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Papaiah v. State Of Karnataka And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondents 4 and 5, Doddaramaiah and Chikkaramaiah, were granted five acres of agricultural land on 13 February 1940 under Rule 43(8) of the Mysore Land Revenue Code, a provision that expressly forbade alienation of such government-assigned lands. Despite that prohibition, the appellant purchased the land from the grantees through a registered sale deed dated 19 December 1958.
To curb alienations of assigned lands, the Karnataka Legislature enacted the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Act 2 of 1979). The statute declared all such alienations void and set up a procedure for restoration. On 22 April 1985 the original grantees applied under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act for restoration. Their application succeeded before the competent authority and was upheld on appeal. The appellant’s writ petition challenging those orders was dismissed by the High Court of Karnataka on 19 September 1990 (WA No. 494 of 1990). The present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the original grantees were estopped from seeking restoration of the land after selling it to the appellant.
- Whether the 1958 sale to the appellant was legally valid despite the prohibition in Rule 43(8) and the 1978 Act.
- Whether the appellant had perfected title to the land by adverse possession against the State of Karnataka.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The prohibition in Rule 43(8) ceased to apply once ten years had elapsed from the date of the original grant; therefore the 1958 purchase was valid.
- Alternatively, even if the sale was void, the appellant had remained in possession long enough to perfect title by adverse possession.
- Relied on K.T. Huchegowda v. Deputy Commissioner (1994) 3 SCC 536 to support the plea of adverse possession.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The appellant never pleaded adverse possession against the true owner, namely the State; his possession originated under a void sale and remained derivative.
- The sale was void ab initio, being contrary to Rule 43(8) and public policy embodied in Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872.
- The plea of estoppel was unavailable because the statute declares such transfers void.
- Relied on R. Chandevarappa v. State of Karnataka (1995) 6 SCC 309, in which similar pleas of adverse possession were rejected for lack of proper pleading.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K.T. Huchegowda v. Deputy Commissioner, (1994) 3 SCC 536 | Proposition that a purchaser can perfect title by adverse possession when in uninterrupted possession for the statutory period. | Distinguished; the Court held that Huchegowda dealt with adverse possession vis-à-vis a purchaser, not the State, and therefore did not assist the appellant. |
| R. Chandevarappa v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 6 SCC 309 | Plea of adverse possession must include a clear disclaimer of derivative title and hostile possession against the State. | Followed; the Court adopted the ratio that failure to plead and prove those facts defeats an adverse possession claim, and applied it to reject the appellant’s contention. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court anchored its analysis in the constitutional mandate of Articles 39(b) and 46, which oblige the State to promote economic justice for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections by distributing land and preventing their exploitation. Rule 43(8) of the Mysore Land Revenue Code operationalises that policy by prohibiting alienation of lands granted to such persons.
Because the rule contains an absolute bar on transfer, any sale in violation thereof is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as being opposed to public policy. Consequently, the appellant acquired no valid right, title, or interest through the 1958 deed.
On the plea of adverse possession, the Court applied the ratio of R. Chandevarappa. Possession derived from a void transaction remains permissive unless the claimant explicitly disclaims that derivative title and sets up hostile possession to the knowledge of the true owner (the State). The appellant had neither pleaded such hostility nor adduced evidence of it. Moreover, proceedings under the 1978 Act commenced within 30 years, precluding acquisition of title by adverse possession against the State.
The argument of estoppel was rejected because a statutory declaration of nullity cannot be defeated by private conduct.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. No order as to costs.
The decision confirms that: (a) transfers of lands assigned to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes remain void irrespective of the time elapsed; (b) adverse possession against the State requires explicit pleading and proof of hostile possession; and (c) statutory prohibitions on alienation override private equities. The ruling enforces existing legislative policy but sets no new precedent beyond reaffirming earlier Supreme Court authority.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
3. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court of Karnataka dated 19-9-1990 made in WA No. 494 of 1990. The admitted facts are that Respondents 4 and 5, by name Doddaramaiah and Chikkaramaiah, sons of late Gurappa of Bangalore were granted five acres of agricultural land under Rule 43(8) of the Mysore Land Revenue Code on 13-2-1940 for use and enjoyment of the government land. Rule 43(8) reads as under:
“Occupancies granted to applicants belonging to Depressed Classes under Rule 43(5) above and those granted by Government free of upset price or reduced upset price to poor and landless people of other communities or to religious charitable institutions, shall not be alienated and the grantees shall execute Mutchalikas in the form prescribed by Government. This shall not, however, prevent lands granted to Depressed Classes under Rule 43(5) being accepted as security for any loan which they may wish to obtain from Government or from a cooperative society for the bona fide purposes of improving the land.”
4. A reading of the said rule would indicate that with a view to augment the economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections of the society, Government may assign the land to them or to cooperative societies composed of them. It is not in dispute that the appellant had purchased the land from the assignees under a registered sale deed on 19-12-1958. The Karnataka Legislature enacted Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Schedules Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (2 of 1979) (for short, “the Act”) declaring alienation by the assignee-Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as void and inoperative. Procedure has been prescribed for restoration of the lands to the assignees or if they are not available, the land resumed be assigned to eligible persons from those classes. In furtherance thereof, Respondents 4 and 5 filed an application under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act before the competent authority on 22-4-1985 for restoration of the land. The competent authority allowed the application which was confirmed on appeal and, therefore, the writ petitions came to be dismissed. Thus this appeal by special leave.
5. Shri P.R Ramasesh, the learned counsel for the appellant, contended that there was no prohibition as against the appellant, since he obtained the title after the expiry of ten years from the date of the assignment by the Government. The appellant had perfected title by adverse possession. Therefore, the Act is inapplicable to such a situation. In support of his contention, he sought to place reliance on the judgment of this Court in K.T Huchegowda v. Dy. Commr. (1994) 3 SCC 536
6. Shri Kapil Sibal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, contended that the appellant had not pleaded adverse possession as against the State. He came into possession by virtue of a title obtained from Respondents 4 and 5. The sale is void and against the public policy. His contention of adverse possession against the respondents, though was raised before the primary authority and the appellate authority and negatived the same was not canvassed before the High Court. The only contention raised before the High Court was as to the estoppel which was rightly negatived. Under those circumstances, the ratio of Huchegowda case (1994) 3 SCC 536 has no application. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on other judgment of this Court in the case of R. Chandevarappa v. State of Karnataka (1995) 6 SCC 309, (1995) 5 Scale 620.
7. In view of the rival contentions raised on both sides, the questions that arise for consideration are whether Respondents 5 and 6 who have alienated the land to the appellant are estopped to challenge the sale and whether the sale is valid and also whether the appellant perfected his title by adverse possession as against the State?
8. It is seen that Article 46 of the Constitution, in terms of its Preamble, enjoins upon the State to provide economic justice to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections of the society and to prevent their exploitation. Under Article 39(b) of the Constitution, the State is enjoined to distribute its largess, land, to subserve the public good. The right to economic justice to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections is a fundamental right to secure equality of status, opportunity and liberty. Economic justice is a facet of liberty without which equality of status and dignity of person are teasing illusions. In rural India, land provides economic status to the owner. The State, therefore, is under constitutional obligation to ensure to them opportunity giving its largess to the poor to augment their economic position. Assignment of land having been made in furtherance thereof, any alienation, in its contravention, would be not only in violation of the constitutional policy but also opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. Thereby, any alienation made in violation thereof is void and the purchaser does not get any valid right, title or interest thereunder. It is seen that Rule 43(8) specifically prohibits alienation of assigned land. It does not prescribe any limitation of time as such. However, it is contended that the appellant has obtained land by way of sale in 1958 long before the Act came into force and thereby he perfected his title by adverse possession. We find no force in this contention. This Court had considered this question in similar circumstances in R. Chandevarappa case (1995) 6 SCC 309, (1995) 5 Scale 620 and had held thus:
“The question then is whether the appellant has perfected his title by adverse possession. It is seen that a contention was raised before the Assistant Commissioner that the appellant having remained in possession from 1968, he perfected his title by adverse possession. But the crucial facts to constitute adverse possession have not been pleaded. Admittedly the appellant came into possession by a derivative title from the original grantee. It is seen that the original grantee has no right to alienate the land. Therefore, having come into possession under colour of title from original grantee, if the appellant intends to plead adverse possession as against the State, he must disclaim his title and plead his hostile claim to the knowledge of the State and that the State had not taken any action thereon within the prescribed period. Thereby, the appellant's possession would become adverse. No such stand was taken nor evidence has been adduced in this behalf. The counsel in fairness, despite his research, is unable to bring to our notice any such plea having been taken by the appellant.”
9. The ratio thereof squarely applies to the facts in this case.
10. In K.T Huchegowda case (1994) 3 SCC 536 neither this question was considered nor the validity of the Rule has been gone into. Therein, this Court had gone into the question of adverse possession as against the purchaser but not as against the State. Unless the purchaser derives valid title, the question of title does not arise. If he remained to be in possession in his own right dehors the title, necessarily he has to plead and prove the date from which he disclaimed his title and asserted possessory title as against the State and perfected his possession to the knowledge of the real owner, viz., the State, in this case. Such a plea was neither taken nor argued nor was any evidence adduced in this behalf. The plea of adverse possession as against the State does not arise even otherwise as the proceedings were laid before the expiry of a period of 30 years. The question of estoppel against the respondent does not arise as the Act voids the sale and thus there would be no estoppel against the statute.
11. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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