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Brij Pal v. State (Delhi Administration) .

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 1, 1996
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was apprehended on 5-8-1994 at Libaspur bus stand, Dhaula Kuan, after police received secret information that a person involved in murder cases was carrying unauthorised weapons. A country-made pistol loaded with one live cartridge and two additional cartridges were seized from him. Following sanction, he was prosecuted under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA). The Designated Court No. 11, Delhi convicted him and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 500, with a further 15 days’ imprisonment in default. The present appeal was filed under Section 19 of the TADA Act challenging that conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a conviction can be sustained solely on the testimony of police officers when no independent public witnesses to the seizure were examined.
  2. Whether the armourer (PW-2) qualified as an “expert” for proving that the recovered firearm was functional.
  3. Whether the prosecution had proved the accused’s conscious possession of the firearm and cartridges so as to invoke the statutory presumption under Section 5 of the TADA Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The absence of independent public witnesses to the search and seizure rendered the police testimony insufficient for conviction.
  • PW-2, an armourer, should not be treated as an “expert”; without proper expert verification of the pistol, benefit of doubt ought to be given.
  • The appellant was allegedly arrested not at Libaspur bus stand but at Rana Pratap Bagh along with another person, Luxman, who was released, indicating false implication.
  • The element of conscious possession of the arms and ammunition had not been established.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdula Pochamma v. State of A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 152 Need for expert evidence to identify and prove a seized explosive/weapon. Distinguished; unlike in Abdula, PW-2 possessed technical qualifications and actually test-fired the pistol, satisfying expert requirements.
Sanjay Dutt v. State (1994) 5 SCC 410 Statutory presumption under Section 5 TADA that possession of unauthorised arms in a notified area is for terrorist/disruptive purposes. Invoked to hold that, once conscious possession was shown, prosecution need not prove intended use; no rebuttal evidence was offered by the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court found the prosecution witnesses, all police personnel, credible and consistent. It accepted the explanation that public witnesses could not be secured despite efforts, noting that police testimony is not inherently unreliable. Chain of custody was proved through PW-5, the In-charge of the Police Mal Khana, who confirmed the sealed condition of the pistol and cartridges until examination.

Regarding expertise, PW-2 held a certificate of technical competency and had extensive experience in inspecting and testing firearms; moreover, he test-fired one seized cartridge, demonstrating the weapon’s operability. Hence, his evidence fulfilled the requirement of expert testimony; the Abdula Pochamma precedent was inapplicable.

On conscious possession, the Court observed that the appellant did not deny awareness of the firearm but claimed false implication. As the weapon was found on his person, conscious possession was established, triggering the statutory presumption under Section 5 TADA as affirmed in Sanjay Dutt. The appellant offered no rebuttal evidence. Consequently, the conviction was upheld.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

The decision confirms that (i) credible and consistent police testimony can suffice for conviction when public witnesses are unavailable, (ii) an armourer with technical certification may qualify as an expert for firearm examination, and (iii) once conscious possession of unauthorised arms in a notified area is proved, the statutory presumption under Section 5 TADA applies unless rebutted. The ruling primarily affects the parties and does not set a new precedent but reinforces existing principles under TADA.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter referred to as the TADA Act). By the judgment dated 5-8-1994, the learned Judge, Designated Court No. 11, Delhi has convicted the appellant under Section 5 of the TADA Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years together with a fine of Rs 500, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 15 days. According to the prosecution case, the police received a secret information that one person of bad character who had been involved in some murder cases in U.P was present with some unauthorised weapons at the Libaspur bus stand, Dhaula Kuan. The police thereafter organised a raiding party. They approached some public persons to become witness to search and seizure, but as no one agreed to become witness for search and seizure of such person, the police thereafter organised a raid with the help of the police officials. At about 1.30 p.m on the day of occurrence at the Libaspur bus stand, the appellant was found and on search of his person a country-made pistol loaded with one live cartridge and two other live cartridges were recovered by the police. After taking measurement of the said pistol and one of the cartridges, a sketch map was prepared and the said weapon and cartridges were sealed and sent by the police to Police Mal Khana. After obtaining necessary sanction from the authorities concerned, the said case under Section 5 of the TADA Act was initiated against the appellant.

2. The prosecution in this case has examined Head Constable Sathir Singh (PW 1), Jagdish Chander, Sub-Inspector (PW 2), ASI Mahipal Singh (PW 3), ASI Santokh Singh (PW 4), Head Constable Baljit Singh (PW 5) and Constable Ramesh Kumar (PW 6). It may be stated here that PW 5 was the Incharge of the Police Mal Khana where the seized pistol and the cartridges were kept in sealed cover and he has deposed to the effect that he received the said articles in a sealed parcel. They were also kept in a sealed cover until they were sent to the ballistic expert at BTP Unit, Old Police Line. The armourer has also deposed that he had taken training about the arms and he has also deposed that as a matter of fact, he fired one of the seized cartridges from the seized pistol and found the pistol in working condition. As the prosecution case was found to have been established beyond doubt by the deposition of the said witnesses, the learned Designated Court convicted the appellant under Section 5 of the TADA Act and passed the aforesaid sentence.

3. Mr Kirpal Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as amicus curiae, submits that according to the prosecution case, the appellant was arrested from the Libaspur bus stand, Dhaula Kuan. The police could have procured independent witnesses to establish that the appellant was in fact apprehended by the police from the said place as alleged in the prosecution case and from his possession the said pistol and the cartridges were recovered. But in the instant case, only the police personnel were examined. In the absence of any independent disinterested public witness, solely on the basis of the depositions of the police personnel, the order of conviction against the appellant should not have been passed. Learned counsel has also submitted that PW 2, examined as armourer, should not be held to be an expert and if the said pistol had not been tested by a proper expert, benefit of doubt should be given to the appellant. Learned counsel has further submitted that it is the case of the appellant that he had been falsely implicated in the case because he had not been arrested at the Libaspur bus stand. He was apprehended by the police at Rana Pratap Bagh along with one Luxman, but unfortunately such case had not been properly appreciated by the learned Designated Court. He has submitted that police had released Luxman so that he could not be examined in support of his case.

4. We have looked into the depositions given in this case and the judgment given by the learned Designated Judge. It appears that the prosecution case has been established by cogent evidences given by the witnesses which are not inconsistent or contradictory. In our view, learned Designated Court has rightly held that since only the police personnel had been examined in this case, their depositions are not liable to be discarded, particularly when it is the specific case of the prosecution that they tried to procure independent witnesses from the public, but they failed in their attempt to get such independent witnesses. In the instant case, it has been established from the evidence that the pistol and cartridges were seized from the person of the appellant and after getting them properly sealed they were deposited in the Police Mal Khana, in sealed condition. The Incharge of the Mal Khana has deposed that such weapons remained intact and in sealed condition until the same were sent for being tested by the expert. So far as the question of examining of the said pistol by the expert is concerned, it appears from the depositions of the said expert that he had obtained certificate of technical competency and armour technical course from Bhopal and he also had long experience of inspection, examination and testing of the firearms and ammunition. In our view, the said police personnel should be held to be an expert in arms. The decision relied upon by Mr Singh in Abdula Pochamma v. State of A.P 1989 Supp (2) SCC 152 in this connection is clearly distinguishable in the facts of this case. In the case of Abdula it was alleged by the prosecution that a grenade was recovered from the accused but whether the substance recovered was a grenade or not had not been examined by a proper expert and the court gave benefit of doubt by not placing implicit reliance on the testimony of an ASI that the object was a grenade. In the instant case, we have already indicated that the armourer as a matter of fact, had also fired one of the cartridges from the seized pistol which was recovered from the possession of the accused.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the element of conscious possession of the arms and ammunition had not been established in this case. We may only indicate that it is not the case of the appellant that he was not aware about the presence of the said ammunition and arms in the pocket of his pant or that someone kept those materials surreptitiously without his knowledge. On the contrary, the case of the appellant was that he was falsely implicated in this case. We may also indicate here that once a person is found in conscious possession of any arm or ammunition in a notified area under TADA, the statutory presumption under Section 5 of the TADA Act that such articles were intended to be used for terrorist and disruptive activities is attracted as indicated in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sanjay Dutt case (1994) 5 SCC 410. It is therefore not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the person who was found in conscious possession of unauthorised arm in a notified area had really intended to use the same for terrorist or disruptive activities. No evidence by way of rebuttal to such statutory presumption has been led by the accused. In the aforesaid circumstances, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the court below. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.