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Sub-Inspector Sadhan Kumar Goswami And Others v. Union Of India And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 25, 1996
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are Group C and Group D personnel of the Special Security Bureau (SSB) posted in the North-Eastern Region. They had earlier received a “special duty allowance” created to attract officers from outside the region. In Union of India v. S. Vijayakumar (1994 Supp (3) SCC 649) the Supreme Court held that such allowance was not payable to employees who were already serving in the North-Eastern Region. After that judgment, the Government stopped the allowance and limited recovery to amounts paid after the date of the judgment.

Relying on an Office Memorandum dated 11-7-1996, the present petition under Article 32 seeks extension of the allowance to Group C and D employees, asserting parity with Group A and B officers who, according to the petitioners, continue to receive it. They also challenge the post-judgment recoveries ordered by Memorandum dated 12-1-1996.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Group C and D employees of the SSB can claim the special duty allowance in spite of the binding judgment in S. Vijayakumar.
  2. Whether the Government is barred from recovering allowance amounts paid after the date of the S. Vijayakumar judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The 11-7-1996 Office Memorandum entitles all staff, including Groups C and D, to the allowance, and denial only to them violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • Recovering sums already paid contravenes the earlier Supreme Court direction that amounts paid up to the date of judgment should not be recovered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. S. Vijayakumar, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 649 Special duty allowance in the North-Eastern Region is meant to attract outsiders and is not payable to resident employees. Held to be binding under Article 141; petitioners, though not parties to that litigation, are governed by it and cannot reopen the issue through Article 32.
Reserve Bank of India v. RBI Staff Officers' Assn., (1991) 4 SCC 132 Grant of a remote-locality allowance only to officers transferred from outside, while denying it to local officers, is not violative of Article 14. Cited to reject the petitioners’ Article 14 claim that differential treatment between local and transferred employees is unconstitutional.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court emphasized that the doctrine of precedent under Article 141 makes the decision in S. Vijayakumar binding on all similarly placed employees, regardless of whether they were parties to that case. Consequently, Group C and D petitioners cannot invoke Article 32 to re-litigate issues already settled.

The Court rejected the reliance on the 11-7-1996 Office Memorandum, noting that even Group A and B officers are, in law, bound by the earlier judgment and any benefit extended to them cannot override the Supreme Court's pronouncement. Therefore, the claim of discrimination under Article 14 fails.

On the question of recovery, the Court found that the Government is only reclaiming amounts paid after the date of the S. Vijayakumar judgment, which is consistent with the Court’s earlier directive that sums paid prior to that judgment be protected.

The Court expressed concern over the growing number of petitions seeking to reopen final judgments. It directed that, henceforth, every advocate-on-record filing an Article 32 petition in such circumstances must certify that the client was advised about the binding effect of the earlier judgment but persisted in filing the petition.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

The dismissal reaffirms the finality of Supreme Court judgments and the binding nature of precedent under Article 141. It denies Group C and D employees entitlement to the special duty allowance and permits the Government to recover amounts paid after the earlier judgment date. Additionally, the Court’s directive on certification by advocates aims to curb future attempts to relitigate settled issues, although no new substantive legal precedent was created.

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Order

1. This writ petition under Article 32 is one of the series of cases we have come across to reopen the judgments/orders of this Court rendered under Article 136 of the Constitution of India after their becoming final.

2. The admitted facts are that the petitioners who joined service under the Special Security Bureau (SSB) in North-Eastern Region of India, claimed special duty allowance as per order of the Central Government. The question was considered by this Court in Union of India v. S. Vijayakumar 1994 Supp (3) SCC 649, (1994) 28 ATC 598; therein this Court had held thus:( and 5)

“We have duly considered the rival submissions and are inclined to agree with the contention advanced by the learned Additional Solicitor General, Shri Tulsi for two reasons. The first is that a close perusal of the two aforesaid memoranda, along with what was stated in the memorandum dated 29-10-1986 which has been quoted in the memorandum of 20-4-1987, clearly shows that allowance in question was meant to attract persons outside the North-Eastern Region to work in that Region because of inaccessibility and difficult terrain. We have said so because even the 1983 memorandum starts by saying that the need for the allowance was felt for ‘attracting and retaining’ the service of the competent officers for service in the North-Eastern Region. Mention about retention has been made because it was found that incumbents going to that Region on deputation used to come back after joining there by taking leave and, therefore, the memorandum stated that this period of leave would be excluded while counting the period of tenure of posting which was required to be of 2/3 years to claim the allowance depending upon the period of service of the incumbent. The 1986 memorandum makes this position clear by stating that Central Government civilian employees who have All India Transfer Liability would be granted the allowance ‘on posting to any station to the North-Eastern Region’. This aspect is made clear beyond doubt by the 1987 memorandum which stated that allowance would not become payable merely because of the clause in the appointment order relating to All India Transfer Liability. Merely because in the office memoranda of 1983 the subject was mentioned as quoted above is not enough to concede to the submission of Dr Ghosh.
The submission of Dr Ghosh that the denial of the allowance to the residents would violate the equal pay doctrine is adequately met by what was held in Reserve Bank of India v. Reserve Bank of India Staff Officers' Assn. (1991) 4 SCC 132, (1991) 17 ATC 295, to which our attention has been invited by the learned Additional Solicitor General, in which grant of special compensatory allowance or remote locality allowance only to the officers transferred from outside to Gauhati Unit of the Reserve Bank of India, while denying the same to the local officers posted at the Gauhati Unit, was not regarded as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

3. In view of the above, this Court allowed the appeals of the State and held that the respondents were not entitled to the allowances but whatever amount was paid up to the date of the judgment, was directed not to be recovered from them. The petitioners are relying upon the Office Memorandum dated 11-7-1996 which provided that “it is not applicable from one station to another station within the region of Groups A and B staff will further continue to get the facilities”. They have filed this writ petition contending that while the Groups C and D employees have been denied the benefit of the above judgment, special duty allowance benefit is being granted to Groups A and B; it tantamounts to violation of Article 14 and, therefore, the writ petition should be allowed so as to give them the same benefit. Admittedly, the petitioners are Groups C and D employees and are bound by the above declaration of law made by this Court. Merely because they were not parties to the judgment, they cannot file writ petition under Article 32. The contention that they are entitled to get the benefit on a par with Groups A and B officers under the above Memorandum dated 11-7-1996 is not correct. Apart from the fact that Groups A and B employees are entitled to special duty allowance contrary to the law declared by this Court in the above judgment, they too are bound by it; whether or not they are entitled to the above benefit due to this Court's judgment, the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of the allowances as claimed by them. The judgment of this Court would indicate that it did not make any distinction between Groups C and D and Groups A and B Officers. All are governed by the law under Article 141. The petitioners are not entitled to the payment of the special duty allowance irrespective of whether or not they were parties to the judgment rendered in Vijayakumar case 1994 Supp (3) SCC 649, (1994) 28 ATC 598; they cannot be permitted to raise new grounds, though not raised or argued in earlier case, to canvass the correctness of the judgment by filing the writ petition under Article 32.

4. Of late, we have been coming across this type of writ petitions filed by several parties. We are constrained to take the view that the learned counsel who are advising them to move this Court under Article 32 should certify to the Court that though they advised the petitioners that the judgment of this Court binds them and cannot canvass its correctness and still, in spite of such advice, the party insisted upon filing the writ petition. It would then be for this Court to consider and deal with the case appropriately. Hereafter, it would be necessary that the Advocate-on-Record should file, as part of the paper-book of the writ petition filed under Article 32, a statement and certificate that the party concerned was advised that the matter is covered by the judgment of this Court and yet the writ petitioner insisted on filing the same. Should such certification form part of the record of the petition, then only the Court would deal with the writ petition. In view of the fact that Classes C and D employees are not entitled to special duty allowance as per the law already declared by this Court, the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit.

5. It is next contended that the Government is recovering as per Memorandum dated 12-1-1996 the amounts paid which is contrary to the direction issued by this Court in the above judgment. The petitioners are not right in their contentions. It is seen that the Government have limited the payments already made after the date of the judgment of this Court; payments made prior to that date are not being recovered.

6. Under those circumstances, we do not think that there will be any justification to direct the respondents not to recover the amount from the petitioner after the date of the judgment of this Court.

7. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.