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State Of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla .

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 19, 1996
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent was promoted to the post of Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, on 21 March 1990. Rule 10 of the Punjab State Cooperative Service (Class II) Rules, 1958, subjects promotees to a two-year probation, extendable up to a total of three years. Although the respondent’s initial probation should have ended on 25 November 1992, the Government repeatedly extended it. On 15 September 1993 a show-cause notice proposed his reversion to his substantive post. After considering his reply, the appointing authority issued an order on 11 February 1994 reverting him. The respondent challenged that order in CWP No. 11874/1994 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which allowed the writ petition on 14 September 1994, holding that failure to revert him within three years amounted to deemed confirmation. The State appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Rule 10 of the Punjab State Cooperative Service (Class II) Rules, 1958, creates an automatic or “deemed” confirmation when a probationer is retained for more than three years without an express confirmation order.
  2. Whether the State could lawfully revert the respondent after the three-year period had lapsed, relying on adverse performance remarks recorded during probation.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Rule 10 fixes an outer limit of three years for probation; therefore, if the Government neither reverts nor discharges a probationer within that period, the employee must be deemed confirmed.

Appellant State’s Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court rejected the “deemed confirmation” theory advanced by the respondent. Interpreting sub-rule (3) of Rule 10, the Court emphasised that:

  • The rule expressly requires a positive order of confirmation; mere continuation in service beyond three years does not convert a probationer into a confirmed employee.
  • The three-year ceiling is “enabling”—it permits the Government to retain a probationer up to that period without passing a confirmation order, but does not mandate confirmation at its expiry.
  • The appointing authority must evaluate a probationer’s work and conduct during probation; adverse remarks for 1991-1992 showed the respondent’s performance was unsatisfactory, justifying extension of probation and preventing confirmation.
  • Because the authority had granted an additional chance covering 1993-1994, it should now assess that later record and decide afresh whether confirmation is warranted.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISPOSED OF WITH DIRECTIONS

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s conclusion of deemed confirmation. It directed the appointing authority to reassess the respondent’s performance for 1993-1994 and either confirm him or pass a fresh reasoned order of reversion, communicating the decision to the respondent. The judgment clarifies that under Rule 10, confirmation is never automatic and always requires an explicit governmental order; however, it does not establish broader precedent beyond interpreting the specific service rule.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana made on 14-9-1994 in CWP No. 11874. The respondent was promoted as an Assistant Registrar of the Cooperative Societies by proceedings dated 21-3-1990. Rule 10 of the Punjab State Cooperative Service (Class II) Rules, 1958 enjoins that the promotee or direct recruit would be put on probation for a period of two years provided that the Government may allow service rendered on a post on an identical cadre or in the higher post in another department to count for probation in the said service. Rule 10 reads as under:

“10. Probation.—All members of the service shall on appointment remain on probation in the first instance for a period of two years, provided that Government may allow service rendered on a post on an identical cadre or in the higher post in another department to count for probation in the post in the service.
2. Provided further that in the case of members promoted from the State Service Class III continue officiating of four months or over shall be reckoned as a period spent on probation.
3. If the work or conduct of any candidate or member during the period of training or probation in the opinion of Government is not satisfactory they may dispense with his service if he has been recruited by direct appointment or may revert him to his former post if he has been recruited by promotion or by transfer. On the conclusion of the period of probation of any member of the service, Government, may, if vacancy exists, confirm him in his appointment; if his work or conduct has, in its opinion been satisfactory may extend his period of probation by such period as it may think fit and thereafter pass such orders as it could have passed on the expiry of the first period of probation, provided that the total period of probation, including extension, shall not exceed three years in any case.”

3. Though respondent had completed his probation on 25-11-1992, however, his probation was extended, in the meanwhile from time to time. On 15-9-1993, a show-cause notice was issued to him as to why he should not be reverted to the substantive cadre. On consideration of the reply to show-cause notice, order came to be passed on 11-2-1994 reverting him to the substantive post from which he was promoted. Consequently, he filed writ petition. The High Court has allowed the writ petition holding that since he was not reverted before expiry of 3 years, he must be deemed to have been confirmed and that, therefore, the reversion order was held bad in law. The High Court did not express any opinion on the adverse remarks commented upon the performance of the respondent. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that since the rule provides an outer limit of three years, if the respondent had not been reverted within that period, he must be deemed to have been confirmed and the High Court, therefore, was right in concluding that the respondent is a confirmed probationer. We do not find force in the contention. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10 clearly envisages that on conclusion of the period of probation of any member of the service the Government may, if vacancy exists, confirm him in his appointment; if his work or conduct has, in its opinion, not been satisfactory, it may extend his period of probation by such period as it may think fit and thereafter pass such orders as could have been passed on the expiry of his period of probation. It would thus be seen that the outer limit of three years provided under the rules is an enabling provision to allow the probationer to continue in service without being reverted or discharged from service for failure to satisfactorily complete the period of probation, but that would not mean that the probationer, on expiry of three years' period, must be deemed to have been confirmed. The rule itself envisages a positive order of confirmation. So long as the order of confirmation is not made, even after expiry of probation, the probationer may continue and remain in service, but by allowing him to remain in service it cannot be concluded that he must be deemed to have been confirmed.

5. The rule also envisages that during the period of probation, the appointing authority is required to see that the performance of the work done by the probationer is to the satisfaction of the appointing authority. It is seen that for the years 1991 and 1992 there were adverse remarks made upon the performance of the respondent. Obvious for that reason, his confirmation was not made. On the other hand, the period of probation was further extended as admitted by the respondent. Under these circumstances, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed. However, since the authorities had extended the period of probation and given him chance to improve his performance during the year 1993-94, that period was not taken into consideration before reverting the respondent from service. The appointing authority is, therefore, directed to consider whether he is fit to be confirmed, on the basis of his performance for the subsequent period and in case it considers that he may be confirmed, it would be open to them to pass appropriate orders. In case, even after consideration of the performance for the year 1993-94, his record is not found satisfactory, appropriate orders may be passed and communicated to the respondent.

6. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.