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Ramesh Singh And Another v. Cinta Devi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
An accident occurred on 27-5-1988, giving rise to a compensation claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (“Old Act”). The claim petition was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on 23-12-1988. While the claim was pending, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“New Act”) came into force on 1-7-1989, repealing the Old Act.
The Tribunal disposed of the claim on 29-6-1992 (i.e., after the New Act commenced). The aggrieved party filed an appeal on 25-9-1992, invoking the appellate right available under the Old Act. The High Court dismissed the appeal for non-compliance with the monetary deposit mandated in the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act (requiring deposit of Rs 25,000 or 50% of the award, whichever is less). The present Supreme Court proceeding challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the claimant’s vested right of appeal, arising under the Old Act when the claim was instituted, survives the repeal of that Act by the New Act.
- Consequently, whether the appellant is obliged to make the pre-deposit required by the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act in order to maintain the appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of M.P., 1953 SCR 987; AIR 1953 SC 221 | A right of appeal is a vested right accruing on institution of the original proceeding and is not destroyed by subsequent legislation unless the new statute expressly or by necessary implication provides otherwise. | Relied upon as binding authority to hold that the appellant’s right to appeal without a pre-deposit was preserved. |
| State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., (1960) 3 SCR 640; AIR 1960 SC 980 | Reaffirmed that vested appellate rights survive repeal in the absence of express retrospection. | Cited to reinforce that the New Act does not retrospectively alter appellate rights. |
| Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. CST, AIR 1967 SC 344; (1961) 12 STC 219 | Endorsed the principle that procedural changes that affect vested rights of appeal cannot operate retrospectively without clear legislative intent. | Used to buttress the conclusion that the deposit requirement cannot be imposed retrospectively. |
| Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dhanram Singh, AIR 1990 All 104 | High Court decision holding that the New Act’s deposit requirement is inapplicable to claims instituted under the Old Act. | Cited as persuasive authority aligning with the view adopted by the Supreme Court. |
| Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai, AIR 1990 MP 354 | Similar High Court view that vested appellate rights under the Old Act are unaffected by the New Act’s proviso to Section 173. | Referenced to demonstrate existing judicial consensus contrary to the impugned High Court ruling. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first examined Section 217(4) of the New Act, which expressly preserves the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 stipulates that, unless a contrary intention appears, repeal of an enactment does not affect accrued rights or pending legal proceedings.
Applying this statutory framework and the trio of Supreme Court precedents (Hoosein Kasam Dada, Supreme General Films Exchange, and Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel), the Court held:
- An appellate right is a substantive, vested right that crystallises on the date the original proceeding is instituted (23-12-1988 in this case).
- The New Act contains no express language nor necessary implication to render Section 173’s deposit proviso retrospective.
- Therefore, the appellant’s appeal could be pursued under the Old Act without satisfying the new pre-deposit condition.
The High Court’s dismissal for want of deposit was thus legally unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside. The case is remitted to the High Court to hear the appeal on merits without insisting on any monetary deposit. No order as to costs.
Implications: The decision reaffirms that repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, does not extinguish or burden vested appellate rights arising prior to the 1988 Act. While it offers no novel principle, it clarifies uniform application of the established doctrine and removes the deposit hurdle for similarly situated litigants.
Order
1. Special leave granted.
2. The short question is: does a right of appeal accrue to a claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter called the ‘Old Act’, on the institution of a claim application in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, notwithstanding its repeal by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter called the ‘New Act’? In other words, does the right of appeal under the Old Act survive even after its repeal by the New Act? The brief facts are that an accident took place on 27-5-1988 which gave rise to a claim for a compensation under the Old Act. The claim application was filed on 23-12-1988. Thereafter the New Act came into force with effect from 1-7-1989. The claim application which was instituted under the Old Act was disposed of on 29-6-1992 after the New Act came into force. That gave rise to a right to file an appeal. The appeal was preferred under the Old Act on 25-9-1992. However, the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had not deposited the amount as required by the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act. Section 173 of the New Act, insofar as is relevant for our purposes, reads as under:
“173. Appeals.— (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court.”
Admittedly, the appellant had not deposited the amount as required by the said proviso. The High Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the appeal was not maintainable and dismissed the same. It is against the said order of the High Court that the present appeal is preferred.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have perused the relevant provisions of the Old Act as well as the New Act bearing on the question whether or not the appellant was required to make the deposit and we may state that the repealing clause, namely sub-section (4) of Section 217, preserves Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. We may at this stage reproduce Section 217(4) of the New Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
“217. (4) The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), with regard to the effect of repeals.”
“6. Effect of repeal.— Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not—
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.”
Suffice it to say that the New Act does not expressly or by necessary implication make the relevant provisions retrospective in character.
4. The High Courts of Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh have, vide Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dhanram Singh AIR 1990 All 104, 1990 All LJ 133 and Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai AIR 1990 MP 354, held that in such circumstances the appellant's right to appeal without being required to make the deposit under the first proviso to Section 173 of the New Act remains unaffected. However, the judgment impugned herein takes a different view. Hence there is a controversy which needs to be resolved.
5. In our view the point at issue stands squarely covered by three decisions of this Court reported in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of M.P 1953 SCR 987, AIR 1953 SC 221, (1953) 4 STC 114 (SCR at p. 991), State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. (1960) 3 SCR 640, AIR 1960 SC 980 and Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. CST AIR 1967 SC 344, (1961) 12 STC 219. In all these decisions the view taken is that unless the New Act expressly or by necessary implication makes the provision applicable retrospectively, the right to appeal will crystallise in the appellant on the institution of the application in the Tribunal of first instance and that vested right of appeal would not be dislodged by the enactment of the New Act. In other words, the appellant would be entitled to file the appeal without being required to make the deposit under the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act. The law, therefore, seems to be fairly well settled by the said three decisions of this Court.
6. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal against the award made by the Tribunal is set aside. The matter will go back to the High Court for disposal of the appeal in accordance with law without insisting on deposit of the amount. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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