is a condition precedent to demand. | Noted by Court but held inapplicable because the present demands flowed from completion of assessment under Rule 173-I. |
| Samrat International (P) Ltd. v. CCE 1992 Supp (1) SCC 293 | Self-assessment amounts to provisional assessment; limitation runs from final assessment. | Supported Revenue’s position that completion of assessment, not Section 11-A notice, was required. |
| CCE v. Kosan Metal Products Ltd. 1989 Supp (1) SCC 135 | Need for Section 11-A notice when finalised assessments are reopened. | Held by Court as not assisting appellants because, unlike in that case, earlier assessments here had been quashed and ordered to be redone. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasised that after the Patna High Court quashed earlier provisional assessments and instructed a fresh determination, the Assistant Collector was obliged to finalise assessments in accordance with Section 4 and Rule 173-I. Under Rule 173-I(1)-(2) the assessing officer, upon examining the assessee’s return and making necessary enquiries, completes the assessment and communicates it. Any differential duty is adjusted through the assessee’s account-current within ten days; conversely, excess duty is credited back.
The Court delineated the distinct spheres of Rule 173-I and Section 11-A: Section 11-A is triggered only after a final assessment when duty is subsequently found short-levied or unpaid. In the present case the impugned orders represented the very final assessment mandated by the High Court; thus no separate Section 11-A notice was legally required.
It further noted that the Department’s letters seeking documents constituted adequate prior intimation for completing assessment. Precedents cited by the appellants (e.g., Madhumilan, Gokak Patel) were distinguishable because they dealt with demands made without reopening or remand of assessments. Conversely, Samrat International confirmed that self-assessment is provisional until formally approved.
Finding no procedural infirmity or misapplication of law in the Tribunal’s order, the Court dismissed the appeals.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Dismissed.
Consequently, the differential duty demands upheld by CEGAT remain payable. The decision reinforces the principle that when a provisional or self-assessment is set aside and directions are issued for fresh computation, the completion of that computation under Rule 173-I does not require a separate Section 11-A notice. The ruling is confined to the facts and does not establish a new doctrinal precedent beyond clarifying the relationship between Rule 173-I assessments and Section 11-A notices.
C. Sen, J.— This case is a good illustration of why the High Court should not intervene in revenue matters in exercise of writ jurisdiction where adequate alternative statutory remedies are available. In the instant case, complications have arisen because of the directions given by the Patna High Court on 15-9-1982 after quashing the various notices and orders in course of proceedings under the Central Excises and Salt Act.
2. The appellants are manufacturers of sheet glass which at the material time was chargeable to Central excise duty on ad valorem basis. The appellants used to file their price lists in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Central Excise Rules (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) and pay duty according to their calculations. The trouble in this case arose with the price list No. 38 of 1979 which was filed on 4-7-1979. A show-cause notice dated 7-7-1979 was issued by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise calling upon the assessee to explain as to why certain deduction claimed by them should not be added back to the excisable value of the goods. This was followed up by another show-cause notice dated 16-8-1979 directing the appellants to follow the provisional assessment procedure prescribed under Rule 9-B of the Rules and execute bonds for the purpose of effecting further clearances. On 5-9-1979, the Superintendent of Central Excise issued yet another show-cause notice calling upon the appellants to explain as to why differential rate of duty should not be demanded under Rule 10 of the Rules w.e.f 20-6-1979 and why penalty should not be imposed on them under Rule 173-Q of the Rules. By another order dated 21-3-1980, the Assistant Collector modified the price list filed by the appellants and disallowed all the deductions claimed by them except for trade discounts.
3. The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the aforesaid orders passed by the Superintendent of Central Excise. Ultimately on 15-9-1982, the High Court quashed the show-cause notice, the order passed on 21-3-1980 by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise disallowing the claim for the deductions made by the appellants and also the direction for provisional clearance on furnishing of bond given on 16-8-1979.
4. The High Court, however, remanded the case back to the Assistant Collector to ascertain the element which will constitute post-manufactural expenses which according to the High Court could not be included in the assessable value. The assessable value was directed to be redetermined by the Assistant Collector in accordance with the guidelines given by the High Court.
5. The Central Excise authorities did not prefer any appeal against the order of the High Court. On 7-3-1983, the Assistant Collector issued another show-cause notice as to why claims for various deductions should not be disallowed. By final order dated 6-9-1984, the Assistant Collector rejected the claims for deductions following the law laid down by this Court in the case of Union of India v. Bombay Tyres International Ltd. (1983) 4 SCC 210 A sum of Rs 4,61,09,242.28p. was demanded for the period from 20-6-1983 to 30-7-1983. By a further order dated 17-10-1984, the Assistant Collector made another demand for differential duty amounting to Rs 27,81,826.87p. for the period from 1-8-1983 to 31-12-1983.
6. The appellants' contention is that these two orders were not preceded by any show-cause notice under Section 11-A of the Central Excises and Salt Act. This according to the appellants was mandatory and failure to give such a notice made these two orders void ab initio and of no legal effect. The appeal against the orders of the Assistant Collector was dismissed by the Collector (Appeals). A further appeal was preferred to Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal did not agree with the assessee's contention that because no show-cause notice under Section 11-A was given to the appellants by the Excise authorities, the orders making demands by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise were void and had to be quashed.
7. Mr Dave on behalf of the appellants has contended that the demand for duty under the Central Excise Act could only be effected by issuing a show-cause notice under Section 11-A except in a case where clearance was provisional under Rule 9-A in which case, on finalisation of assessment, differential duty could be determined as payable by the assessee. Reliance was placed for this proposition on the decision of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Madhumilan Syntex (P) Ltd. (1988) 3 SCC 348
8. In Madhumilan case (1988) 3 SCC 348 an approved classification list was in force. A demand was made without issuing a notice modifying the classification list. In the instant case, however, there was a series of notices issued by the Excise authorities. Although show-cause notice dated 7-7-1979 was quashed by the Patna High Court, the other notice had not been quashed. In any event, the Tribunal has pointed out that the Excise authorities wrote to the appellant repeatedly for production of the bills and account books for the purpose of “determination of duty liability”. The Tribunal held that the Assistant Collector's letter dated 5-12-1983 was nothing but a notice for levy of “differential duty”.
9. In Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. CCE (1987) 2 SCC 93 it was held by this Court that issue of show-cause notice under sub-section (1) of Section 11-A was a condition precedent to a demand under sub-section (2) of that section.
10. On behalf of the Revenue, Mr Gowri Sankaramurty drew our attention to the case of Samrat International (P) Ltd. v. CCE 1992 Supp (1) SCC 293 where this Court held that when the assessee cleared the goods by determining the duty himself and debiting the amount to personal ledger account, the duty was provisional and subject to final approval by the Excise Officer concerned. In such situations, para (B), clause (e) of the Explanation to Section 11-B will apply. The relevant provisions of Section 11-B at the material time were as under:
“11-B. Claim for refund of duty.—(1) Any person claiming refund of any duty of excise may make an application for refund of such duty to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise before the expiry of six months from the relevant date:
Provided that the limitation of six months shall not apply where any duty has been paid under protest.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(A) ***
(B) ‘relevant date’ means,—
(a) to (d) ***
(e) in a case where duty of excise is paid provisionally under this Act or the rules made thereunder, the date of adjustment of duty after the final assessment thereof;
(f) in any other case, the date of payment of duty.”
11. It was argued that Sections 11-A and 11-B are similarly worded and the scheme of the two sections is the same. In one case, the assessee can claim refund, in the other, the department can realise tax which was not levied or short-levied. Under Section 11-A, the period of limitation has to be calculated from the “relevant date” as defined. The important point is that this Court recognised that in a self-assessment scheme, where the assessee calculated and paid the amount of duty, nothing but a provisional assessment had taken place which was subject to final assessment. The period of limitation in such case will run from the date of making of the final assessment.
12. Mr Dave drew our attention to the case of CCE v. Kosan Metal Products Ltd. 1989 Supp (1) SCC 135 In that case, brass rods were assessed under TI 68 during the period from 24-7-1978 to 31-3-1979 and under TI 26-A(1)(a) with effect from 1-4-1979. Thereafter, it was noticed by the Superintendent of Central Excise that the assessee had availed of the incorrect set-off of duty and a notice for imposition of penalty was issued under Rule 173-Q. It was alleged in the notice that the company was not eligible to set-off of duty. The case of the company was that no notice under Rule 10 was issued to it within the time and there had been no fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts on its part and that it had correctly availed this set-off.
13. Rule 10 has now been repealed and its provisions have been incorporated in Section 11-A of the Act. But, in that case the Tribunal found that the classification lists had been finalised by the Bombay Collectorate. The Assistant Collector, Surat, had no authority to reopen those assessments.
14. Because the assessments had become final, this Court held that when the duty of excise had not been levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid, a notice had to be issued under Section 11-A to realise the amount which had been short-levied. The notice has to be issued normally within a period of six months of completion of final assessment. This case does not in any way give any support to the contention made by Mr Dave.
15. In the instant case, the High Court after quashing the provisional assessment, directed the assessments to be made afresh in accordance with the guidelines given by it. No question of giving any notice under Section 11-A arises at this stage. The provisional assessment was quashed by the High Court and direction was given to recompute the value of the excisable goods. This could only be done in accordance with the substantive provisions of Section 4 and in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 173-I which at the material time stood as under:
“173-I. Assessment by proper officer.—(1) The proper officer shall on the basis of the information contained in the return filed by the assessee under sub-rule (3) of Rule 173-G and after such further inquiry as he may consider necessary, assess the duty due on the goods removed and complete the assessment memorandum on the return. A copy of the return so completed shall be sent to the assessee.
(2) The duty determined and paid by the assessee under Rule 173-F shall be adjusted against the duty assessed by the proper officer under sub-rule (1) and where the duty so assessed is more than the duty determined and paid by the assessee, the assessee shall pay the deficiency by making a debit in the account-current within ten days of receipt of copy of the return from the proper officer and where such duty is less, the assessee shall take credit in the account-current for the excess on receipt of the assessment order in the copy of the return duly countersigned by a Superintendent of Central Excise.”
16. The assessee is entitled under Rule 173-F to determine his liability for duty on the excisable goods manufactured by him and to remove such goods on payment of duty on self-assessment in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Rules. But this is only the first step in making of the assessment. The proper officer is empowered to assess the duty on the goods so removed by the assessee and complete the assessment on the return filed by the assessee. A copy of the return so computed by the proper officer has to be sent to the assessee. The duty assessed and paid by the assessee on self-assessment will be set off against the duty assessed by the proper officer. If the duty paid by the proper officer on final assessment is more than the duty determined and paid by the assessee, the assessee has to pay the deficiency by making a debit in the account-current within ten days of the receipt of the copy of the return from the proper officer. If the duty on final assessment payable by the assessee is less than what he has actually paid, the assessee is entitled to take credit in the account-current for the excess payment. No question of any show-cause notice under Section 11-A arises at this stage. The duty has to be paid by making adjustment in the account-current which has to be maintained by the assessee within ten days' time.
17. Section 11-A deals with recovery of duty not levied or not paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded. Proceedings under Section 11-A have to be commenced with a show-cause notice issued within six months from the relevant date. “Relevant date” has been defined under sub-section (3)(ii) to mean in a case where duty of excise is provisionally assessed under this Act or the rules made thereunder, the date of adjustment of duty after the final assessment thereof.
18. After final assessment, a copy of the order on the return filed by the assessee has to be sent to him. Duty has to be paid by the assessee on the basis of the final assessment within ten days' time from the receipt of the return. No question of giving any notice under Section 11-A arises in such a case. It is only when even after final assessment and payment of duties, it is found that there has been a short-levy or non-levy of duty, the Excise Officer is empowered to take proceedings under Section 11-A within the period of limitation after issuing a show-cause notice. In such a case, limitation period will run from the date of the final assessment. The scope of Section 11-A and Rule 173-I are quite different. In this case, the provisional assessment earlier made by the proper officer has been quashed and pursuant to the direction of the High Court, the proper officer has made the final assessment. No question of failure of issuance of show-cause notice under Section 11-A arises in this case. Even otherwise, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal.
19. There is no merit in the appeals. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
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