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Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 9, 1996
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Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals by special leave challenge the Bombay High Court’s judgment dated 14-10-1994 in Writ Petition No. 4023 of 1989. The litigation arises out of proceedings commenced under the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1966 (“the Act”) to frame a development scheme and acquire land accordingly.

  • The Final Development Plan was sanctioned on 29-11-1980.
  • A notification under Section 126(4) of the Act issued on 6-8-1987 was published in a local newspaper on 18-7-1987 and at the Village Chavadi on 25-9-1987.
  • Subsequently, a Section 4(1) notification and a Section 6 declaration under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“LAA”) were issued. Notice under Section 9 LAA followed on 16-9-1989, and an award was passed on 22-9-1989 and published on 27-9-1989.
  • The respondents filed writ petitions on 25-9-1989 challenging the acquisition.
  • Although the draft plan had reserved the land for public purposes with no objections filed, the reservation was later deleted (26-12-1990 order; 28-6-1993 notification; 30-9-1993 Final Plan). On 19-8-1994 the State issued a corrigendum restoring the status quo ante with minor modification.
  • The High Court upheld the Section 4(1) and Section 6 notifications but set aside the award, directing that fresh procedures under Sections 28, 31 and 37 of the Act be followed. The acquiring authorities appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether restoration of reservation by corrigendum required the entire procedural framework of Sections 28, 31 and 37 of the Act to be recommenced, thereby invalidating the land acquisition award.
  2. Whether failure to serve individual notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act rendered the award void.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Deletion of the reservation and its later restoration meant that status quo ante applied; therefore, fresh proceedings under Sections 28, 31 and 37 had to be undertaken. The award passed without those steps was void.
  • They were not served with the Section 9 notice under the Land Acquisition Act, making the award legally infirm.

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The corrigendum merely modified the purpose of reservation (from stables and a 100-foot road to “informal housing” and stables) and restored the earlier position; Section 127 of the Act permitted acquisition under the LAA without restarting the entire planning procedure.
  • Non-service of Section 9 notice, even if assumed, does not vitiate the award; the appropriate remedy is reference under Section 18 LAA.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's view, relying on the statutory framework rather than judicial precedents:

  • Section 127 of the Act empowers the State to acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act when it is required for a public purpose, even if that purpose differs from the original reservation. Once Section 4(1) and Section 6 notifications are issued, the “public purpose” becomes conclusive.
  • Because the corrigendum merely restored the reservation (now for “informal housing” and stables), the court held that no “substantial formalities” necessitated republication under Sections 28, 31, and 37.
  • Regarding notice under Section 9 LAA, the Court held that absence or failure of service does not invalidate the award. Instead, an affected party can seek a reference under Section 18 LAA for judicial determination of compensation.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; HIGH COURT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE.

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the acquisition award and directed the acquiring authority to entertain a Section 18 reference application from the respondents within six weeks, with the Land Acquisition Officer to make the reference to the competent civil court within two months. The decision restores the acquisition while giving the landowners an avenue to contest compensation; it sets no new precedent beyond reaffirming the statutory effect of Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act and the limited consequence of non-service of Section 9 notice.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 14-10-1994, made in WP No. 4023 of 1989. Proceedings were initiated under the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1966, (for short “the Act”), for framing a scheme and for acquisition of the land in that behalf. The Final Development Plan was made on 29-11-1980. Notification under Section 126(4) of the Act was published on 6-8-1987. It was published in the local newspaper on 18-7-1987 and in Village Chavadi on 25-9-1987. It would appear that subsequently, after Section 4(1) notification and declaration under Section 6 of the [Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894)] were published, notice was issued under Section 9 of the said Act on 16-9-1989. Award came to be passed on 22-9-1989. The respondents filed writ petitions on 25-9-1989. The award was published on 27-9-1989. It would appear that the Draft Plan was issued for reservation of certain lands for the public purpose and no objections were filed. In the meanwhile, by proceedings dated 26-12-1990, the same came to be deleted by publication of the notification on 28-6-1993 and Final Plan was published on 30-9-1993. On a representation made by the Corporation, the Government had issued a corrigendum on 19-8-1994 restoring the status quo ante with a slight modification. The High Court in the impugned order, while upholding the validity of the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, held that the award was not valid in law since there was a corrigendum issued by the Government. Consequently, the procedure provided under the Act was to be followed by operation of Section 37 of the Act. Thus these appeals by special leave.

3. Mr U.R Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, contends that once the reservation has been deleted, status quo ante stands restored. As a consequence, the entire process required under Section 28 and Section 31 read with Section 37 requires to be followed. In this case, that was not done. The High Court was right in quashing the award. We find no force in the contention.

4. It is true that if any scheme is modified and the Plan has become final, the procedure contemplated under Sections 28 and 31 read with Section 37 of the Act is required to be adopted. But in this case, it is seen that as per the corrigendum what has been modified is that the entire site is now reserved for “informal housing” and stable. Originally, the entire area was reserved for stables and 100′ wide road. The reservation was deleted earlier, as stated above, and western part was included in commercial zone and eastern part was included in the residential zone on the plan. In view of the fact that status quo ante of the final plan was restored, though a part of it is now said to be used for residential purpose, the question is whether the entire process of the issuance of the notice under Section 28 involving consideration of the objections and passing of the final plan after consideration is required to be gone through. It is seen that by operation of Section 127 of the Act where any land is included in any of the schemes as being reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified therein or for the purpose of Planning Authority or Development Authority or Appropriate Authority and the State Government is satisfied that the same land is needed for a public purpose different from any such public purpose or purpose of the Planning Authority, Development Authority or Appropriate Authority, the State Government may notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Sub-section (3) envisages that on the land vesting in the State Government under Section 16 or 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the case may be, the relevant plan or scheme shall be deemed to be suitably varied by reason of acquisition of the said land. Thus it could be seen that once a notification under Section 4(1) was published and the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act came to be published, the public purpose becomes conclusive and for any variation without substantial formalities, it is not necessary that the entire process of re-publication of the notification under Section 28, finding having been recorded under both Section 31 read with Section 37, requires to be followed. The view of the High Court, therefore, was not correct.

5. It is then contended by Mr U.R Lalit, that the respondents had not been given the information of the notification under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the award is bad in law. We find no force in the contention. In the absence of notice or failure to serve notice, the award does not become invalid. Due to the fact that immediately after the award and before the publication of the award, the writ petition came to be filed on 25-9-1980, we direct the appellants to make an application within six weeks under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act seeking reference. The Land Acquisition Officer is directed to refer the matter to the competent civil court for disposal within two months according to law.

6. The appeals are accordingly allowed but without costs.