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A.P Sareen And Others v. State Of U.P And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The State Government issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 27 July 1995 for acquisition of land needed for the planned development of Ghaziabad. Invoking the urgency provision in Section 17(1), it dispensed with the enquiry ordinarily required under Section 5-A.
Instead of immediately issuing a declaration under Section 6, the acquiring authorities first published the notification in local newspapers, served personal notices, and only thereafter obtained the Government’s approval for publication of the Section 6 declaration on 18 April 1996. The appellants challenged the acquisition before the Allahabad High Court in CMWP No. 23997 of 1996 on 19 July 1996. While the writ petition was pending, possession could not be taken; after its disposal, possession was finally taken on 10 December 1996.
Dissatisfied with the High Court’s direction that an enquiry under Section 5-A be conducted, the acquiring authority appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the delay between the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration negated the “urgency” required for dispensing with the Section 5-A enquiry under Section 17(1).
- Whether deletion of certain khasra numbers from the acquisition notification revealed mala fides sufficient to vitiate the entire acquisition.
- Whether the acquisition, alleged to benefit a private company, required compliance with the special procedure in Chapter VII of the Act.
- Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the Section 6 declaration and directing that an enquiry under Section 5-A be held.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The delay in issuing the Section 6 declaration demonstrated absence of real urgency; therefore, dispensing with the Section 5-A enquiry under Section 17(1) was unlawful.
- Some khasra numbers were deleted from acquisition because of external influence, indicating lack of bona fides.
- The land was purportedly being acquired for a private company; hence the procedure under Chapter VII should have been followed.
- The appellants sought time to harvest standing crops and remove structures if the acquisition was ultimately upheld.
Respondents' Arguments
- The acquisition served a public purpose—planned development by the Ghaziabad Development Authority—and therefore Chapter VII was inapplicable.
- The deleted khasra numbers were withdrawn because those lands were already liable to be taken under the Urban Land Ceiling Act; no mala fides were involved.
- Urgency persisted throughout because the development scheme had not yet been executed; bureaucratic delay did not extinguish the urgent need.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Jan Kalyan Samiti, (1996) 2 SCC 365 | Interpretation of deemed possession under Section 17(4). | The Court held that the ratio of this case “has no application” to the facts at hand. |
| Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India, (1997) 9 SCC 132; JT (1996) 10 SC 311 | Scope of Government’s power under Section 17(1) and the procedural sequence when enquiry under Section 5-A is dispensed with. | Relied upon to affirm that when urgency is declared, the Government can issue Section 4(1) and, after a minimal interval, a Section 6 declaration, followed by immediate possession upon payment of 80% compensation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that the authorities had “misconstrued the steps to be taken,” causing undue delay between the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration. However, it reasoned that the delay resulted from bureaucratic inadvertence, not from lack of urgency. Urgency continues, the Court said, as long as the development scheme remains unexecuted; hence the statutory power under Section 17(1) was validly exercised.
Regarding the withdrawal of certain khasra numbers, the Court accepted the State’s explanation that those lands were to be taken under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, negating any allegation of mala fides.
The Court likewise rejected the contention that the acquisition benefited a private company, noting the State’s sworn statement that the purpose was public—planned development by the Ghaziabad Development Authority—thereby rendering Chapter VII inapplicable.
Because the urgency determination and public purpose survived scrutiny, the Court found “no justification to quash the declaration under Section 6 and to give direction to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A.”
The Court nonetheless accommodated the appellants’ practical concerns. It directed the Land Acquisition Officer to allow sufficient time to harvest standing crops and remove existing structures: (i) the appellants must file an affidavit within two days specifying the affected plots; (ii) an officer is to assess the time needed for harvesting; (iii) respondents shall not destroy the crops during that period; (iv) structures must be cleared within four weeks.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISPOSED OF. The Supreme Court upheld the acquisition and declined to reinstate an enquiry under Section 5-A. Limited relief was granted to allow the appellants to harvest crops and remove structures within specified timeframes. No costs were awarded.
Implications are confined to the parties: the State may proceed with planned development once the crops are harvested and structures removed. The decision applies established principles of urgency under the Land Acquisition Act and does not create new precedent.
Order
1. Heard learned counsel on both sides.
2. Leave granted.
3. This appeal arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, made on 9-12-1996 in CMWP No. 23997 of 1996. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) was published on 27-7-1995 and the Government had in exercise of the power under Section 17(1) of the Act dispensed with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Shri P.P Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that since declaration was not published immediately, the exercise of power under Section 17(1) dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, is bad in law as it indicates that there was no real urgency. The view of the High Court that possession of land is deemed to have been taken under Section 17(4) is not correct on the facts of this case. The ratio of the judgment of this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Jan Kalyan Samiti (1996) 2 SCC 365 has no application to the facts of this case. Though we are in agreement with the learned counsel in this behalf, we do not find substance in the other contentions. As regards the delay in issuing the said declaration we find that the authorities appear to have misconstrued the steps to be taken under the Act. It is a well-settled legal position that urgency can be said to exist when land proposed to be acquired is needed for planned development of the city/town etc. In Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India (1997) 9 SCC 132, JT (1996) 10 SC 311 this Court considered the scope of exercise of the power by the Government under Section 17(1) of the Act and the procedure to be followed in that behalf. When the Government forms an opinion that the lands are urgently needed for a public purpose, notification under Section 4(1) could be issued and published in the Gazette while dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A. Giving a gap of one day, the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act could be published in the Gazette. Notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 should be given and on the expiry of 15 days thereafter, possession could be taken. The land stands vested in the State under Section 17(2) read with Section 16 free from all encumbrances. Since enquiry under Section 5-A has been dispensed with, as provided under the Act, 80% of the compensation was required to be given to the claimants. In this case, instead of adopting the said procedure, after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), they published the notification in the local newspapers in English as well as Hindi and also substance thereof in the locality and thereafter personal notices appear to have been issued to the owners of the lands. After completion of this process, proceedings were put up before the Government for publication of the declaration under Section 6 which came to be made on 18-4-1996. The appellant filed the writ petition on 19-7-1996 and consequently possession could not be taken. After the writ petition was disposed of, possession was taken on 10-12-1996. In this backdrop, the need for urgent possession was dissipated by bureaucratic inadvertence and the urgency did not cease. Urgency continues as long as the scheme is not initiated, action taken and the process completed.
4. It is true that the petitioners would have raised, at an enquiry under Section 5-A, objections for the acquisition. One of the objections raised in the writ petition was that some of the khasra numbers notified under Section 4(1) had been deleted from the acquisition proceedings due to interference by some persons and that showed that there was no bona fide in the acquisition proceedings. In that behalf, in the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court, it was stated that the notification was withdrawn in respect thereof since those lands were required to be taken possession of under the Land Ceiling Act and, therefore, there was no need to acquire those lands. Accordingly, the khasra numbers were deleted by a separate notification.
5. Another objection raised was that the lands were sought to be given to the private company and, therefore, the procedure prescribed in Chapter VII was required to be adopted. The acquisition notification under Section 4(1) without compliance of the provisions under Chapter VII is bad in law. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court, it was stated that the acquisition was only for the public purpose, viz., for the planned development as per the plans prepared and submitted to the Government by the Ghaziabad Development Authority and, therefore, the objection raised was not tenable. In view of this stand taken by the Government, the direction to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is of no material consequence on the facts of this case. Under those circumstances, we think that there is no justification to quash the declaration under Section 6 and to give direction to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A.
6. Instead, it is contended by Shri Rao that the standing crops and the structures are required to be removed and that the appellants are prepared to cut and carry away the standing crops after they are harvested. Shri Rao states that at least one month's time would be required. Shri Rao undertakes to give the khasra numbers and the extent of the land in which there are standing crops. The affidavit be filed within two days. To that extent, the respondents are directed not to destroy the standing crops. The appellants are directed to cut and harvest the standing crop and thereafter the respondents are at liberty to carry on the building operations. For removal of the standing structures, the learned counsel states that four weeks' time is enough. Accordingly, the appellants are directed to remove the structures within four weeks from today. With regard to the standing crops, the Land Acquisition Officer is directed to depute one of his officers to assess the time required for harvesting the crop and on the basis of the report submitted to the Land Acquisition Officer, he is directed to give them time to cut and harvest the crop and thereafter, the respondents are at liberty to proceed with the carrying out of the planned development activities. Therefore, we do not find any justification warranting interference.
7. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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