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Kamta Tiwari v. State Of M.P .

Supreme Court Of India
Sep 4, 1996
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Factual and Procedural Background

Pinky, a seven-year-old girl from Bhutari Tolla, Budhar, went missing on the evening of 30-4-1995 after visiting the appellant’s television-repair shop. The appellant, known to the family as “Tiwari Uncle,” was last seen purchasing biscuits for her and leaving the area with her. Hours later, the child’s father, accompanied by neighbours, found the appellant returning home drenched and wearing only underwear. A missing-person report was lodged at 1 a.m. on 1-5-1995.

The police arrested the appellant on 2-5-1995. His disclosure led to recovery of Pinky’s body from a well and her blood-stained frock from a concealed location. Post-mortem findings confirmed rape and death by throttling. Medical examination of the appellant revealed injuries consistent with recent sexual activity. After investigation, he was charged under Sections 363, 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdol, and sentenced to death for murder along with lesser sentences for the other offences. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed his appeal. He then sought and obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the circumstantial evidence satisfied the legal standard to uphold the appellant’s convictions under Sections 363, 376, 302 and 201 IPC.
  2. Whether, applying the “rarest of rare” doctrine, the death penalty was an appropriate sentence for the murder under Section 302 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, AIR 1980 SC 898 Laid down broad guidelines for imposing the death penalty, emphasising that it should be reserved for the “rarest of rare” cases after weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Used as the foundational framework to assess whether death was warranted in the present case.
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470, AIR 1983 SC 957 Formulated specific propositions from Bachan Singh, including life imprisonment as the rule and death as the exception, and the need to balance aggravating and mitigating factors. The Court applied the Machhi Singh propositions to draw a balance-sheet of circumstances and concluded that aggravating factors overwhelmingly justified the death sentence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court independently scrutinised the evidence and concurred with the concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court. It found that each circumstantial link—last-seen evidence, recovery of the body and stained clothing on the appellant’s disclosure, medical evidence of rape and throttling, and injuries on the appellant—was conclusively proven and together formed an unbroken chain pointing solely to his guilt. The defence plea of false implication was rejected as incompatible with the established circumstances.

On sentencing, the Court invoked Bachan Singh and Machhi Singh, drawing up a balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating factors. It identified multiple aggravating elements: appellant’s position of trust, the victim’s tender age, the brutality of the rape and murder, and disposal of the body. Finding no mitigating circumstances, the Court categorised the matter as a “rarest of rare” case in which life imprisonment would be “altogether inadequate.” Accordingly, it upheld the death penalty as an emphatic societal response and a deterrent to similar crimes.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed; death sentence and all convictions affirmed.

Immediate effect: the appellant remains under a sentence of death and the subsidiary rigorous imprisonment terms. Broader implication: the judgment reinforces the “rarest of rare” doctrine, confirming that child rape-murder by a trusted adult warrants capital punishment when no mitigating factors exist.

Show all summary ...

M.K Mukherjee, J.— The appellant was tried for and convicted of offences punishable under Sections 363, 376, 302 and 201 IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdol. For his conviction under Section 302 IPC he was sentenced to death and for the other convictions to different terms of rigorous imprisonment. As the appeal preferred by him in the High Court was dismissed, he has filed the instant appeal after obtaining special leave.

2. Briefly stated the case of the prosecution is as follows:

(a) Parmeshwar Lal Sharma (PW 1) along with his wife and three children used to reside at Bhutari Tolla in the township of Budhar. Of the three children, Pinky (the deceased) was the youngest and her age at the time of her death was about seven years. The appellant who was also a resident of the same locality used to occasionally visit the family of Parmeshwar and his children used to address him as ‘Tiwari Uncle’.
(b) On 30-4-1995 at or about 6 p.m Parmeshwar had gone to a hair-cutting saloon in the local market along with his son Santosh (PW 4) and daughter Pinky. After Santosh and Pinky had their hair cut they went out of the saloon to play outside while Parmeshwar stayed back for his turn. After some time Pinky went to the television repairing shop of the appellant which was by the side of the saloon. The appellant was then playing ludo with Suresh Gupta (PW 8) in his shop. Pinky requested the appellant to give her some toffees and biscuits whereupon he took her to the nearby grocery shop of Budhsen Gupta (PW 3), purchased a packet of biscuits and gave it to her. Thereafter both of them left the shop of Budhsen.
(c) After his haircut when Parmeshwar came out of the saloon and enquired of his daughter, Santosh told him that Pinky had gone to the shop of the appellant and that he had given biscuits to her. On getting that information Parmeshwar along with Santosh went to the shop of the appellant but found it closed. They then went back to their house only to find that Pinky had not returned. Parmeshwar then went to the house of the appellant but he was not available there. Accompanied by his wife and other two children Parmeshwar then went in search of Pinky and in the course of the search they met Hari Krishna Soni (PW 10) and Subhash Chander Soni (PW 2) at or about 10.30 p.m on a crossroad near the shop of the appellant. As advised by them he sent back his wife and children home and again went to the house of the appellant accompanied by them. While they were waiting there they saw the appellant coming towards his house completely drenched. He was then wearing only an underwear with some clothes pressed under his armpit. When they enquired about Pinky he told them that after he had given the packet of biscuits to her she left. All three of them then went to Budhar Police Station at or about 1 a.m and reported that Pinky was missing.

(d) After recording the report in the station diary book (Ext. P-15.C) H.C Munna Prasad went in search of Pinky but could not trace her out. However, on the basis of the enquiry conducted by him Station House Officer Shri V.D Tripathi (PW 11) registered a case under Sections 363, 364 and 366 IPC (Ext. P-16) and took up investigation. On the following day, i.e, 2-5-1995 in the afternoon the appellant was arrested by Shri Tripathi and then interrogated in the presence of Hari Krishna and Din Dayal. On such interrogation the appellant disclosed that he had thrown the dead body of Pinky in a well and concealed her frock near a mahua tree. Shri Tripathi recorded the disclosure statement of the appellant (Ext. P-8) and then, led by the appellant and accompanied by the above two witnesses went to the well of one Ramjiyawan Lodhi and found the dead body of Pinky floating in the water. After Shri Tripathi took the photograph of the floating dead body (Ext. P-3) it was brought out of the well. He then prepared a recovery memo of the dead body (Ext. P-9) which was signed by the appellant as also the witnesses present there. Shri Tripathi held inquest thereupon, prepared a report in respect thereof (Ext. P-14), and then sent it for post-mortem examination. Pursuant to the statement made by the appellant, Shri Tripathi recovered a bloodstained frock (Article A) and seized it under a seizure memo (Ext. P-10).

(e) On the same day Dr K.K Gautam (PW 13) held autopsy on the dead body of Pinky and found a lacerated wound on the right side of the mouth, abrasions on both arms, contusion on the left knee, laceration on the labia majora with clotted blood, laceration on the posterior vaginal wall, hymen ruptured, labia majora and labia minora swollen and blood around the orifice of the vagina. Dr Gautam also found three contusions on the left side of the neck below the level of the thyroid with abrasions all around, brain and its membrane congested, hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage fractured with haemorrhage on the tissue around the fractures, the fourth rib on both the side fractured and uterus deeply congested and swollen. He opined that the deceased was raped and that the cause of her death was asphyxia owing to throttling. According to him all the injuries were ante-mortem in nature. Dr Gautam prepared a slide from the vaginal discharge of the deceased and arranged to send it for chemical analysis by the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) through the investigating officer.

(f) On the following day (3-5-1995) the appellant was sent to the Primary Health Centre for his medical examination. Dr B.N Sharma (PW 7), who examined him found one abrasion on his right knee and another on the glans penis but there was no smegma. In his opinion the appellant was competent to commit sexual intercourse and that the injury found on the glans penis could have been caused while committing rape on the girl of tender age. According to him the injury found on the knee of the appellant could have been caused while committing sexual intercourse with the victim lying on the bare floor of a room. Dr Sharma prepared a slide of semen of the appellant and along with his underwear sent the same for chemical analysis through Constable Kamla Prasad. The frock which was recovered in pursuance of the statement of the appellant and was identified by Parmeshwar as that of Pinky was also sent for such examination. On receipt of the reports of the FSL and completion of investigation Shri Tripathi submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant.

3. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against him and his defence was that he had been falsely implicated.

4. In the absence of any eyewitness the prosecution relied upon the following circumstances to establish the charges levelled against the appellant:

(i) In the evening of 30-4-1995 the deceased went to the TV repairing shop of the appellant when he was playing ludo with Suresh Gupta (PW 8) and asked him to give him some biscuits;
(ii) Accompanied by the deceased the appellant went to the grocery shop of Budhsen (PW 3), purchased a packet of biscuits and gave it to her;
(iii) At or about 8.30 p.m Purshottam Lal (PW 5) saw the appellant along with a girl aged about 6/7 years going towards the bus-stand;
(iv) Around midnight the appellant was found by Parmeshwar Lal (PW 1), Subhash Chander Soni (PW 2) and Hari Krishna Soni (PW 10) returning to his house completely drenched (which indicated that he had taken a bath) and wearing only an underwear with some clothes under his armpit;
(v) Pursuant to the statement made by the appellant on 2-5-1995 to Inspector V.D Tripathi (PW 11) in the presence of Hari Krishna Soni (PW 10) and others, the dead body of Pinky was recovered from a well and her frock from a place which was not accessible to all;
(vi) While conducting autopsy Dr Gautam (PW 13) found a large number of injuries on the person of the deceased, nature of which indicated that she had been raped and strangulated to death;
(vii) On examining the appellant on 3-5-1995 Dr Sharma (PW 7) found some injuries on his person which were about 72 hours' old and likely to have been caused while having sexual intercourse with a girl of tender age; and
(viii) Blood was found on the frock of the deceased and her vaginal smear and on the underwear of the appellant.

5. Both the trial court and the High Court detailed and discussed at length the evidence of all the witnesses who were examined by the prosecution to prove the above circumstances and held that each of the above circumstances stood conclusively proved and that those circumstances unerringly pointed to the guilt of the appellant.

6. We have also closely scrutinised the evidence and our such exercise persuades us to unhesitatingly hold that the concurrent findings entered by the learned courts below are unexceptionable. It is unnecessary therefore for us to burden this judgment with a repetition of the details of the evidence. It is of course true that the entire case is based on circumstantial evidence but the tell-tale circumstances all of which stand firmly established are not compatible with any other reasonable hypothesis except that the appellant kidnapped Pinky, committed rape on her, then strangulated her to death and to cause disappearance of evidence of the murder threw her dead body in a well. The conviction of the appellant for the offences under Sections 363, 376, 302 and 201 IPC must, therefore, be upheld.

7. That brings us to the question whether the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant by the trial court for his conviction under Section 302 IPC and confirmed by the High Court should be maintained or not. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, AIR 1980 SC 898 this Court indicated, while discussing the sentencing policy, the guidelines to be followed for imposing the extreme penalty of death. From the guidelines so indicated, this Court in its later judgment in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470, AIR 1983 SC 957 formulated the following propositions, which are to be applied when the question of awarding death sentence arises:

“(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the ‘offender’ also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the ‘crime’.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised.”

8. Taking an overall view of all the facts and circumstances of the instant case in the light of the above propositions we are of the firm opinion that the sentence of death should be maintained. In vain we have searched for mitigating circumstances — but found aggravating circumstances aplenty. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the appellant was close to the family of Parmeshwar and the deceased and her siblings used to call him ‘Tiwari Uncle’. Obviously her closeness with the appellant encouraged her to go to his shop, which was near the saloon where she had gone for a haircut with her father and brother, and ask for some biscuits. The appellant readily responded to the request by taking her to the nearby grocery shop of Budhsen and handing over a packet of biscuits apparently as a prelude to his sinister design which unfolded in her kidnapping, brutal rape and gruesome murder — as the numerous injuries on her person testify; and the finale was the dumping of her dead body in a well. When an innocent hapless girl of 7 years was subjected to such barbaric treatment by a person who was in a position of her trust his culpability assumes the proportion of extreme depravity and arouses a sense of revulsion in the mind of the common man. In fine, the motivation of the perpetrator, the vulnerability of the victim, the enormity of the crime, the execution thereof persuade us to hold that this is a “rarest of rare” cases where the sentence of death is eminently desirable not only to deter others from committing such atrocious crimes but also to give emphatic expression to society's abhorrence of such crimes.

9. The appeal is therefore dismissed.