Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acqn., Vishakapatnam v. Smt. A. Mangala Gowri

Factual and Procedural Background

A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, by an order dated 28 June 1995, dismissed the appellants’ writ petition in terms of “minutes of order” tendered by counsel for the parties. The appellants contended that a statement in the first clause of those “minutes of order” was incorrect because the judgments referred to therein were inapplicable to their case. On that basis, they filed a Review Petition. The High Court, in the order under challenge, rejected the Review Petition as not maintainable on the ground that the 28 June 1995 order had been passed on the basis of the parties’ consent recorded in minutes of order signed by senior counsel. The matter came before the Supreme Court by special leave; notice indicated possible disposal at the SLP stage, and although served, the respondents did not appear.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether an order passed by the High Court “in terms of minutes of order” (signed by counsel) is a consent order rendering a review petition not maintainable.
2. Whether such an “order in terms of minutes” is appealable and capable of review, as distinct from an order passed “in terms of consent terms.”

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s basis for dismissing the Review Petition—namely, that the underlying writ dismissal order was a consent order—was incorrect. The Court explained the practice surrounding “minutes of order”: counsel may put statements in writing (often as a courtesy and longstanding practice) indicating, for example, that a judgment of the Supreme Court and a Full Bench judgment of the High Court cover the matter, leading to an “Order in terms of minutes.”

The Court clarified that signatures of counsel on “minutes of order” serve identification purposes so that the resulting order binds the parties represented. Such an order is characterized as an order b invitum and not a consent order. Consequently, it is appealable and may also be reviewed. The Court contrasted this with a different category: where the order is passed on “Consent Terms,” i.e., a statement expressly marked “by consent” above counsel’s signatures, leading the court to record “Order in terms of consent terms.” Only in that latter situation would the order properly be treated as a consent order in the manner assumed by the High Court.

On this reasoning, since the High Court treated the 28 June 1995 order as a consent order merely because it was passed in terms of minutes of order, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and directed that the Review Petition be reconsidered on its merits. The Supreme Court expressly stated that it expressed no view on the merits of the Review Petition.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER SET ASIDE; REVIEW PETITION RESTORED AND REMANDED.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order dismissing the Review Petition as not maintainable and remanded the Review Petition to the Bombay High Court to be heard afresh on merits. The Court clarified that condonation of delay in filing the Review Petition was not affected. There was no order as to costs. The decision’s direct effect was to reopen the review proceedings in the High Court; the Court expressly did not decide the substantive merits of the review and did not indicate that it was laying down any new precedent beyond clarifying the nature of an “order in terms of minutes” as distinct from an order “in terms of consent terms.”