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Durga Devi And Another v. State Of H.P And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants were appointed as Voluntary Teachers on a tenure basis under the Voluntary Teachers Primary Scheme, 1991. Respondent 4 challenged these appointments on the ground (among others) that he was academically more meritorious and that the Selection Committee was not justified in preferring the appellants over him.
The State Administrative Tribunal allowed Respondent 4’s application and quashed the appellants’ selection by itself judging the comparative merits of the candidates. The appellants challenged the Tribunal’s order dated 10-12-1992 before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the State Administrative Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in quashing a selection by independently scrutinising and reassessing the comparative merits and fitness of candidates, as if sitting in appeal over the Selection Committee.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. Dr B.S Mahajan (1990) 1 SCC 305, (1991) 16 ATC 528, AIR 1990 SC 434 | Courts/tribunals are not appellate bodies over Selection Committees and should not reassess comparative merit; interference is limited to grounds such as illegality, patent material irregularity in constitution/procedure vitiating selection, or proved mala fides. | The Court held the Tribunal erred by quashing the selection solely by reassessing comparative merits and fitness, without relying on any other permissible ground. The precedent was found “squarely attracted” and was used to invalidate the Tribunal’s approach. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court relied on its earlier decision in Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. Dr B.S Mahajan, which emphasised that it is not the function of a court to hear appeals over Selection Committees by scrutinising the relative merits of candidates. Fitness for a post is to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee, which has subject-matter expertise. Judicial interference is permissible only on limited grounds such as illegality, patent material irregularity in the constitution of the committee or in its procedure vitiating selection, or proved mala fides.
Applying that principle, the Court noted from the impugned order that the Tribunal had quashed the appellants’ selection by itself scrutinising the comparative merits and fitness of the candidates, effectively acting as an appellate authority over the Selection Committee. The selection was not quashed on any other ground. The Court held that the Tribunal fell into error by arrogating to itself the power to judge comparative merit and suitability, which properly belonged to the Selection Committee.
Holding and Implications
ALLOWED; IMPUGNED ORDER QUASHED; MATTER REMITTED. The appeal succeeded. The Tribunal’s order dated 10-12-1992 was quashed and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh disposal on other points in accordance with law, after hearing the parties.
As an interim protection pending the Tribunal’s final disposal, the Court recorded that both the appellants and the contesting respondent were in service and directed that they shall not be disturbed until the matter is finally decided by the Tribunal. The appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs. The opinion applies existing precedent on limits of judicial/tribunal interference in selections and does not indicate that any new precedent was set.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellants were appointed as Voluntary Teachers on tenure basis under the Voluntary Teachers Primary Scheme, 1991. Respondent 4 challenged their appointment inter alia on the ground that he was academically more meritorious than the appellants and therefore the Selection Committee was not justified in preferring the appellants to him. The State Administrative Tribunal allowed the application filed by Respondent 4 and quashed the selection of the appellants, by itself judging the comparative merits of the candidates. The appellants have put that order of the State Administrative Tribunal dated 10-12-1992 in issue.
3. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. Dr B.S Mahajan (1990) 1 SCC 305, (1991) 16 ATC 528, AIR 1990 SC 434 while dealing with somewhat an identical question, this Court opined:
“… It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. It is not disputed that in the present case the University had constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made and in setting it aside on the ground of the so-called comparative merits of the candidates as assessed by the court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction.”
4. In the instant case, as would be seen from the perusal of the impugned order, the selection of the appellants has been quashed by the Tribunal by itself scrutinising the comparative merits of the candidates and fitness for the post as if the Tribunal was sitting as an appellate authority over the Selection Committee. The selection of the candidates was not quashed on any other ground. The Tribunal fell in error in arrogating to itself the power to judge the comparative merits of the candidates and consider the fitness and suitability for appointment. That was the function of the Selection Committee. The observations of this Court in Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke case (1990) 1 SCC 305, (1991) 16 ATC 528, AIR 1990 SC 434 are squarely attracted to the facts of the present case. The order of the Tribunal under the circumstances cannot be sustained. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 10-12-1992 is quashed and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal for a fresh disposal on other points in accordance with the law after hearing the parties.
5. We are informed that both the appellants and the contesting respondent are in service. They shall not be disturbed till the matter is finally disposed of by the Tribunal.
6. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. No costs.
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