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Dokka Samuel v. Dr. Jacob Lazarus Chelly .

Supreme Court Of India

Mar 14, 1997

Judgment

CaseIQ

Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents instituted a suit in the trial court seeking a declaration that they had purchased two plots (Nos. 307 and 308, each measuring 40′ × 31′) in Hubli and for recovery of possession, asserting that the appellant had no right to interfere with their possession. The trial court dismissed the suit. On the respondents’ appeal, the first appellate court decreed the suit. In a second appeal, the Karnataka High Court initially affirmed that decree. However, on a subsequent review petition, the learned Single Judge of the High Court reversed the earlier decision, restored the trial court’s dismissal, and held that the appellants had no title. Pursuant to prior liberty granted by the Supreme Court (order dated 24-11-1995), the appellant challenged the High Court’s review decision through the present appeal by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its review jurisdiction to overturn its earlier judgment that had affirmed the first appellate decree.
Whether the mere omission to cite certain legal precedents constitutes an “error apparent on the face of the record” warranting review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Whether the document in question was a valid sale deed or merely a document executed for collateral purposes, and upon whom the burden of proof lay to establish its true nature and consideration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The High Court exceeded its limited review jurisdiction by re-appreciating evidence and reversing factual findings of the first appellate court.
An omission by counsel to cite precedents cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record.
The burden of proving that the transaction was a genuine sale for valid consideration lay on the respondent, especially because the respondent had earlier pleaded that the document was merely an agreement to sell.

Respondent's Arguments

Relevant legal authorities had not been brought to the High Court’s attention earlier; their absence justified the review.
The sale deed had been acted upon, and there was no evidence disproving payment of valid consideration.
Consequently, the appellate decree in the respondent’s favour ought to stand.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that:

The sale deed was executed for only “Rs 300 and odd,” whereas the property had a substantially higher market value, casting doubt on the authenticity of the purported sale.
The respondent had, in earlier litigation, described the instrument as merely an agreement to sell, amounting to an admission that it was not an outright sale.
Under review jurisdiction, the High Court could interfere only if there was an error apparent on the face of the record; failure by counsel to cite certain decisions does not satisfy this standard.
By embarking on a fresh appraisal of evidence and shifting the burden of proof onto the appellant, the High Court transgressed the narrow confines of Order 47 review proceedings.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s approach was legally unsustainable, and its review order had to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court’s review order set aside; first appellate decree (which had decreed the suit) restored.

Direct Effect: The respondents’ suit for declaration of title and possession stands decreed, reinstating the findings of the first appellate court as originally affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal. The Supreme Court awarded no costs.

Broader Implications: The decision reiterates that a review cannot be employed to cure counsel’s omission to cite authorities and that factual re-appreciation is impermissible in review proceedings. No new precedent was explicitly created beyond this clarification of review limits.

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Order

1. Leave granted.

2. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

3. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the learned Single Judge, made on 29-2-1996 in RSA No. 90 of 1983 by the Karnataka High Court. The respondents had filed a suit in the trial court for declaration that he had purchased two plots bearing Nos. 307 and 308 admeasuring 40′ × 31′ in Hubli town and for recovery of possession on the plea that the appellant has no manner of right whatsoever to interfere with his possession. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal, it was decreed. In the second appeal, the learned Judge confirmed the same. But in the review application, the Single Judge reheard the matter and reversed the decree of the appellate court and confirmed that of the trial court. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

4. It is seen that by an order passed by this Court on 24-11-1995, liberty was given to the appellant, in the event of the High Court reviewing the order on merits against him, to agitate his rights in this Court. The question is whether the High Court was justified in reviewing the earlier order and reversing the finding recorded by the appellate court. It is not in dispute that the sale deed is for a small sum of Rs 300 and odd and that the property sold commands good market value. The question arises whether the document was a sale deed or is only a document for collateral purpose. The respondent himself in an earlier suit had pleaded that it was an agreement of sale. In view of such an admission, the High Court has wrongly reversed the decree of the appellate court holding the transaction to be a real sale. In the second appeal, the High Court confirmed, in the first instance, the decree of the appellate court. Subsequently, the High Court has reviewed the judgment and reconsidered the matter holding that relevant precedents were not cited. Since this Court had given liberty to raise the questions of reviewability of the judgment of the High Court, the question arises whether the High Court could not have embarked upon appreciation of evidence and considered whether there was an error apparent on the face of the record. It was contended before the learned Single Judge that various decisions were not cited; proper consideration was paid; in fact the sale deed was acted upon; and that there was no proof that the sale was not for valid consideration. The omission to cite an authority of law is not a ground for reviewing the prior judgment saying that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, since the counsel has committed an error in not bringing to the notice of the court the relevant precedents. In fact, since the respondent had claimed that it is not a sale deed but was executed for collateral purpose, it was for the respondent to establish that the sale was for real consideration and he had a valid sale deed duly executed by the appellant. The High Court wrongly placed the burden on the appellant and reviewed the order and heard the matter on merits. The entire approach of the learned Single Judge is not correct in law.

5. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order of the High Court stands set aside and the decree of the appellate court, as confirmed by the High Court in the first instance, is upheld. In other words, the suit stands decreed. No costs.