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Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant instituted Partition Suit No. 24 of 1988 before the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Aurangabad, seeking partition of certain immovable properties. Respondents 16–20 filed a written statement on 15 June 1988 asserting ownership over part of the suit property on the basis of a registered gift deed executed by Ramdeo Singh on 28 July 1978. On 11 November 1992 the appellant moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to amend the plaint so as to include a prayer for a declaration that the said gift deed was obtained illegally and fraudulently and was therefore ineffective and non-binding.
The trial court allowed the amendment on 24 November 1992, but the High Court, in Civil Revision No. 1657 of 1992, set aside that order on 13 August 1993. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant should be permitted to amend the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to challenge the validity of the 1978 gift deed.
- Whether allowing such an amendment would defeat a right that had accrued to the respondents by the lapse of limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant lacked knowledge of the 1978 gift deed when the suit was filed.
- The proposed amendment does not alter the nature of the partition suit but merely seeks to avoid the gift deed that adversely affects the appellant’s rights.
- Granting the amendment would not prejudice the respondents because it is ancillary to the relief of partition already sought.
Respondents' Arguments
- The claim for declaration is barred by limitation: registration of the deed constituted notice to the world as early as 28 July 1978.
- The respondents specifically pleaded the gift deed in their written statement on 15 June 1988, yet the appellant waited until November 1992—well beyond the three-year limitation period—to seek declaratory relief.
- Permitting the amendment would deprive the respondents of a vested right accrued by efflux of time.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Laxmidas Dahyabhai Kabarwala v. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabarwala (1964) 2 SCR 567; AIR 1964 SC 11 |
Courts ordinarily refuse amendments that extinguish an accrued right by lapse of time; however, purely clarificatory amendments may be allowed. | The Court relied on the precedent to hold that, because acceptance of the amendment would defeat a limitation-accrued right of the respondents, the High Court correctly refused to permit the amendment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court acknowledged the general liberal approach toward amendments but emphasized the exception where an amendment would annihilate a right that has vested through limitation. Citing the ratio in Laxmidas Dahyabhai Kabarwala, the Court observed that:
- A registered deed constitutes constructive notice to all concerned from the date of registration (28 July 1978).
- Even after explicit reference to the gift deed in the respondents’ written statement (15 June 1988), the appellant delayed seeking amendment until 11 November 1992, well beyond the three-year period for a declaratory suit based on fraud or want of knowledge.
- Permitting the amendment would, therefore, extinguish the respondents’ limitation-accrued defense and upset the legal finality attached to the deed.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in setting aside the trial court’s order and refusing the amendment.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. No order as to costs.
The immediate effect is that the plaint will not be amended to challenge the 1978 gift deed, preserving the respondents’ limitation-accrued rights. The decision reinforces the principle that courts will deny amendments which, if allowed, would defeat vested rights obtained through the statute of limitation; it does not establish a new precedent but affirms existing jurisprudence on Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.
Order
1. We have heard learned counsel for both sides.
2. Leave granted.
3. The appellant has instituted Partition Suit No. 24 of 1988 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Aurangabad for partition of certain properties. Respondents 16 to 20 herein filed written statement on 15-6-1988 wherein they pleaded that Ramdeo Singh had executed and registered a gift deed in their favour on 28-7-1978 bequeathing the properties covered thereunder. They became owners of those lands and the appellant is bound by the same. Pending the suit, the appellant filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on 11-11-1992 seeking declaration that the gift deed was obtained by the respondents illegally and fraudulently and, therefore, it was ineffective and does not bind the appellant. Though the trial court by order dated 24-11-1992 allowed the petition, the High Court in Revision No. 1657 of 1992 by order dated 13-8-1993 allowed the petition and set aside the order directing amendment of the plaint. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
4. Shri S.K Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the appellant had no knowledge of the execution of the gift deed by Ramdeo Singh and by the amendment of the plaint, the appellant is not defeating the right of the respondents but is merely seeking to avoid the gift deed executed which was detrimental to the appellant's right, title and interest in the property. Therefore, the amendment does not alter either the character of the suit or the nature and the relief already sought, viz., partition of the property. Shri Sanyal, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, contended that the appellants had lost the right to seek the above declaration as being barred by limitation. The registration of the document is a notice to everyone claiming any right, title and interest therein; even otherwise, the respondents in the written statement filed on 15-6-1988 has specifically pleaded about the gift being made by Ramdeo Singh in their favour. Despite that, the appellant had not taken any steps till November 1992 by which time even the suit for declaration within the limitation of three years from the date of knowledge had got time-barred. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to amend the plaint which would prejudicially affect the rights of the respondents.
5. We find no force in the contention of the appellant. No doubt, the amendment of the plaint is normally granted and only in exceptional cases where the accrued rights are taken away by amendment of the pleading, the Court would refuse the amendment. This Court in Laxmidas Dahyabhai Kabarwala v. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabarwala (1964) 2 SCR 567, AIR 1964 SC 11 (SCR at p. 582) held thus:
“It is, no doubt, true that, save in exceptional cases, leave to amend under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code will ordinarily be refused when the effect of the amendment would be to take away from a party a legal right which had accrued to him by lapse of time. But this rule can apply only when either fresh allegations are added or fresh reliefs sought by way of amendment. Where, for instance, an amendment is sought which merely clarifies an existing pleading and does not in substance add to or alter it, it has never been held that the question of a bar of limitation is one of the questions to be considered in allowing such clarification of a matter already contained in the original pleading. The present is a fortiori so. The defendants here were not seeking to add any allegation nor to claim any fresh relief which they had prayed for in the pleading already filed.”
6. In that case this Court considered the cross-objections to be treated as a cross-suit since no alteration was being made in the written statement to treat it as a plaint originally instituted. The amendment which was sought to be made was treated to be clarificatory and, therefore, this Court had upheld the amendment of the written statement and treated it to be a cross-suit. The ratio therein squarely applies to a fact situation where the party acquires right by bar of limitation and if the same is sought to be taken away by amendment of the pleading, amendment in such circumstances would be refused. In the present case, the gift deed was executed and registered as early as 28-7-1978 which is a notice to everyone. Even after filing of the written statement, for 3 years no steps were taken to file the application for amendment of the plaint. Thereby the accrued right in favour of the respondents would be defeated by permitting amendment of the plaint. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to grant permission to amend the plaint.
7. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs.
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